



HETEROPHALLOCENTRIC BINARISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND PRAXIS

a postmodern analysis of gendered nation-states

Our language, intellectual history, and social forms are “gendered”; there is no escape from this fact and from its consequences on our lives [...] like it or not, in our present culture, our activities *are* coded as “male” and “female” and will function as such within the prevailing system of gender-power relations.

— Susan Bordo

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*Note: This document differs slightly from the “official” version.
A few lingering errors in typography, spelling and punctuation discovered after departmental review have been corrected.*

Abstract

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A Postmodern Analysis of Gendered Nation-States

Postmodern feminist social theorists question categories typically taken as self-evident truths. They frequently analyze knowledge claims through the deconstruction of cultural dualisms. Splintering binary constructs reveals the asymmetrical deontic judgments, stereotypes and status-functions inherent in gender and gender roles—it exposes power as the core precept. The analysis of dialectic logic in this paper conforms to the general feminist views of J. Ann Tickner, R. W. Connell, V. Spike Peterson and Joan W. Scott. Furthermore, gender is seen as an epistemological “node” of semi-fixed meaning, an anchor or reference point in the mapping of ontologies. Its hierarchical construction and inherent male bias is perpetuated by the masculinist hegemonic ideal. This intolerant and exclusionary ideal archetype of manly virtue peripheralizes alternative discourse. It defines and embodies the IR paradigms with clear preference for the masculine. These properties permeate all “levels of analysis” and invest collective notions of character and identity with gendered elements. Perceptions of the Other in the global arena are influenced by this inundation of associated gender meanings. Thus, nations can be thought of as masculine or feminine entities, based upon predominant cultural indicators such as nurturance (e.g., welfare expenditure), conflict resolution trends, military profiles and women’s participation. Understanding the nature of social reality, its construction, maintenance and perpetuation, prompts the investigation of how we perceive, interpret and comprehend reality. Human perception is saturated with meaning, which results from biologically innate intentional mental states and the input of socialization encoded in language. This project generally prescribes to John R. Searle’s ideas concerning (social) reality, intentionality and consciousness. It broadly equates higher conscious features, such as those expressed by language and complex belief systems, with Ned Block’s conceptions of access consciousness. Cognitive scientific insights are blended with the cultural software and normative arguments of Daniel C. Dennett, Geert Hofstede and others. The main objective is to reevaluate international relations in the context of the socially contingent construct gender. The implications for both the academic and political domains are profound, for its mechanisms allow for redefinitions of power, security, territoriality, sovereignty and other mainstream masculinist IR concepts. Thus, this study endeavors to bridge the gap between purely deconstructive, metalevel trends in IR theory and the need for a “post-postmodern” empirically relevant reconstruction that conveys the discipline forward.

Nicholas C. Zedlar

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Abbreviations

AI	ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE —THE REALM OF SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ATTEMPTS TO REPLICATE THE HUMAN MIND, USUALLY BY ELECTRONIC MEANS. THE NATURE OF COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS ARE CAREFULLY CONTEMPLATED. <i>SEE CS.</i>
CDC	CULTURALLY DERIVED CONSCIOUSNESS —THE BELIEF THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS CAUSED BY CULTURE; THIS POSITION DENIES BIOLOGICAL CAUSALITY AND IN THIS PAPER IS ASSOCIATED WITH DENNETT, NIETZSCHE, MARX AND ENGELS. THE TERM/ACRONYM IS MY OWN.
CFSP	COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY — <i>SEE EU.</i>
CEE	CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN [COUNTRIES]
CIC	COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
CNS	CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM —THAT PART OF THE VERTEBRATE NERVOUS SYSTEM WHICH IS ENCASED IN BONE AND SURROUNDED BY THREE MENINGEAL LAYERS. IT INCLUDES THE BRAIN, LOCATED IN THE SKULL, AND THE SPINAL CORD, LOCATED IN THE VERTEBRAL COLUMN.
CS	COGNITIVE SCIENCE —A MULTIDISCIPLINARY FIELD THAT STUDIES HUMAN MENTALITY, SYMBOL-MANIPULATION AND THOUGHT PROCESSES. IT IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH AI.
CSBM	CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES —MEASURES DESIGNED TO INCREASE OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITH THE AIM OF REDUCING THE RISK OF ARMED CONFLICT. IT IS ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH DISARMAMENT.
CSCE	CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE — <i>SEE OSCE.</i>
DAC	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE —ASSOCIATED WITH THE OSCE.
DoD	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE —CREATED BY CONGRESS IN 1949, IT IS PART OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE DEPARTMENT DIRECTS AND CONTROLS THE ARMED FORCES AND ASSISTS THE PRESIDENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE COMMANDS, OTHER AGENCIES INCLUDE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA), THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) AND THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY (DNA).
EFTA	EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION —FOUNDED IN 1960 BY AUSTRIA, DENMARK, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND AND THE UK TO REMOVE TRADE BARRIERS. SINCE ITS FOUNDATION, THE COMPOSITION OF EFTA HAS CHANGED AS NEW MEMBERS JOINED AND A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ACCEDED TO THE EU. FINLAND BECAME A FULL MEMBER IN 1987.
EMU	ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION —FROM AT LEAST 1970, REFERS TO THE EU'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH (1) A SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY, (2) A SINGLE MONETARY POLICY VIA AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (ECB) AND (3) INTENSIFIED COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY POLICIES.
EC	EUROPEAN COMMUNITY — <i>SEE EU.</i>
EU	EUROPEAN UNION —THE EU CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1951) AND WAS KNOWN AS THE EC EARLIER IN ITS DEVELOPMENT. PRINCIPALLY AN ECONOMIC, JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL UNION, THE EU MAY IN THE FUTURE INCORPORATE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE MILITARY DYNAMIC (CFSP) AS DESCRIBED BY ARTICLE V OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (1992). AT PRESENT THERE ARE 15 MEMBER-STATES WITH PLANS FOR CONTINUED EXPANSION.
Ex-Im	EXPORT-IMPORT [BANK OF THE UNITED STATES]
FCMA	FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE [TREATY] —FENNO-SOVIET TREATY SIGNED ON APRIL 6, 1948, WHICH CONTAINED VARIOUS ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CLAUSES WITH A PROVISION FOR MILITARY CONSULTATIONS. SUBSEQUENTLY RENEWED IN 1955, 1970 AND 1983, IT WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS A PILLAR IN COLD WAR FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY.
FIM	FINNISH MARK, [SUOMEN MARKKA IN FINNISH] —THE NATIONAL MONETARY UNIT OF FINLAND PRIOR TO JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON CURRENCY. DURING THE PERIOD OF

THIS STUDY, THE EXCHANGE RATE WITH THE U.S. DOLLAR FLUCTUATED FROM APPROX. 4.3 FIM AT THE BEGINNING TO 5.5 FIM AT THE END.

- FINEFTA** **FINLAND-EFTA ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT**—SIGNED MARCH 27, 1961 BY EFTA MEMBER STATES (AUSTRIA, DENMARK, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND AND UNITED KINGDOM) AND FINLAND AS AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMATION OF A FREE-TRADE AREA. ENTERED INTO FORCE JUNE 26, 1961.
- FUSEEC** **FINLAND-U.S. EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE COMMISSION**—THE HELSINKI-BASED ORGANIZATION THAT ADMINISTERS THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS GRANT IN FINLAND AND COORDINATES OTHER BILATERAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES AND ACTIVITIES FOR FINNISH AND AMERICAN STUDENTS.
- FYROM** **FORMER YUGOSLAVIAN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**
- GA** **GEBERGSARMEE**—GERMAN WORLD WAR II MILITARY UNIT.
- GDP** **GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT**—THE VALUE OF THE TOTAL FINAL OUTPUT OF GOODS AND SERVICES PRODUCED BY A NATION WITHIN A GIVEN PERIOD, USUALLY A YEAR. DOES NOT INCLUDE GOODS AND SERVICES PRODUCED BY DOMESTIC FIRMS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (UNLIKE GNP, WHICH COUNTS FOREIGN ACTIVITY). TO GET A TRUER PICTURE OF GEOGRAPHIC NATIONS, GDP IS MORE COMMONLY USED THAN GNP IN RECENT YEARS.
- GNP** **GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT**—*SEE* GDP.
- GPS** **GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM/SATELLITE**—THE DoD'S 24 SATELLITES IN SIX CIRCULAR PATHS 20,200 KM (10,900 NM) ABOVE THE EARTH, WHICH PERMIT LAND, SEA AND AIRBORNE USERS TO PLOT THREE-DIMENSIONAL POSITION, VELOCITY AND TIME WORLDWIDE.
- HM** **HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY**—ALTERNATIVELY MASCULINIST HEGEMONY.
- HTML** **HYPERTEXT MARK-UP LANGUAGE**—THE STANDARD FORMAT ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB (WWW), WHICH ALLOWS WEB BROWSERS TO DISPLAY A PAGE'S TEXT, FONTS, GRAPHICS, ANIMATION AND OTHER MEDIA.
- IR** **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**—IN GENERAL TERMS, THIS REFERS TO WORLD POLITICS AND THE STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, ACTORS, INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND PHENOMENA OPERATING IN THE GLOBAL ARENA. THIS MAY REVOLVE AROUND ISSUES OF POLITICAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL OR OTHER CONSEQUENCE.
- ISSS** **INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**—PART OF THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE SINCE 1990, THE ISSS PLANS AND ORGANIZES INTERNATIONAL STUDY PROGRAMS, COORDINATES EXCHANGES AND OFFERS B.A. AND M.A. LEVEL DEGREE COURSES.
- MAS** **MASCULINITY INDEX**—ONE OF THE FOUR AXES GEERT HOFSTEDE USED IN HIS IBM STUDY TO CHARACTERIZE MASCULINITY-FEMININITY AS A NATIONAL CHARACTER TRAIT OF 50 COUNTRIES AND 3 REGIONS. ALSO KNOWN AS ACHIEVEMENT-NURTERANCE INDEX.
- ME** **MILITARY EXPENDITURE**
- MEP** **MEMBER OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**—ALSO KNOWN AS EURO-MP.
- MFN** **MOST FAVORED NATION**
- MP** **MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT**
- NATO** **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**—NATO WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE 1949 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, OR TREATY OF WASHINGTON. AS OF THIS WRITING THERE ARE 16 MEMBER-STATES WITH PLANNED CONTINUED EXPANSION.
- NGO** **NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION**
- NNWFZ** **NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE**
- ODA** **OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**
- OECD** **ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT**—*SEE* OEEC.
- OEEC** **ORGANISATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION**—ORIGINALLY WITH 18 MEMBERS, THE OEEC WAS FORMED ON APRIL 6, 1948. IT EMERGED FROM THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE CONFERENCE OF SIXTEEN, WHICH SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT ORGANISATION FOR POST-WAR RECOVERY AND AID DISTRIBUTION. IN SEPTEMBER 1961 IT WAS SUPERCEDED

BY THE OECD WITH THE ADDITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. TODAY IT IS CONCERNED WITH ECONOMIC AND TRADE MATTERS.

OOF **OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS**

ORBAT **ORDER OF BATTLE**—THE SIZE, ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF A GIVEN MILITARY FORCE.

OSCE **ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**—A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATION NOW WITH 55 PARTICIPATING STATES. CREATED IN THE EARLY 1970S AS THE CSCE, IT IS A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT UNDER CHAPTER VIII OF THE UN CHARTER AND SEEN AS A PRIMARY INSTRUMENT IN EUROPE FOR EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION. IT BECAME THE “OSCE” IN 1994.

PfP **PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE**—ASSOCIATED WITH NATO

PM **PRIME MINISTER**

TAPRI **TAMPERE PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**—THE INSTITUTE WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE FINNISH PARLIAMENT IN 1970 AND MANDATED TO UNDERTAKE PEACE RESEARCH. IT WAS INDEPENDENT UNTIL AUGUST 1, 1994 WHEN IT BECAME PART OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE.

URL **UNIVERSAL RESOURCE LOCATOR**—COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE “WEB ADDRESS” WHERE ELECTRONIC MEDIA (TEXT FILES, HTML DOCUMENTS, AUDIO AND VIDEO FILES, PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC.) CAN BE FOUND AND ACCESSED ON THE INTERNET BY USE OF A BROWSER.

USSR **UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**—ALSO REFERRED TO AS THE SOVIET UNION.

WMD **WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION**—GENERALLY REFERS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT IS APPLICABLE TO ANY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL OR RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) WEAPON INTENDED TO INFLICT LARGE-SCALE CASUALTIES AND/OR ENORMOUS MATERIAL DAMAGE.

Preface

a. Timeframe and funding

This research is the product of an on-going project begun in conjunction with grant applications before August 1995. The work was completed in two main phases.

Phase One was funded by full Fulbright grant administered by the Finland-U.S. Educational Exchange Commission (FUSEEC) from August 1, 1995 through May 31, 1996. Studies began with the International School of Social Science's (ISSS) summer sessions from August 7-18, 1995. Independent research was undertaken in association with the University of Tampere and the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in preparatory anticipation of Phase Two. In addition to initial travel and baggage allowances, the monthly rate was 5,900 Finnish marks (FIM).

Phase Two began with acceptance into the ISSS's International Relations and European Studies Master's Program on July 29, 1996. Study began that September and ended in June, 1998. It was funded by Finnish government stipend from October 4, 1996 through May 31, 1998 at an average monthly rate of 1,448 FIM (eight months at 1,540 FIM and 12 months at 1,386 FIM). Housing assistance later augmented the educational stipend. It peaked at 80 percent of rent at 1,610 FIM per month.

Summary. The Finnish university system is financed exclusively by state funds and does not demand tuition fees from students as is standard in American educational institutions. However, an obligatory student union fee is levied, which entitles the student to virtually free medical/dental care and legal advice. This annual fee of 439 FIM is paid by over 10,000 students in Tampere each year. In pursuit of this degree, total student union fees came to 1,137 FIM. Combined financial assistance—not counting discounted meals, transport or domicile allowances—was 53,100 FIM for the first nine months and 28,952 FIM over the next 20 months. The combined total was 82,052 FIM from August, 1995 through May, 1998.

b. Acknowledgments

I thank the taxpayers of Finland for financing my studies; my fellow students for their helpful comments; the insightful instruction of my lecturers and advisors; and especially my dear wife Tiina for her loving support, tireless patience and apparently near-infinite capacity for long-suffering during the god-awful torture of writing this thing.

A guide through this paper

a. Structural brief

This thesis deviates from the standard formula of about 20 percent devoted to theory/methodology and some 80 percent reserved for empirical analysis. The reason for this is simple: the very nature of the postpositivist approach *questions all that comes before it!* This requires an in-depth critique of existing structures, deconstruction of their meanings and assumptions and a total rewrite of the fundamental sub-assemblies of modern international relations theory. The vast depth and breadth of these questions demand a thesis-sized endeavor to *begin* to do it justice. Cracking the bedrock beneath paradigmatic skyscrapers is no easy task—but, hey, the bigger they are, the harder they fall, right?

This said, the reader will soon come to see that the bulk of this thesis sets out to do the things outlined in the paragraph above. It starts from scratch and incrementally builds a social constructivist argument. Throughout, it stresses the centrality of meaning, interpretation, intentionality, identity and ultimately *gender* in the behavior of international players. It investigates the implications of these elements to IR theory and practice, stressing possibilities for change and alternatives to the mainstream.

Section Six is an empirical case-study intended to briefly demonstrate the practical applicability of the metalevel theory which precedes it. This section is merely a quick illustration, a “prototype” of gender as reconstructive and analytical category, if you will. Therefore, the reader is admonished not to expect too much from the empirical “Maiden Finland” section in terms of hoping to see an extensive application of a “gendered states” approach. I leave that to other scholars. So conceptualized, I imagine this paper as a bridge between vague deconstructive postmodern feminist theories and further, more developed versions of refined, reconstructive and gender-based empirical applications.

Metaphorically speaking, the reader may view this paper’s structure cinematographically, as a series of orchestrated camera movements and angles, lens changes and carefully planned shots to *tell a story*. Theoretically, the director (me) could choose to record, cut, splice and present these images to the viewer (you) in a million different ways. No two stories are exactly the same; every storyteller’s take is a bit different. This said, the main body of this paper is divided into seven sections.

Sections 1-5 are part of a collage of wide-angle shots. They are devoted to metalevel analyses and represent a sweeping scrutiny of the epistemological topography. It builds a cultural constructivist argument, beginning with such topics as sense modalities, consciousness, intentionality, norms, language, socialization, cognition, perception, meanings, binarism, reality-mapping and gender.

Section 6 is the close-in zoom shot followed by the wide-angle transition to the conclusion. It hosts the paper's empirical application of gender as a reconstructive analytical category in international relations. Historically sketched, the extended metaphor of "Maiden Finland" is evaluated in gendered terms. Four time periods—the inter-war League period, World War II, the Cold War and present day—have been chosen to demonstrate distinct gender transitions in Finland's history. These are linked with overall deontic expectations in IR, gendered national character issues and the general nature of evolving 20th century gendered state relations.

Section 7 represents the paper's return to a distant horizon shot. Conclusions here are discussed in terms of the grander scheme. Fade out.

b. Contributing viewpoints

The table below shows the major, but not all, positions synthesized into this research.

Author	Perspective
Block	dual conception of consciousness (A- and P-consciousness)
Chalmers	cognition and consciousness
Connell, Tickner	postmodern feminist approaches to binarism, gender and hegemonic masculinity
Dennett	culturally derived consciousness and the link with language
Farrell	deontic properties of gender from the "Men's Movement" point of view
Giddens	normative influence and socialization
Hofstede	cultural programming, software of the mind and the Masculinity Index
Pringle & Watson	cultural nodes
Searle	consciousness, (non)institutional facts, status-functions, intentionality, systemic recursion

c. Navigation help

Section 1: Introduction. This section provides a background to the main features of the international relations discipline. It covers the paradigms in the historical context of the "great debates" and chronicles the substance, players and chronology of the body of IR theory. In addition to political realism (classical and neo-), institutionalism (idealism) and behavioralism, this section introduces postpositivist critiques, their tenets and main contributors as part of the "third debate."

Section 2: Research Design, Method and Preconceptions. This section is concerned with the research problem, orientation (locating the research on the methodological and epistemological map) and the main questions, issues and aims of the study. Included is a brief topical literature review, which shows "holes" in the current research corpus. This section addresses the "level of analysis" consideration in IR and states the contribution of the research to the field. It also covers the paper's basic ontological and metatheoretical assumptions. These concern ontological objectivity,

conceptual relativity, the nature of perception, facts, truth, science and postmodern perspective in social scientific inquiry. Also discussed are the concepts of brute and institutional facts and their direct relevance to postmodernism.

Section 3: Sense Modalities, Cognition and Consciousness. This section discusses sense modalities, our tangible connection to the world, eliminating sense and limb as the deciding factors separating humanity from the animals. It also introduces the reader to consciousness, awareness, perception, ontologies, meaning and Block's P- and A-consciousness. This section further investigates the definitions and origins of consciousness, including the perspectives of physicalism, culturally derived consciousness and cultural software. Some views include those of Searle, Descartes, Durkheim, Nietzsche, Marx, Engels, Hofstede and Dennett. This section concludes a biological basis for consciousness. In addition, it briefly highlights the contributions of cognitive science and artificial intelligence in understanding human cognition and perception. This section finds the key features to be intentionality, meaning and the resolution of human mental states. It then continues the discussion of intentionality and meaning. The language-consciousness connection with meaning-constituting systems is associated with Searlean status-functions. The concepts of "global activation" and collective intentionality are introduced, expanding on A-consciousness. This section concludes that language contributes to consciousness, but does not cause it; it broadens the palette of sophistications, but does not preclude it.

Section 4: Social Reality: Meaning and Mapping. This section expands the topic of access consciousness, meaning and culture. Specifically, norms and enculturation are examined via input from Alasuutari and Giddens. The main thrust of this section concerns social constructivism: social reality is what we make it. This section also deals with how we construct and map social reality and sees much of our constructions as relative and changing. However, partially fixed "nodes" are used as reference markers. They exhibit a binary nature and are deconstructed by postmodernist metatheorists. This section further delves into the hierarchical construction of cultural dualisms. It offers biblical examples of binarism and properties associated with race and construction of identity through the Self-Other diametric.

Section 5: Gender Theory and International Relations. This section mentions that identity is at least partly a gendered construct. It debates the confusion between sex and gender and dispels sociobiology as the preferred approach. Sex is considered an *a priori* brute fact, gender is seen as a social construct. Psychology, normative influence and studies of sexual "aberration" are offered in support of this argument. Feminist and "Men's Movement" views on masculinist hegemony and deontics are discussed, ending with the position that gender is a fundamental, pervasive and universal nodal binary. Beyond gender construction, this section evaluates its history in international relations discourse, its relevance and viability as a category of social scientific analysis and its standing in postmodern feminism. This section also investigates masculinist hegemony and the marginalization

of alternative discourses, feminist critiques of realism and international relations, feminist multidisciplinary approaches and feminist redefinitions of power, security and territoriality. It continues with an outline of gender as a pervasive feature of social reality. Next come a review of Hofstede's Masculinity Index (MAS) and a discussion of feminine and masculine cultural traits contributing to gendered national character/identity. This section concludes with country profiles of Finland and the U.S. by MAS criteria, such as development aid contributions, military expenditure, weekly work-hours, social welfare commitments and the quantitative station of women in politics.

Section 6: Maiden Finland in a Masculinist World. This section describes the main features of 20th century Finnish international relations history, from the collapse of the League system to introduction of the EU's common currency. Throughout the roughly chronological narrative, I evaluate using gender stereotypes, roles and deontics as explanatory factors.

Section 7: Conclusions and Final Remarks. This section wraps up the paper with words on the empirical and metatheoretical.

1.0. Introduction

1.1. Overview

Postmodern critiques challenge the validity of paradigmatic ontological assumptions. “Paradigm” in this sense generally refers to Thomas Kuhn’s use of the term.¹ In the tradition of hermeneutics, postmodernists investigate meaning, meaning-constituting systems and their interrelations. In contrast to hermeneutics, however, they also scrutinize issues of “power, its rituals, its dramas, its modes of representation,” not just significations.² Relational thinking is a central tenet. This paper is inspired by, and borrows from, such a tradition.

In keeping with this tradition, if we buy the notion that nothing institutional can exist without people, then how we perceive, interpret and represent reality to ourselves individually and collectively is central to any inquiry into the social and cultural world. If this is so, then it follows that the origin, nature and features of sense modalities, perception, cognition and consciousness (specifically intentional mental states) are directly relevant.

Other biological considerations aside, this is particularly the case when we consider the supposition that the physiological structure and traits of the central nervous system (CNS) and human brain conduce the existence and maintenance of higher-order consciousness. To our knowledge, this defining element distinctly separates us from all other creatures and, in the final analysis, makes the whole shooting match of institutional facts (including society, science and knowledge themselves) possible.

It becomes apparent that the reliance on meaning to interpret the world is not only a uniquely human trait, but also essential in any discussion of human behavior in a cultural context. It is believed that certain features associated with sophisticated intentional mental states afford this ability. Consciousness can be thought of as two-tiered: phenomenal (P) and access (A). Phenomenal consciousness is associated with sense modalities and qualia. Access consciousness, on the other hand, is more closely linked with intentionality and is thus meaning-laden. It is also associated with the symbol-manipulation properties of cognition, which appeal to cognitive scientists and AI researchers for obvious reasons.

The essential features of consciousness are spontaneously and intrinsically caused by and realized in the human brain and CNS. This physicalist point of view holds that consciousness, therefore, exists independently of culture and does not require culture for its maintenance or

¹ Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind—Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival*, London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1991, pp. 247-248. [Hofstede] Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) wrote of the rejection and ridicule “normal” science’s paradigms heap onto new discourses.

manifestation. However, the fire of consciousness burns brightest in its social context, where it demonstrates greater depth in culture, through language and by way of other collective activities, processes and structures. The link between intentionality and culture is fundamental, necessary and reflexive.

This paper discusses some of the numerous and varied perspectives on causality and the structure of the consciousness-language-culture dynamic. This will include normative, linguistic, rule-governed and “cultural software” behaviorist theories; neurobiological considerations; phenomenology and the roles of individual and collective intentionality.

Although humanity is biologically endowed with intentionality (which precurses culture), normative influence, social interaction and sociocultural institutions such as language and complex belief systems awaken and sophisticate certain conscious latencies. Consciousness is seen as making culture possible, but not the reverse. In other words, this thesis prefers a biological thesis and resists Daniel Dennett’s assertion that consciousness is culturally derived. However, it concurs on causality for some higher-order A-conscious traits. This “global activation” is a function of collective intentionality and socialization from the “cultural stock of knowledge.” It instills frames of reference, perceptual frameworks and ways of interpreting and representing the world. This “systemic recursion” is a mutually symbiotic and recursive relationship—each affects and is affected by the other.

Intentionality and the capacity for language characterize A-conscious features and inject meaning into conscious experience. They also reduce the relative role of biology and thus derail overriding sociobiological claims to causality and explanation of human behavior. In accordance with this point of view, the majority of sense modalities, qualia, autonomic responses, base passions and instincts are thus diminished. Favored instead are matters of mapping and orienteering in reality. This is particularly true of collective intentionality.

To a greater degree than Searle does, this paper stresses the plausible impact of socialization, normative influences and meaning-constituting systems in shaping our relationship with, and perception of, reality.³ Although consciousness itself is not derived of culture, *meanings and meaning webs are*. Various ways of interpreting the import of these meanings in “mapping” reality will be addressed, including those expressed by Searle, Giddens, Derrida and Foucault.

Understanding the nature of reality-mapping through its dualisms is a valuable tool for social scientists. Indeed, investigating this avenue reaps its own rewards for international relations. Such

² Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War—The Discourse of Politics*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990, p. 5. [Dalby]

“inherited frameworks” lie at the heart of traditional, particularly realist, IR concepts: i.e., the security dilemma, territoriality, sovereignty, autonomy, Us-Them separation and stereotypes. This is so, because reality-mapping underpins ontologies, orders worldviews and to some degree plots prospective behaviors. It deals with the creation, interpretation, maintenance and perpetuation of meaning-constituting systems—essentially how we represent reality. Representations of reality—or institutional (Class A) facts—require human agreement for their creation and maintenance. These are distinguished from brute, non-institutional (Class B) facts, which exist independently of human intentionality. On the other hand, Class B facts, unlike their “real world” counterparts, are characterized by assigned status-functions.⁴

Through deconstruction,⁵ many feminists feel that web of associated status-functions manifests in binary oppositions, or cultural dualisms, which are hierarchically constructed. This structure is seen as necessarily and inherently a relationship based on disparate power distribution and male bias. Binaries vary temporally and spatially at the micro (individual) and macro (cultural) levels. However, this variance is not uniform. Some binary pairs called “nodes” are ontological anchors or reference points. They are characterized by relatively semi-rigid and fairly consistent meanings over time, as described by Laclau & Mouffe and Pringle & Watson. Metaphorically, they functionally parallel global positioning satellites as time and space reference markers. This thesis proposes that “man” and “woman” (Man-Woman binary) are two such nodes.

Many feminists see gender as a universal, pervasive feature of social reality. They maintain that attached status-functions, or value judgments, tend to prefer masculine qualities throughout a wide spectrum of cultural frames. The bias is ingrained and often subtle, but is at least as real and significant a social force as racism, ageism, xenophobia, homophobia or other forms of systemic discrimination. It also constitutes one side of the tripartite analytical categories of race, class and gender. Recognizing that gender is tethered to the brute features of sex differences, most feminists reject sociobiology, the belief that biology is the primary causal agent for the social natures of men

³ “External Reality,” *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at URL www.utm.edu/research/iep on July 31, 1997. [External Reality] There are three traditional philosophical views on human perception: *direct realism* (the world is as we perceive it), *representationalism* (the world causes our experiences and cannot exist outside our perception) and *phenomenalism* (we can only know phenomena, not their causes).

⁴ This is, according to Searle, the difference between a fact and a fact stated or between the empirical and a representation of it. A mountain is an independent, brute fact; whether one perceives it or contemplates it is irrelevant to its existence. Calling that tall, rocky thing a “mountain” is a representational act. It is partly a matter of subjective interpretation, as others may label it a mere “hill.” Further assigned status-functions may consider the mound of rock, soil and snow to be the dwelling place of gods and therefore holy. This is clearly moving along the Class A-Class B axis towards the more subjective and arbitrary, though ultimately both are tied to an empirical point of origin. Section 2 addresses this in detail.

and women. Instead, they maintain that the nodal marker gender—perhaps the most fundamental node of them all—is a more significant indicator, as it normatively prescribes behavior and dictates attached meanings. Unlike sex, which is seen as an *a priori*, naturally determined brute fact, gender is considered an *a posteriori*, culturally contingent construct. As such, it is largely subjective—some say arbitrary—and need not reflect any empirical attributes.

Thus, in the view of postmodern feminists, gender is essentially malleable and can be changed. Many feminists seek to reveal and undermine a system which prefers and favors men and the masculine over that of women and the feminine in its web of correlate status-functions. Also, although people are certainly not only gendered beings, gender is a major constituent element in the conceptualization and construction of identity (Self-Other). It ranks among the most rudimentary of binaries. We define others and ourselves through a complex and interlocking system of deontics. These are defined partly by independent experience and partly by normative processes, socialization and cultural influence of one form or another. Behaviorists would say that that one's actions and conduct can be at least partly understood in these terms.

Collectively, these notions comprise part of how peoples and nations define, view and represent themselves, other peoples and nations. Thus, in the modern state system, nation-states can be thought of as masculine or feminine entities, based upon predominant cultural indicators. These indicators provide for profiles of nurturance predilections, conflict resolution trends and the quantity/quality of women's participation, role in decision-making and societal impact.

For this reason, postmodern gender theorists believe that all elements of social life are understood in gender terms. Consequently, gender is seen as a fundamentally useful, albeit underutilized, reconstructive vehicle and category of social scientific analysis. This applies to IR as well. Yet to date the discipline has staunchly resisted gender-based or gender-sensitive research. In this study, the constructs⁶ of gender roles and obligations (as outlined by Warren Farrell in *The Myth of Male Power*) are central.

Finally, the utility of gender as analytical category to the discipline of IR is discussed. In particular, this refers to the decidedly heterosexual and power-based nature of discursive practices.

⁵ This paper does not address the feminism-deconstruction relationship, but does assume analytical compatibility. For an excellent discussion of this correlation, see Diane Elam, *Feminism and Deconstruction—Ms. en abyme*, London and New York: Routledge, 1994. [Elam] Also, I do not use the term "deconstruction" in the strict Derridean sense. I merely refer to those approaches which seek to investigate the fundamental "latent discursive commitments" of other theories—as Moira Gatens does in "Power, Bodies and Difference" in Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips (eds.), *Destabilizing Theory—Contemporary Feminist Debates*, Great Britain: Polity Press, 1992. [Gatens]

⁶ "Construct," *Principia Cybernetica Web* at URL pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/CONSTRUCT.html on October 9, 1997. "A hypothetical variable or system which does not purport to accurately represent or model given observations but has a heuristic or interpretative value concerning them. *Constructs* may be (1) ideal types... [or] (2) hypothetical entities, processes or mechanisms which would explain the connections between observed causes and consequences if those entities, processes or mechanisms existed."

These practices relegate alternative discourses⁷—usually in the forms of perceived diminished masculinity (i.e., homosexuality) and femininity—to the margins. This entails a discussion of *masculinist hegemony* (as described by Connell, Scott and Tickner), traditional and alternative definitions of power and a fundamental reevaluation of the realist worldview. Further analysis focuses on gender and identity, gender deontics, and the interplay between international actors seen as gendered entities.

1.2. The great IR debates

As K. J. Holsti points out in *The Dividing Discipline* (1987), international relations approaches—regardless of their particular orientation or flavor—find that they share some central concerns. Namely, these issues revolve around:

- (1) the reasons behind war and conflict;
- (2) the conditions for peace, security and order;
- (3) the nature of power and its application;
- (4) the essential actors and/or units of analysis; and
- (5) images of the world, system or society of states.⁸

That’s a lot of territory to cover—too much territory for a single Master’s thesis. Any wide, in-depth survey of the international relations, its contributors, tenets and history lies well bound the reasonable bounds of this paper. However, a brief and general summary is necessary to understand the evolution of the field and the reasons, standing and motivations behind poststructuralist contributions to the discipline’s so-called “third debate.”

Countless efforts have attempted to systematically categorize the plethora of IR viewpoints. For this reason, I will not get sidetracked with the specifics of each and every feature of every school of thought. What follows is a skeletal and quick narrative of the predominant theoretical frames in contemporary IR. Note that this is a grossly simplified and decidedly limited view; it is not intended to represent a comprehensive scan of the field. Considering the space and time limitations imposed upon this paper, a useful point of departure is to launch into a chronological developmental account, as Steve Smith suggests. Since IR’s birth as a separate discipline in 1919,⁹ John Vasquez, Hedley Bull and other big names in the field consider IR’s history to be one of three stages, or transitions, known as the “great debates.” These take the following forms:

⁷ David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data—Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*, London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1994, p. 78. More than simply the formal discussion or collection of reasonings about a particular subject, *discourse* herein also refers to “the articulation and disarticulation of the ensemble of signs and sign-systems.”

⁸ K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline—Hegemony and Diversity in International Relations Theory*, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987, p. 8.

- (1) **the first debate** is associated with idealism, which predominated in the 1920s and early 1930s, and realism, which came to the fore in the late 1930s and 1940s;
- (2) **the second debate** is associated with realism and behavioralism in the 1950s-1960s; and
- (3) **the third debate**, which currently occupies the discipline, is characterized by fragmentation, diversity and multiplicity.

As regards the third debate, this explosion of critical perspectives is difficult to categorize. Naturally, this has given rise to numerous interpretations of its nature, structure and consequences. Whereas Mahroori and Ramberg consider the transition of that from state-centric realists to transnationalists, Yosef Lapid sees the move from positivism to postpositivism.¹⁰ Bayliss and Rengger clarify methodological questions associated with neo-realism and institutionalism.¹¹ Let's examine the major points in detail.

Realism. Realist literature dates back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz.¹² The realist paradigm "in one form or another is dominant in context, if not name." It is associated with positivism and is relatively pessimistic. It rejects intuitive and deductive points of departure in favor of inductive, empirical and objective approaches. The central tenets of realism are national interest, power maximization and the balance of power.¹³ According to Hans J. Morgenthau, "political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature."¹⁴ Niebuhr and Wight, for example, agree. Others blame conflict on "malign individuals," such as the Hitlers of the world, or a perceived "anarchical nature of the international system." Waltz and Gilpin believe the latter.¹⁵ Neo-realism, a derivative school, employs more normative-based positivistic methodologies. It tends to focus on the structure of the international system as delimiting the parameters for actions, but not determining those actions. However, it does not fundamentally deviate from classical realism, in the sense that it assumes the same basic definitions of power and security.

Major contributors to classical realist literature include such Americans as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, Nicholas Spykeman, George Kennan, Walter Lippman, Arnold Wolfers and Henry

⁹ Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory" in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp. 11-14. [Smith, 1995] This considers the David Davies founding of the Woodrow Wilson Chair at the Aberystwyth as the birth of IR.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 12-18.

¹¹ John Baylis and N. J. Rengger, "Introduction: Theories, Methods, and Dilemmas in World Politics" in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics—International Ethics in a Changing World*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 15. [Baylis & Rengger]

¹² Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate" in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International Relations—A Handbook of Current Theory*, London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985, p. 13.

¹³ Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science" in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds.), *The Study of International Relations—The State of the Art*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989, pp. 13, 16. [Smith, 1989]

¹⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations—The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985.

¹⁵ Baylis & Rengger, p. 11.

Kissinger; such Britons as E. H. Carr, Georg Schwarzenberger and Martin Wight; and the Frenchman Raymond Aron. Scholars of the neo-realist breed include Americans Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Robert Art, Stephen Krasner and Stephen Walt and Britons Barry Buzan and Steve Smith.¹⁶ Smith also mentions regime theorist Robert Keohane in conjunction with neo-realism.¹⁷

Idealism. On the other hand, institutionalism, or “idealism” as dubbed by E. H. Carr,¹⁸ seeks to “overcome the egoistic instincts and attitudes” which define realism. As John Herz writes:

Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological one but a *social* one.¹⁹

Proponents of idealism see collective security and not the balance of power as the avenue to peace.²⁰ They envisage reconcilable human goals and the possibilities of cooperation through constructed institutional mechanisms. As Hollis and Smith write, “[h]ence it is often seen as primarily normative, in contrast to a more scientific Realism.”²¹ Some of the tenets of idealism include democracy, harmony of interests, rationality, and the depoliticization of political science (pragmatism). It is frequently characterized by descriptive, formal and legalistic views of static structures. The mainstream often considers it to be subjective and optimistic, for it believes in a fundamental “good.” It focuses on values and policy prescriptions. However, idealism does not challenge the underlying realist paradigm, in particular its state-centric assumptions.²² Big names in idealism include Americans James Shotwell, Ernst Haas and David Mitrany and Britons Alfred Zimmern, David Davies and Philip Noel-Baker.²³

Behavioralism. This approach born in 1955 has been characterized as a “crusade for empiricism and scientific procedures.”²⁴ Borrowing from the natural sciences, it is primarily concerned with methodological questions. As such, it seeks to infuse the discipline with positivistic and quantitative tools for explaining observable human behavior. For this reason, it advocates breaking down the barriers between specialized scientific fields. Yet behavioralism, like idealism, does not fundamentally dispute realism’s views on the state. Significant scholars associated with behavioralism are David Singer, Hedley Bull, Morton Kaplan and Richard Snyder.²⁵

Postpositivism. At the beginning of the 1990s, neo-realism and institutionalism in their

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 12.

¹⁷ Smith, 1989, p. 8.

¹⁸ Baylis & Rengger, p. 12.

¹⁹ John H. Herz, “Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma” in *World Politics*, Volume II, Number 2, January, 1950.

²⁰ Baylis & Rengger, p. 13.

²¹ Hollis & Smith, p. 11.

²² Banks, p. 11.

²³ Baylis & Rengger, p. 13.

²⁴ Banks, p. 11.

²⁵ Smith, 1989, pp. 11-12, 20.

various manifestations constituted the two dominant classes of theoretical approaches in IR.²⁶ The third debate's transition, as described by Lapid (outlined below), revolts against the strict categories and grand theories which precede it. The four primary distinctions within the poststructuralist movement are:

- (1) **critical theory**, which considers the subjective nature of knowledge (contributors include Robert Cox, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater, Jürgen Habermas and Mervyn Frost);
- (2) **historical sociology**, which views the overlap of IR and sociology (contributors include Michael Mann, Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol);
- (3) **feminist approaches**, which focus on the construction of gender (contributors include Cynthia Enloe, Jean Elshtain, Christine Sylvester, V. Spike Peterson and Ann Sisson Runyon); and
- (4) **postmodernism**, which attacks assumptions concerning reality, truth, identity, etc. (contributors include R. B. J. Walker, James Der Darian and David Campbell).²⁷

Baylis and Rengger, on the other hand, offer a dual model composed of *critical interpretive theory* (analogous to the critical theory category above) and *radical interpretivism*, which follows in the poststructuralist footsteps of Foucault and Derrida (a rough chart of poststructuralist IR branches demonstrating this can be found later in this section). Feminist perspectives fall under this category. In addition to those listed above under the postmodern grouping, Baylis and Rengger add Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro, Ole Wæver, Bradley Klein and Hayward Alker.

1.3. Postpositivism: challenging confines

Considering the paradigm. The postpositivist critique of IR discourse²⁸ does not, in general, clearly “favour or advantage one international relations paradigm over the other.” However, postpositivists do hold some essential criticisms of IR, namely its absolutist, hegemonic and static nature. They find fault with IR's “ahistorical attempts to posit universal truths about the international system and the behavior of its member states.”²⁹ Postpositivist perspectives maintain the crucial importance of challenging ontological confines embodied in paradigmatic approaches. On this basis, they attack the notion of singular, overarching, all-encompassing theories that implicitly claim or *posit* universal applicability, uniform human behavior and absolute global Truth.

Michel Foucault is widely regarded as the prime mover of such ideas. His legacy as a leading

²⁶ Baylis & Rengger, pp. 15-6.

²⁷ Smith, 1995, pp. 24-25, and Baylis & Rengger, pp. 16-17.

²⁸ Joan W. Scott, “Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism” in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds.), *Conflicts in Feminism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 135-138. [Scott] In Foucauldian fashion, *discourse* refers to “a historically, socially, and institutionally specific structure of statements, terms, categories, and beliefs,” which in the post-Enlightenment period overlap in a conflicting and competing hierarchical system of truth claims visible in social relationships, institutions and organizations. These hierarchical structures are discussed in subsequent sections.

postmodernist has been profound and multifaceted. Most significantly he initiated the battle cry against “metanarratives,” universalist megatheories and their *knowledge claims*. Most feminists see knowledge as historically and socially constructed, thus reject this notion of a universal abstract rationality under objectivity³⁰—an “unmediated foundation for knowledge.”³¹ Zalewski and Enloe point to the static nature of paradigmatic thinking and its inability to cope with diversity.³²

Partly for this reason, poststructuralists regard paradigms as exclusionary and *hegemonic*,³³ because they “impose... a coercive, hierarchical, and conformist pattern on scientific inquiry”³⁴ and “constrain the thinking of the scientists in the field.”³⁵ Thus poststructuralists, along with constructivists in general, feel that “the role of the theorist should not be to invent and impose further meaning, but to deconstruct and expose impositions.”³⁶ As an alternative to a system of “privileged discourses that deny and silence competing dissident voices,”³⁷ Vasquez suggests picturing IR in different terms. This entails visualizing the discipline as varied conceptual frameworks that should be “integrated” and “synthesized,” not as a collection of contending theories vying for supremacy.³⁸

Postpositivists question, reevaluate, deconstruct and reconsider the primacy of mainstream research orientations. It is vital, in their opinion, that paradigmatic ontologies themselves not be unquestionably ingested as given, self-evident and unchallenged bastions of unmitigated truth.³⁹ The assumptions inherent in these knowledge claims may then be systematically taken apart, dissected and studied. As V. Spike Peterson explains

Postpositivism is essentially (re)examining categories and classifications, their relationships and meanings, and how these shape our “understandings” and perceptions of “reality.” The “crucial point of the post-positivist critique is rejecting transcendental, decontextualized criteria for assessing epistemological, ontological or

²⁹ J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations—Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 21. [Tickner, 1992]

³⁰ V. Spike Peterson, “Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations” in *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, Volume 21, Number 2, London: Millennium Publishing Group, London School of Economics, Summer 1992, p. 84. [Peterson]

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³² Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, “Questions about Identity in International Relations” in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 301.

³³ Dalby, pp. 9-10 *Hegemony* in critical social theory can be considered “analogous with domination and control” and “is often used to refer to ideological formulations that are widely accepted and used to structure social and political life.”

³⁴ Tickner, 1992, p. 36.

³⁵ Hofstede, p. 262.

³⁶ John A. Vasquez, “The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Inquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment’s Fall” in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 224. [Vasquez]

³⁷ Jane L. Parpart and Marianne H. Marchand (eds.), “Exploding the Canon: An Introduction/Conclusion” in Jane L. Parpart and Marianne H. Marchand (eds.), *Feminism/ Postmodernism/Development*, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 2-3.

³⁸ Vasquez, p. 234.

³⁹ Michèle Barrett, “Words and Things: Materialism and Method in Contemporary Feminist Analysis” in Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips (eds.), *Destabilizing Theory—Contemporary Feminist Debates*, Great Britain: Polity Press, 1992, p. 207. [Barrett] Barrett points specifically to criticisms of “‘Enlightenment’ thought, or philosophical ‘liberalism’: the doctrine of rationalism and the ‘Cartesian’ concept of a human subject.”

normative claims, and therefore establishing the necessity of taking responsibility for the world(s) we make. In contrast to visions of nihilism, this understanding of post-positivism reminds us that we never had anything other than historically contingent 'foundations'; thus post-positivism does not render us worse off (for losing nonexistent foundations) but more accountable (for the foundations we construct). Post-positivism does not deny socially constituted foundations, only the illusion of transcendental ones.⁴⁰

Furthermore, dominant discourse may even be circumvented, minimized and eliminated if need be, through "a minimalist standard of rationality," as Mary Hawkesworth suggests.⁴¹ Indeed, as Nicos Mouzelis indicates:

Actors often distance themselves from rules and resources, in order to question them, in order to build theories about them, or—even more importantly—in order to devise strategies for either their maintenance or their transformation.⁴²

Anthony Giddens remarks, however, that this distancing itself cannot occur independently of the rules and resources under scrutiny, because, as he puts it, "there can be no stepping outside of the flow of actions."⁴³ This in mind, humanity may well be incapable of representing reality without some degree of "filtration." Ironically, even the very task of analyzing such activity is so affected. For example, in his response to comments by Kuhn, Karl Popper wrote of truth and science that:

It [scientific knowledge] may be regarded as a system of theories on which we work as do masons on a cathedral. The aim is to find theories, which in light of critical discussion, get nearer to the truth. Thus the aim is the increase of the truth-content of our theories (which, as I have shown, can be achieved only by increasing their content).⁴⁴

One could say that increasing content means taking nothing for granted. In fact, it attempts to follow Mouzelis' wise recognition that, however fruitless it may appear to detractors, at least *attempting* to step outside ontological boundaries is a step in the right direction by expanding knowledge. Even so, as Vasquez points out, Popper's principle of falsification ultimately relies upon established decision rules or criteria by consensus, which are essentially normative.⁴⁵ This reifies the

⁴⁰ Peterson, pp. 189, 204.

⁴¹ Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, "The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory" in *Alternatives—Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers for the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, the International Peace Research Institute Meigaku, and the World Order Models Project, Volume 16, Number 1, Winter 1991, p. 75. [Runyan & Peterson] Originally in Mary E. Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing and Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth" in *Signs* 14, Spring 1989.

⁴² Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method—A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociology (2nd ed.)*, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1993, p. 3. [Giddens, 1993b] For original reference, see Nicos Mouzelis, *Back to Sociological Theory: the construction of social orders*, London, 1991.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Karl Popper, "Normal Science and its Dangers" in Imre Kakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, (proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, volume 4), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 57. See also Popper's "A Theorem on Truth-Content" in P.K. Feyerabend (ed.), *Mind, Body, and Method*, Grover Maxwell, 1966.

⁴⁵ Vasquez, p. 228.

postpositivist/postmodern position that science cannot be considered separate from the rest of the sociocultural matrix. The feminist IR writer V. Spike Peterson confirms that:

In fact, most contemporary scholars acknowledge that the process of inquiry is socially embedded and that absolute distinctions between subject and object and between fact and value cannot be sustained... I am arguing against and attempting to demonstrate the persistent effects of thinking and living dichotomously... Post-positivism is not a rejection of everything preceding it but an insistence on seeing "objects," and the boundaries constituting them, in relation. This insistence on relational thinking acknowledges continuities as well as contradictions.⁴⁶

Tickner makes the excellent point that, if our descriptions of reality affect how we perceive and act upon our environment, then new perspectives may add to alternative courses of action.⁴⁷ As we will see later, this has profound implications for international relations. For now, John A. Vasquez outlines five basic tenets of postmodernism:

- (1) modernity is arbitrary, inherently denying traditional notions of Truth and Progress;
- (2) multiple truths result from conscious and unconscious human choices;
- (3) reality is a recursive social construct born of human beliefs and behavior;
- (4) social science is not value-free or neutral; it is both shaped by and shapes reality; and
- (5) identity is fundamentally a power question, an imposition of culture.⁴⁸

There is something of a philosophical paradox here, a logical inconsistency or self-contradiction. If postmodernism argues multiplicity and relativity as the very nature of society and that science innately mirrors this state of affairs, then it makes a universal claim. True enough (Peterson did admit "contradictions"). However, in a real sense, by lobbying for multiplicity and plurality, it argues on behalf of all positions, all points of view, and all knowledge claims. Its position is not by default *exclusionary*. In any case, the bottom line is that no viewpoint should be held so dear, that it blinds its adherent to alternative discourse. Postpositivism advocates a more open mind, more tolerant disposition and more receptive stance.

Multidisciplinary philosophy. Finally, poststructuralism's propensity for challenging confines and seeking reconciliation in the sciences fosters interdisciplinary approaches. Feminism's transdisciplinary and critical orientations⁴⁹ make it a rich resource. Borrowing from many natural and social science traditions produces a dynamic cocktail of fresh approaches and critiques of mainstream ideologies. Overall, feminism wants to "open up discursive space," while advocating diversity in a

⁴⁶ Peterson, p. 183. Some of the theoretical "contradictions" she refers to are dealt with below in subsequent sub-sections. Also note that she gives examples of binary pairs (e.g., subject-object and fact-value), referring to "dichotomies." These cultural dualisms are discussed in detail in later sections.

⁴⁷ J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation" originally in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Volume 17, Number 3, London: Millennium Publishing Group, London School of Economics, Winter 1988, pp. 429-440, reprinted in James Der Darian (ed.), *International Theory—Critical Investigations*, London, 1995, p. 60. [Tickner, 1995a]

⁴⁸ Vasquez, pp. 217-223.

⁴⁹ Peterson, p. 197

state of simultaneous opposition to the dominant culture.⁵⁰ Peterson explains feminism's collective composition and mission thusly:

Feminist scholarship is not monolithic, but tremendously diverse in range and orientation, due in part to its transdisciplinary nature. In addition, feminists are, by definition and conviction, engaged in critical studies, analyzing and resisting status quo masculinism and gender hierarchy... Since it is transdisciplinary and critical, feminism presupposes a commitment to transgressing boundaries. As a result, feminist scholarship offers many resources for rethinking "givens," redrawing boundaries, and re-envisioning our horizons: it has unique and significant contributions to make to the third debate in international relations.⁵¹

Giddens points out "monopolized" divisions have become cemented in educational socialization. The resulting "intellectual division of labour" has curtailed communication between the sciences and reduced the likelihood of transcending the barriers.⁵² He says these divisions gain identity from internal and external activities: political science with governmental mechanisms and IR with the external.

Since Giddens equates societies with nation-states, this means that as "the dominant focus of investigation of sociology, the nation-state remains essentially untheorized in sociological discourse." Indeed, as this sociological discourse filters into traditional IR, its new ways of looking at old problems, fresh approaches and alternative methodologies are often seen as threats to the *status quo*, as Kuhn suggested. The crux of this phenomenon is best summed up by Giddens, who is right to say that:

However we might think it best to conceptualize nation-states, they are obviously territorial and political formations, not the particular province of one discipline, be it sociology, political science, or economics.⁵³

⁵⁰ Runyan & Peterson, p. 72.

⁵¹ Peterson, p. 191.

⁵² Hofstede, p. 248. Hofstede likens this to the Indian fable of blind men studying an elephant. None have access to the "big picture," because they do not communicate and pool their observations. One man thinks a leg is a tree, another is convinced the tail is a rope.

⁵³ Anthony Giddens, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*, Worcester, Great Britain: Billing & Sons Ltd., 1987, pp. 25, 33, 38-39. [Giddens, 1987]

2.0. Research Design, Method and Preconceptions

2.1. Problems and premises

Background. This research ponders matters associated with international relations. As such, it is interested in collective human social behavior, which entails investigating the nature, structure and properties of social reality and its constitutive institutional facts. Our perception of reality and the manner in which we create, perpetuate and maintain representations becomes a central question. What cognitive and conscious features make this possible? What role does intentionality play in meaning and meaning-constituting systems? What is the underlying structure of knowledge, its interconnections, normative disposition and associated status-functions? How is this relevant to identity and gender? What are the wider implications of gender's inherent asymmetry?

Main Questions. How can gender as analytical category illuminate the field and prompt new theoretical and practical avenues in international relations? In particular, this refers to the utility of seeing nation-states as gendered entities. This hypothesis involves:

- (1) revealing hegemonic masculinity and masculinist bias in “malestream” science;
- (2) analyzing the deontic properties and status-functions of gender and gender roles;
- (3) investigating national character and identity issues as contributing to gender perception;
- (4) redefining mainstream assumptions such as power, territoriality, sovereignty, etc.; and
- (5) postulating the changing and evolving nature of gender roles and gender relations.

Although somewhat problematic and difficult to reconcile with postmodern/postpositivist methodologies, this paper undertakes to tackle questions of gender on two levels: the metalevel and the empirical level. On the metatheoretical level, this study seeks to explicitly challenge the fundamental premises of mainstream positivist international relations discourse. This applies in particular to the dominant paradigm realism and other discourses that share its masculinist assumptions. On the empirical level, the objective is to briskly demonstrate ideographically—through case-study Finland—the feasibility and viability of employing gender as a *reconstructive tool* and *category of analysis* in international relations.

Literature Review. It's been said that international relations is one of the last social science fields “to be touched by gender analysis and feminist perspectives.”⁵⁴ Despite a centuries old feminist literary tradition, according to Pringle and Watson, feminist theorists began to tackle the state only as late as the 1970s.⁵⁵ The first conferences on gender and international relations wouldn't take place for

⁵⁴ Tickner, 1992, p. 8.

⁵⁵ Rosemary Pringle and Sophie Watson, “Women's Interests' and the Post-Structuralist State” in Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips (eds.), *Destabilizing Theory—Contemporary Feminist Debates*, Great Britain: Polity Press, 1992, p. 57. [Pringle & Watson] Initial feminist critiques operated within Marxist frameworks.

yet another decade.⁵⁶

Connell admits that, to date, “almost no one has seen it [the state] as an institutionalization of gender. Even in feminist thought the state is only just coming into focus as a theoretical question.”⁵⁷ Consequently, a survey of the field indicates a relatively small, but growing, body of gender-sensitive and gender-based IR literature. Likewise, it appears that no explicit, detailed investigation of deontic expectations and prescriptions at the macro level exists. That is to say that at present research into nation-states as categorically gendered has not filtered into the corpus of IR theory.

To be sure, a variety of feminist and non-feminists perspectives hint at this type of research. Others contribute critiques that are relevant, but do not directly tackle the state or the international system. Most deal with individual, micro-level analyses or non-IR sociological forays. Many intimate—often between the lines—that such data may be useful to the international sphere, yet they themselves do not venture there.

The most compelling quantitative study is that of Geert Hofstede in *Cultures and Organizations* (1991), in which the author compares, contrasts and plots countries on four axes. One of these is the “Masculinity Index,” or “MAS.” Although Hofstede himself admits that the wide-scale applicability of the study is limited, the results are a fascinating glimpse into collective perceptions of gender as a component of identity, national character and international behavior.

Hofstede’s research is largely a cultural study with business applications in mind and is not directly international relations-oriented *per se* in the traditional academic sense. The work is wholly relevant, however, and is considered a primary source for obvious reasons. Furthermore, it injects a quantitative basis to the mostly qualitative research milieu of this paper.

Elsewhere, several IR gender analyses have been consulted. These are mostly feminists, many of the postmodernist variety. These include R. W. Connell’s *Gender and Power* (1993), Diane Elam’s *Feminism and Deconstruction* (1994) and J. Ann Tickner’s *Gender in International Relations* (1992). Other feminist authors include Brenda Almond, Alison Assiter, Susan Bordo, Michèle Barrett, Nancy Fraser, Moira Gatens, Morwena Griffiths, Nancy Hartsock, Linda J. Nicholson, V. Spike Peterson, Ann Phillips, Rosemary Pringle, Ann Sisson Runyon, Joan W. Scott, Sylvia Walby, Sophie Watson and Margaret Whitford.

Some of the aforementioned appear in anthologies, such as Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips’ (eds.) *Destabilizing Theory* (1992), Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford’s (eds.) *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy* (1988), Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller’s (eds.) *Conflicts in Feminism* (1990) and Linda J. Nicholson’s (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism* (1990). Still

⁵⁶ Tickner, 1992, p. xii in “Preface.” Tickner particularly cites conferences in conjunction with the London School of Economics (L.S.E.).

others are found in international relations periodicals such as *Millennium*.

The main thrust of most of these is deconstruction of gender as a binary construct to expose hidden power relationships and male bias—in other words, the liabilities of feminine deontics. Warren Farrell's *The Myth of Male Power* (1996) balances these feminist claims of disadvantage and discrimination against his gripping and detailed descriptions of masculine deontics. His book is concerned with normative and functional questions on a societal level and the changing nature of gender and gender relations. Like the feminist literature mentioned above, it does not ponder gendered nation-states. However, the deontic analysis tells the other half of the feminist story and thus provides a more complete picture of gender, gender roles and expectations.

Justification. Clearly, there are holes in the current theoretical landscape as pertains to gender and international relations. The sparse literature selection in the field reflects this. In response, this research undertakes to fill those voids by doing what the others have only alluded to, overlooked, avoided or only cursorily argued at the abstract level. To this end, I specifically employ gender as an analytical category/reconstructive tool and evaluate it as a binary construct, as outlined by Tickner, Scott and others. Furthermore, I fuse it with the deontic discussions of Farrell and the national character/cultural differences of the Hofstede study.


The brief empirical part personifies my disillusion with deconstruction as the apparent *end*, rather than a *means* to an end. Deconstructive approaches have successfully trickled into mainstream IR over the past 30 years or so. They plunked away at the armor of the great paradigms and left them standing naked. Sure, they *tore down*, but they never *built* anything. They convincingly showed the flaws and problems associated with that which came before, but they failed to offer equally cogent practical alternatives. Recognizing that change in science is slow and incremental, it is nonetheless time to move on to the next stage. This paper attempts to do so.

Also, in contrast to the majority of current hermeneutic approaches, this research chooses to regard intentional consciousness and cognitive concerns, rather than language, as its primary point of departure. On this basis, the background argument melds several viewpoints not found synthesized elsewhere in the literature. This entails reconciling John R. Searle's thoughts on social reality, intentionality and consciousness from *Minds, Brains and Science* (1984) and *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995) with Ned Block's conceptions of phenomenal and access consciousness, discussions of cognition by David J. Chalmers and others, and cultural software and normative arguments of Daniel C. Dennett and Geert Hofstede.

⁵⁷ R. W. Connell, *Gender and Power—Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*, Great Britain: Polity Press, 1993, pp. 125-126. [Connell]

2.2. Orientation and level of analysis

Orientation. At its core, this paper borrows from the philosophical legacies of Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Virilio. In particular, it incorporates from feminist postmodernism and poststructuralism the tool of deconstruction. Deconstruction entails reexamining the building blocks of cultural knowledge in order to unlock its underlying structures. These are generally considered to be binary and gendered, and therefore inherently hierarchically constructed. As such, postmodern feminists seek to unravel and reveal the hidden, asymmetrical webs of cultural values and normative prescriptions that constitute cultural dualisms. The following chart, based on the delineations of IR discourse outlined in the previous section, shows where this paper rests on the methodological map of the discipline.



As the reader can see, it is a postpositivist fusion of postmodernism and feminism: postmodern feminism. Postmodernism’s deconstruction of social reality is blended with feminist arguments explicitly concerned with gender. Therefore gender is analyzed in the context of socially contingent constructs. As introduced in the previous section, another tenet is multidisciplinary strategy. Postmodernism recognizes that the “division of labor” among the various specialized fields is itself a constructed conceptual scheme, which often unnecessarily hinders and splinters the search for truth.

Accordingly, this research crosses several dividing lines—social constructivism, cognitive science, feminist deconstructive theory, philosophy of the mind, social interactionism, normative theory, linguistics, semiotics and so forth. Thus this research itself can be seen as an embodiment of postmodern methodological application. If positivism erected the walls at Jericho, postpositivism hopes to blow horns loud enough to cause them to tumble down.

This subject requires quite a bit of preparatory work and systematic investigation of human perception, social constructivism, intentionality and meaning. In fact, questions surrounding gender, its creation and maintenance as an institutional fact, the nature of gender roles and stereotypes and their relevance to international relations are the main questions which absorb the metalevel of this research. As a result, the analysis of postmodern feminism’s deconstruction of gender is reserved for

the final part of Section 4 and will not be discussed at this juncture.

Level of analysis. Today, in planning and structuring the methodological and theoretical orientations to apply to research such as this, it is customary in IR to ponder the “level of analysis” question. Although the roots of this “problem” originated in the 1950s as a result of the behavioral movement’s impact on international relations, it wasn’t articulated until 1961 by J. David Singer. Other IR contributors have included Kenneth N. Waltz and Morton A. Kaplan.⁵⁸ This entails the research focus on “top-down” (system-to-unit) or “bottom-up” (unit-to-system).

Debate	Level of Analysis
	international system
first debate	vs. nation-state
second debate	vs. bureaucracy
third debate	vs. individual

Postmodern feminists such as Jean Elshtain and Christine Sylvester question the validity and necessity of the whole question.⁶⁰ These levels of analysis are seen as mutually reinforcing constructs.⁶¹ So, to a postmodern analyst, it seems rather ridiculous to choose one level over the other. These levels are recursive; they are part and parcel of the same phenomenon, for gender assumptions and judgments permeate them all. Sylvester ponders what the “costs in knowledge” are incurred by an IR that rigidly “corrals its research into discrete levels of analysis.”⁶²

Still, if one insists on speaking of levels of analysis, this paper can accommodate to some degree. According to David Silverman, qualitative research (such as this thesis) “can claim to tell us about ‘macro’ structures, using the analysis of ‘micro’ interaction as a first step.”⁶³ If one chooses to see it thusly, this paper attempts to do just that. It presupposes that deconstructing embedded and

⁵⁸ Barry Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered” in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp. 199-200. [Buzan]

⁵⁹ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 7. [Hollis & Smith] See also J. D. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds.), *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 7-9.

⁶⁰ See Jean Bethke Elshtain, “International Politics and Political Theory” in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, and Christine Sylvester, “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International Relations” at URL csf.colorado.edu/is/ftgs/femir.html on April 30, 1998. [Sylvester]

⁶¹ Tickner, 1992, p. 131.

⁶² Sylvester.

⁶³ Silverman, p. 25. This was adapted from M. Hammersley, *Reading Ethnographic Research: A Critical Guide*, London: Longmans, 1990.

constructed gender identities, roles, deontics and stereotypes *individually* reveals much about their *collective* counterparts (and *vice versa*, for that matter). Giddens has suggested that:

is there not a long distance between “everyday practices,” the situated interaction of individuals, and the properties of the large-scale, even global social systems that influence so much of modern social life? How could the former [micro] in any way be the medium of reproduction of the structural properties of the latter [macro]? One response to the question would be to say that, [... for example,] the way in which a man looks at a woman may be a constituting element of engrained structures of gender power. The reproduction/transformation of globalizing systems is implicated in a whole variety of day-to-day decisions and acts.⁶⁴

This reflects the core assertion of Searle’s bottom-up/top-down causality, which I refer to as “systemic recursion.” This idea of mutual symbiosis and interleaved micro-macro structures/processes is a recurring and central element of this paper’s theoretical framework. In this vein, for the purposes of this study, ontology (the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being) is understood in its *collective* form, which refers to how social facts exist at the macro level.⁶⁵ This does not deny *individual* ontologies (in fact it tacitly addresses them), but sees them as reflexively caused by and constitutive of the global structure. This follows John Searle’s opinion that:

Since all the surface features of the world are entirely caused by and realised in systems of micro-elements, the behaviour of micro-elements is sufficient to determine everything that happens. [This] ‘bottom up’ picture of the world allows for top-down causation... [which] only works because the top level is already caused by and realised in the bottom levels.⁶⁶

Searle demonstrates this “bottom up” causal link with the example of water. He maintains that the physical properties of water accessible to our senses (for instance, wetness and liquidity) are derived of its molecular structure and mechanical properties, which do not themselves exhibit these features. This is no insignificant parallel, because it forms the basis for his biologically derived consciousness thesis. It also is relevant to the link between his individual and collective intentionality argument and hints at his conception of how institutional facts are constructed and structured.

Bottom line: one could say that this study looks at nation-states, but level of analysis delineations are fundamentally irrelevant and artificial from a postmodern perspective. In fact, beyond state-level analysis, this thesis could also be interpreted as investigating the larger, encompassing meaning-constituting system or the smaller components which encompass it. All these are equally valid.

⁶⁴ Giddens, 1987, p. 8.

⁶⁵ John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, London: Penguin Books, 1995, p. 5. [Searle, 1995]

⁶⁶ John R. Searle, *Minds, Brains and Science*, London: Penguin Books, 1984, pp. 94. [Searle, 1984]

2.3. Ontological assumptions

Ontological objectivity and conceptual relativity. In this paper, consistent with the premises of (some versions of) “external realism” and ontological objectivity, I presuppose the existence of a reality independent of human representations of it. In principle, institutional facts deviate from this perspective, for they are by definition matters of convention and can only exist by human agreement. In this sense, conceptual schemes are characterized by varying levels of arbitrariness, for they merely represent, describe, classify and interpret reality. Poststructuralists cling to this connection. To illustrate, Evelyn Fox Keller, according to Tickner:

argues for a form of knowledge, which she calls ‘dynamic objectivity,’ ‘that grants to the world around us its independent integrity, but does so in a way that remains cognizant of, indeed relies on, our connectivity with the world’.⁶⁷

So defined this coincides in principle with the thesis of “conceptual relativity,” the notion that perception is inherently subjective and therefore a relative connection to reality. For the purposes of this thesis, the postpositivist position that meaning is “not fixed or static but dynamic and contextual”⁶⁸ implies relativity, but does not connote nihilism or subscribe to the idea of an imminent “implosion.”⁶⁹ Poststructuralist theory seizes on this point, stressing “fragmentation and multiplicity of meaning” in a world which lacks “fixed, intrinsic meanings.”⁷⁰

Soft relativism or relational thinking. Sandra Harding has argued of the need for a feminist epistemology to defend against “objectivism” and “interpretivism.” She feels it is important to recognize the social context of inquiry, yet avoid relativism.⁷¹ Also, Peterson writes that postpositivism rejects relativism, because it “presupposes an opposition between absolute and relative.”⁷² This seems entirely reasonable. Therefore, this paper takes the position of “soft relativism” or “relational thinking,” emphasizing that, reduced to their ultimate points of origin, institutional facts are based on “real world” counterparts. This means that they are *representations* or *descriptions* of those brute features of reality, but also have “strings” traceable to the empirical. Their apparent relative proximity to, or separation from, the empirical is what concerns science.

Note that this thesis does not support an “anything goes” policy for science, though it takes the position that scientific inquiry is strengthened by multiple perspectives, not weakened by them.

⁶⁷ Tickner, 1995a, p. 65.

⁶⁸ Pringle & Watson, p. 65.

⁶⁹ Peterson, pp. 189, 204. *Postmodernism* is variously regarded by detractors as a vacuum, a “theoretical anarchism,” a system of value-free objectivity, anti-empiricism or epistemological anarchy.

⁷⁰ Pringle & Watson, p. 64.


⁷¹ Linda J. Nicholson, “Introduction” in Linda J. Nicholson, (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism*, New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1990, p. 7. In this paper, *relative* generally connotes relational thinking, multiple interpretations and unfixed meanings.

⁷² Peterson, p. 189. This quote is originally from Susan Hekman, “The Feminization of Epistemology” in *Women and Politics*, Volume 7, Number 3, 1987, p. 79.

“Relativism” and “relativity” in this paper, then, concur with Hofstede’s definition, which advocates a “willingness to consider other persons’ or groups’ theories and values as equally reasonable as one’s own.”⁷³ Of course, there must be certain criteria erected to safeguard the endeavor and chart a course for truth. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Science and the correspondence theory of truth. Representations are reflections of reality and claim to depict the way things really are. Truth is considered to be an accurate portrayal of reality. Correspondingly, an account that fails this criterion is dismissed as erroneous or false. Thus viable ontologies generally desire to reflect objective reality with some degree of accuracy. Scientific ones demand it. Knowledge, such as scientific knowledge, seeks true representations backed by justification or evidence through epistemic objectivity. However, this may be impossible to attain. Classical arguments against realism have adhered to these epistemic issues.⁷⁴ Although reality cannot be reduced to what is known by science, based on the aforementioned correspondence theory of truth, science purports to be the only *credible* channel we have at present towards learning what reality is.⁷⁵ Dilman, in his critique of Skinner and Searle, tells that these two, among many contemporary intellectuals, feel “that all human knowledge centres round the sciences.”⁷⁶

Hermeneutics, which views truth as a matter of interpretation,⁷⁷ need not fundamentally conflict with the core of the correspondence theory of truth—particularly as it pertains to the social world. This is the difference between “hard relativism” and relational thinking. Relativism fragments into an unlimited number of what are seen as equally valid interpretations (based upon the criteria for truth content defined above). Alternatively, *relational thinking* more conservatively attempts to limit these to a finite number of “truths.”



As the graphic at left illustrates, empiricism and the positivist scientific approach sharply delineate that which is considered true (empirical) and false (interpretive). This representative system is clearly exclusionary and binary: there is but one empirical Truth. Something is either true or it’s not, period. All else fall under the domain of separate and false subjective interpretation. It regards epistemic objectivity with high esteem. The lower model represents the postpositivist and relational perspective on truth. No viewpoint is excluded, but rather *gradated*. All knowledge is situated within a pyramidal continuum of relative truth content. The limited quantity of “truths” at the empirical summit seamlessly fuses into the widening base of ever-

⁷³ Hofstede, p. 262.

⁷⁴ Searle, 1995, pp. 150-151, 160, 168.

⁷⁵ Alain-Marc Rieu, “The Epistemological and Philosophical Situation of Mind Techno-science,” *SEHR*, Volume 4, Issue 2: Constructions of the Mind at URL shr.stanford.edu/shreview/4-2/text/rieu.html on January 3, 1998.

⁷⁶ Ilham Dilman, *Mind, Brain and Behaviour: Discussions of B. F. Skinner and J. R. Searle*, London: Routledge, 1988, p. xiii in “Preface.”

increasing and ultimately infinite interpretations. Epistemic subjectivity is acknowledged as inherent in all forms of knowledge, including scientific inquiry.

Relativism sees all points within the structure as equally valid truth claims since epistemic objectivity is virtually impossible to attain and all of social reality is constructed. Relational thinking doesn't dispute that perception is innately subjective. However, to some degree it tends to place higher value on those interpretations which appear near the top of the triangle, where roots extend more firmly into the ground of objective reality.

Such a postpositivist model for truth and the pursuit of truth offers a wider (but finite) range of possibilities for science. This model too is hierarchical in the sense that prefers more truth over less truth. It can be considered a "fact axis" (discussed below) flipped 90° clockwise and transposed onto the "truth pyramid." In this manner, any given individual brute fact allows for an infinite number of interpretations. The truth content of a claim (quality) is inversely proportional to the number of claims (quantity). At the apex, few claims occupy the lateral space and approach empirical truth and brute reality. As one moves vertically along the axis toward the base, these facts/claims increase in institutional content and rely more and more upon other institutional facts for their constitution. This makes them inherently more false, more arbitrary and increasingly farther removed from objective reality.

The "real world" and the "social world." Specifically, this thesis concerns itself with issues in the international relations realm. IR is an academic discipline and frame of scientific inquiry. As such, it is defined by, and seeks to operate according to, certain established standards, procedures, guidelines and frameworks in its systematic, rational search for knowledge. Science seeks to learn more about the universe and our relationship with it. IR is situated within the cradle of Western scientific theory and praxis, which has historically viewed itself as fundamentally split between the natural and the social sciences. The former is rooted in the 16th century "outside" view, the latter in 19th century ideas of history and "inside" view.⁷⁸ There are, of course, overlapping, cross- and multidisciplinary sciences and "gray zones." However, put crudely, this division of labor or "branching" in many ways reflects the conceptual difference between, "fact" and "value."⁷⁹ Alternatively, this could be conceptualized as a "fact axis," described by American philosopher John R. Searle as:

- (1) **non-institutional or brute facts** (objective "real world" facts), which exist autonomously of people or their representations of them, and

⁷⁷ Baylis & Rengger, p. 24.

⁷⁸ Hollis & Smith, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Nicholas J. Rengger, "Culture, Society, and Order in World Politics" in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas in World Politics—International Ethics in a Changing World*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 95.

- (2) **institutional facts** (subjective “social world” facts), which require human agreement and institutions to exist and endure.⁸⁰

The former delineation—that of non-institutional facts—focuses on the intrinsic properties, relationships and processes exhibited by natural phenomena, such as metal oxidation, the magnetic fields of distant pulsars and iguanid digestive tracts, which exist independently of all mental states.⁸¹ The social sciences, on the other hand, investigate human behavior and describe the ontology of social facts and institutions.⁸² These can also be loosely seen as the methodological divide between *positivism* and *hermeneutics* within the social sciences themselves.⁸³



Investigating institutional facts means cultivating an interest in meaning itself (which will be discussed at greater length later). Indeed, as Anthony Giddens affirms: “sociology, unlike natural science, deals with a pre-interpreted world, where creation and reproduction of meaning-frames is a very condition of that which it seeks to analyze.”⁸⁴ More precisely, while recognizing that institutional facts cannot occur apart from their brute manifestations,⁸⁵ Searle’s thinking maintains that the crux of social scientific explanation is specifying causal mental states (e.g., beliefs, hopes, fears, etc.). Searle points specifically to the “role of the mind” and “the mental character of social sciences” as having caused a “radical discontinuity” between the natural sciences and the social and psychological disciplines.⁸⁶ The “social sciences are powered by the mind,” he says, and “at their best are theories of pure and applied intentionality.”⁸⁷

The discipline of international relations resides in this sphere, particularly in light of the tenets of realism, which focus on power and power relations. The “security dilemma,” for example, vividly demonstrates that intentionality—and not necessarily the brute facts of weapons stockpiles—sits at the heart of traditional IR theory. It can be said, then, that if someone *feels* threatened, the degree or nature of the *actual* danger is immaterial from a *perceptual* point of view. This takes on special

⁸⁰ Searle, 1984, pp. 1-2, and Searle, 1995, p. 12.

⁸¹ Searle, 1995, p. 12. According to Searle, mental states themselves are the exception, for they cannot exist independently of people, yet are also intrinsic features of reality.

⁸² Searle, 1984, pp. 72-73.

⁸³ Baylis & Rengger, p. 6.

⁸⁴ Giddens, p. 166.

⁸⁵ Searle, 1995, pp. 34-35. Searle says they are hierarchically structured, with institutional facts “piggy-backing” brute physical facts, be they manifested verbally or as physical objects. For this reason, many social scientists start with natural scientific causality.

⁸⁶ Searle, 1984, p. 79.

significance as we focus on gender deontics and their importance to IR. If this is so, then in order to gain a deeper understanding of social phenomena, we must digress briefly and examine the nature of humanity's relationship with reality. This entails perception, the senses and biological features at the base, with a superstructure of cognition, intentionality, the mind, meaning and culture.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 18, 84-85. *Intentionality* refers to "the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer to, or are objects and states of affairs in the world other than ourselves."

3.0. Sense Modalities, Cognition and Consciousness

3.1. The Senses

Sensory conduit to reality. Let's start with the senses, our frontline modes of contact with reality, social or otherwise. It's probably safe to say that most of us are fairly pleased with our senses and how they work.⁸⁸ Life is, after all, a sensory experience. Not only can the wealth of wonderful images, tastes, smells, sensations and sounds around us be great sources of joy and pleasure (and catalysts for negative emotions and experiences too), they also serve as our sole avenue to gathering and processing the innumerable elements of the surrounding world.⁸⁹ In this regard, we are not alone among the countless trillions of creatures populating this diverse and shining planet. Practically all life is characterized by perceiving stimuli and responding in one way or another.⁹⁰

Second-best sense and limb. Nonetheless, as fairly adept as we like to think we are at harvesting these stimuli, individually considered, our appendages and organs hardly compare in complexity, efficiency and performance to many "lower" organisms. This is true even of what we consider our key sensory assets: audition and vision.⁹¹ Whales and dolphins, for example, have us beat "flippers down" when it comes to hearing. They are so especially attuned to sound that they hear and *communicate* using ultrasound frequencies well beyond the range of human hearing.⁹² This is an impressive adaptation for the marine environment, where sound carries farther and faster than for us terrestrials.⁹³

Dolphins are also remarkably adapted for *visually* penetrating the pitch-blackness of the aquatic depths. Their eyes contain 7,000 times more light-sensitive receptor cells called *rods* (associated with low-light vision) than human eyes.⁹⁴ These cells function much like the principle behind computer screen pixels, the higher their number and density, the sharper the picture. This also

⁸⁸ Although fairly limited to our individual phenomenal experience, we can imagine what it would be like to have significantly sharper senses and how these enhanced abilities might affect many facets of life. Likewise, we can envisage how dramatically the quality of life would plummet should, for example, one's eyesight or hearing be radically diminished or completely lost.

⁸⁹ "Sense Organs," Microsoft *Encarta* '95 CD-ROM, Microsoft Corporation, 1994. [**Encarta**] These refer to the five "classic" senses classified by Aristotle, though as many as 15 additional senses are recognized today.

⁹⁰ John Tyler Bonner, "Life," *Encarta*.

⁹¹ Johan Tast, Heikki Tyrväinen, Rauno Mattila and Teuvo Nyberg, *Koulun biologia* (Lukiokurssi 4), Keuruu: Kustannusosakeyhtiö, Otavan painolaitokset, 1993, p. 6. [**Tast et al.**]

⁹² "Hearing Range in Animals" and "Sound," *Encarta*. Ultrasound refers to frequencies over 100,000 Hz. The human upper limit is around 15,000-20,000 Hz. Compare this to bat echo-locating pulses in the 30,000-70,000+ Hz range. In total darkness experiments, returned "radar" signals have alerted bats to the presence of even a 0.1 mm thick suspended thread, which was then avoided in-flight. According to Tast et al., p. 9, certain butterflies react to 250,000 Hz soundwaves!

⁹³ "Sound," *Encarta*. Sound carries some five times faster in water than in air.

⁹⁴ Ira Snow Jones (reviewer), "Eye," *Encarta*.

applies to the so-called *phi phenomenon*, which is responsible for how we perceive motion.⁹⁵

Relatively speaking, our other senses fare no better either. Take the shark, for instance. Its keen sense of smell can detect even the minutest drop of blood—one part in 100 *million* parts of water⁹⁶—at impressive distances in the open sea. In addition, employing *Lorenzini ampullae*, sharks can discern infinitesimal discharges as small as .005 microvolt. That’s equivalent to the electrical field distributed by a 1,000-mile-long copper wire attached to a D-size battery!⁹⁷

Comfort from etiology? In light of some of the incredible abilities of our animal cousins, our sense modalities themselves are certainly nothing to write home about. This is no reason to feel inferior, however. It should be borne in mind that older species, such as the sharks, have a slight evolutionary head-start over us simians. They prowled the seas long before *T. Rex* and stegosaurus came to rule the land, yet continue to thrive millennia after the great lizards died out and fossilized.⁹⁸ If we, ourselves, don’t ultimately decimate their populations, they may quite possibly out-survive *us* as well.

In any case, if one subscribes to the tenets of Darwinism, many of these developments are distinctive adaptations to specific environmental conditions and biological requirements irrelevant to *Homo sapiens*. In terms of species continuation, nature simply found no practical utility (from an *etiological* point of view, see footnote 125) for humanity in some of the extraordinary and specialized abilities of other creatures. We don’t need to pull 50 times our body-weight as ants,⁹⁹ leap 300 times our body-length as fleas, or, in an explosive 40-millisecond burst of tongue energy, snag insects out of the air as chameleons do!¹⁰⁰

Contrast with a kick. Actually, our senses in most normal respects functionally parallel those of other animals, in that they constantly inform us about our internal and external environments.

⁹⁵ Tast et al., p. 13; Ira Snow Jones (reviewer), “Eye,” Encarta; Korb. We discern movement as series of still “snapshots” strung together like frames in a motion picture film. Again, much like computer monitors, the human eye captures individual images through rapid scanning motion. Human eyes “refresh” in this manner 16 times each second, whereas insect compound eyes—formed of thousands of image-forming elements called *ommatidia*—blaze past at some 250-300 “snapshots” a second!

⁹⁶ Rhonda Sanford, “Shark Facts” at URL www.cntwk.net/~rsanford/rhonda/sharks.html on August 7, 1997. Compare this figure to a drop of blood diffused in 30,000 U.S. gallons (113,520 liters) of seawater as asserted by “Shark Week” documentaries on Discovery Channel Europe (aired October 5, 1997). [Discovery]

⁹⁷ “Cold Hard Facts About the Great White” at URL www.cybervault.com/users/D/txtshrkr.html on August 7, 1997. *Lorenzini ampullae* are thousands of hypersensitive sensors filled with secreted jelly in the shark’s snout. According to one study, chum and bait attracted Great White sharks (*Carcharodon carcharias*) to research vessels from as far away as 5 kilometers. Blood-filled water also widely disperses charged ions in the water, which draw in sharks. See also Dr. John McCosker and Richard Ellis, *The Great White Shark*, HarperCollinsPublishers, 1991.

⁹⁸ “Sharks and How They Live” at URL wilmot.unh.edu/~krasuski/sharkspt.html (Oceanic Research Group, Inc., 1995) on August 8, 1997. *Discovery* suggests that the sharks are some 350 million years old, meaning that they could have predated the dinosaurs by 100 million years.

⁹⁹ Stephanie Bailey, “The Secret Lives of Ants” (Entomology Extension Specialist, University of Kentucky) at URL www.uky.edu/Agriculture/Entomology/yhtfacts/ants.htm on August 7, 1997. Compare to the ant’s abilities to those of humans, who can at best pull but 60 percent of their body-weight. According to “Kratz’s Creatures” on *Animal Planet*, Paragon Entertainment Corporation, 1995 [Kratz] (aired September 16, 1997), if we could carry the same relative weight as the rain forest cutter ant, for instance, we could easily heave a five-ton elephant up miles of steep terrain!

¹⁰⁰ “Best of the Best,” Kratts, August 29, 1997.

Information from within and without is received through specialized peripheral cells and transmitted to the CNS. This information is used for perception, control of movement, regulation of internal organs and maintenance of arousal.¹⁰¹

Still, our species deviates in some critical ways. Speaking of purely “secondary” physical considerations, as Fergus Duniho has pointed out “the opposable thumb, the large bridged nose, and the shape of the human foot all set humans apart from the animals.”¹⁰² But, plainly, these are ultimately *not* the deciding factors. It would seem that our rise to the top¹⁰³ is rooted in something other than anatomical considerations of *sense and limb* alone.

For us, the senses also define self, localize self in relation to others and enable and contribute to conscious experience, thus diminishing the predominance of subliminal and automatic response.¹⁰⁴ This concept of Self, or identity, will be discussed in later sections. For now, to summarize, we have seen that humans are not unique in that they are sense-oriented creatures. However, in this respect, they are neither the most proficient nor the most gifted of nature’s children. In terms of relative precision, complexity and efficiency of sense modality and other obvious physiological elements, *Homo sapiens* clearly does *not* top the list as the supreme species.

Yet people are more than machines bristling with sensory antennae. Intuitive, common sense understandings of our world tell us that we are fundamentally and dramatically different. But just *how* are we different, why should we care, and how is this debate not only relevant, but *vital*? In the following sections, I will argue that this key factor is consciousness, which is biologically based upon a capable CNS, and requires the fertile environment of human social interaction and institutions to flourish and expand. To this end, I will examine the relevant structures and features of:

- (1) **the human brain and CNS**, which give rise to and maintain individual consciousness (specifically higher-order intentional mental states), and
- (2) **human culture, institutions and social reality**, which are created and maintained by collective intentionality and human agreement.

3.2. Consciousness: the deciding factor

The elusive definition. Although, as David Chalmers points out, the study of *cognition* is

¹⁰¹ “Lecture 22: Nervous System IV” at URL umbc7.umbc.edu/~farabaug/nerve4.html on October 13, 1997.

¹⁰² Fergus Duniho, “Chapter1: The Problem” (Rochester) at URL www.ling.rochester.edu/~duniho/MS-Thesis/Ch_1-The_Problem.html on October 9, 1997. [Duniho]

¹⁰³ “Rise” and “top” denote spatial references which express a clear hierarchical view of external reality. This pyramidal taxonomic system of lifeform classification is based on such criteria as physiological complexity, intelligence, social behavior, etc. Humankind considers itself at the apex of this structure. Feminists and others draw attention to such stratified “mapping” systems. They view them as intrinsically flawed and biased frameworks of understanding, particularly in the social context.

¹⁰⁴ “Sensory Systems” at URL wilmot.unh.edu/~jel/sensory.html on October 13, 1997.

well on its way, adequately defining consciousness remains a problematic and elusive task.¹⁰⁵ As perplexing intellectual quandaries tend to do, this undertaking has spawned some serious as well as poetic and downright amusing off-hand attempts to pin it down.¹⁰⁶

Thomas Polger and Owen Flanagan note that “[c]onsciousness is more familiar than anything else, yet we don’t know what it is.”¹⁰⁷ Indeed the veil of uncertainty surrounding the origins, nature and features of consciousness are long-standing and fraught with conjecture. These issues remain unresolved today despite centuries of philosophical, scientific and theological debate. John Searle’s following “quickie” stock explanation is based on common sense, phenomenal substance and a shared experiential referentiality.

By consciousness I simply mean those subjective states of awareness or sentience that begin when one wakes in the morning and continue throughout the period that one is awake until one falls into a dreamless sleep, into a coma, or dies or is otherwise, as they say, unconscious.¹⁰⁸

Polger and Flanagan point out that first-person phenomenal descriptions like these are relatively easy to produce. The tricky part lies in the challenge of finding an adequate *non-phenomenological* account.¹⁰⁹ Delving a bit deeper, ordinarily speaking, consciousness often refers to subjective experience in terms of the tautological, partial psychological or descriptive states coupled with functional elements (examples in footnote below).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ David J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and Cognition” (Department of Philosophy, University of California) at URL ling.usc.edu/~chalmers/papers/c_and_c.html on July 30, 1997. [Chalmers] Chalmers writes that “[t]his tripartite investigation of behavior, brain function and cognitive models has led to a significant increase in our understanding of diverse aspects of cognition, such as vision, memory and language comprehension.” Note here that, while affirming the depth and breadth of this debate, I must nonetheless limit the discussion here. I take a notably brief look at consciousness and readily acknowledge that any deeper, more complete investigation simply lies beyond the reasonable bounds of this paper.

¹⁰⁶ Walter J. Freeman, “The Physiology of Perception” (University of California, Berkeley), 1991 at URL sulcus.berkeley.edu/FLM/MS/Physio.Percept.html on August 25, 1997, and Quote of the Day at URL www.absoluteaccess.com on August 25, 1997. Freeman, a professor of neurobiology, quotes the following William Blake passage: “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite.” Freeman echoes Blake’s sentiment that consciousness is the gatekeeper between humankind and the awesome expanse of eternity. The following funny comment was found at absolute.com: “Consciousness: that annoying time between naps.”

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Polger and Owen Flanagan, “Is Consciousness an Adaptation?” (Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA) at URL www.duke.edu/~twp2/is_consc_adapt.html on October 9, 1997. [Polger & Flanagan 1]

¹⁰⁸ Ned Block, “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness” (Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge) at URL www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/bbs/Archive/bbs.block.html on October 9, 1997. [Block] This quote is attributed to John R. Searle, “Who is computing with the brain?” in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 13:4, pp. 632-642.

¹⁰⁹ Polger & Flanagan 1.

¹¹⁰ Alvin I. Goldman, “Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science” (Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson) at URL cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/goldman.consc.html on October 9, 1997 [Goldman] and Wilse B. Webb, “States of Consciousness,” Encarta. The tautological (e.g., awareness, a generalized condition of alertness and arousal), partial psychological or descriptive states (e.g., sensations, thoughts, individual beliefs, plans, emotions and strategies) and the functional (e.g., informational accessibility).

Some features are awareness of awareness (self-awareness),¹¹¹ self-knowledge and higher-order reflection,¹¹² troubleshooting abilities, choice and selection of action, modification and interrogation of long-range plans, long-term memory retrieval, construction of storable representations of current activities and events,¹¹³ spatio-temporal orientation¹¹⁴ and

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli; the integration of information by a cognitive system; the reportability of mental states; the focus of attention; the deliberate control of behavior; and the difference between wakefulness and sleep.¹¹⁵

Alvin Goldman feels that such a “relational definition of consciousness” is unsatisfactory because each definitional element “tries to explain the consciousness of a state in terms of some relation it bears to other events or states of the system.”¹¹⁶ In like manner, Ned Block feels that consciousness is something of a “mongrel” term.¹¹⁷ He argues a two-tiered structure of consciousness comprised of

- (1) **phenomenal consciousness** (P-consciousness), related to sensory awareness and information-processing, and
- (2) **access consciousness** (A-consciousness), representational and associated with reportability, rational thought, reason, control of action and speech.

Awareness, A-consciousness and meaning. Many religions venerate consciousness as “an independent ontological category:” a pre-matter, preexisting entity¹¹⁸ or an ethereal “spark” bestowed

¹¹¹ George Mandler, “Consciousness Redux” (University of California, San Diego and University College London) at URL cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/mandler.cons.html on October 9, 1997. [Mandler], and Block. This is, in principle, indefinitely self-recursive (one can theoretically be infinitely self-aware). Block sees this as an example of internal scanning and higher order thought or *metacognition*, or “a conscious state... accompanied by a thought to the effect that one is in that state” *ad infinitum*.

¹¹² Mandler, and Goldman.

¹¹³ Mandler.

¹¹⁴ Catherine Lutz, “Culture and Consciousness: A Problem in the Anthropology of Knowledge” in Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole and Dale L. Johnson (eds.), *Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives*, Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992, as reviewed by Valerie Gray Hardcastle (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Philosophy, Blacksburg, Virginia) at URL psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-01-hardcastle.html on August 29, 1997.

¹¹⁵ David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” (Department of Philosophy, University of California) at URL ling.usc.edu/~chalmers/papers/consciousness.htm on July 30, 1997, and Block. Block sees phenomenal consciousness as distinct from the cognitive, intentional and functional. He defines *cognitive* as “essentially involving thought”; *intentional* as “a representation or state... about something”; and *functional* as exhibiting computer program-like properties. Thus, he sees interaction, yet draws a clear distinction, between phenomenal and access consciousness.

¹¹⁶ Goldman. For example, “(1) its expressibility in verbal behavior, (2) the transmission of its content to other states or locations in the system, or (3) a higher-order state which reflects on the target state.” Goldman points out, however, that Block’s A/P-consciousness categorization (questionably) overcomes this using its “intrinsicist” argumentation. Goldman says folk understandings of consciousness also see states as intrinsically separate.

¹¹⁷ David J. Chalmers, “Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience?” (Department of Philosophy, University of California) at URL ling.usc.edu/~chalmers/papers/availability.html on July 30, 1997. Chalmers explains: “Block notes that researchers on consciousness often start with an invocation of phenomenal consciousness but end up offering an explanation of A-consciousness and leaving P-consciousness to the side... much of this work can be interpreted as seeking to explain A-consciousness, but trying to find a basis for P-consciousness.” See Block.

¹¹⁸ Colin McGinn, “Consciousness and Space” (Rutgers University) at URL www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/ConsciousnessSpace.html on October 9, 1997. [McGinn]

upon prehistoric forefathers. Humanistic Western science, on the other hand, considers this ability a unique development. Although assertions of natural selective advantage prove somewhat problematic, some envisage it as a product of adaptive evolution; others see it as a random quirk.

As discussed earlier, consciousness entails the sensory modalities,¹¹⁹ yet whereas rodent or shark awareness culminates and/or terminates at a basic level, for us it merely begins. Fred Dretske cleverly points out that “[m]ice who hear—and thereby become auditorily aware of—french horns never become *aware* that they are aware of anything—much less of french horns.”¹²⁰ Our *senses* are not directly responsible for this awareness, our ability to *perceive* is.¹²¹

Existents in reality interact with sensory organs according to their natures to produce sensations which the sensory organs relay to the brain. This is an automatic process which is infallible within its context. Sense organs will only sense those aspects of reality within their nature to sense, but it will relay those sensations accurately—sense organs themselves will not hide sensations they are capable of sensing nor will they invent sensations they do not sense. The level of sensation is the lowest level of consciousness and is all that is available to the lowest lifeforms.¹²²

This chapter later turns to artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science to demonstrate the role of *meaning* and how it separates us from animals and all current attempts at replicating consciousness electronically. In building this argument, clearly, A-consciousness pertains more directly to the creation and maintenance of institutional facts (and, therefore, the construction of social reality and culture). Higher A-conscious traits are characterized by *meaning* (what Searle calls status-functions), while P-conscious traits are not.

Thus, interpreting Block’s representation as hierarchical in the sense that “higher” features are clearly access consciousness-related, I broadly equate the representational features of Block’s A-consciousness with Searlean intentional mental states. Therefore, I maintain that we can leave behind the “lower” sensory and perceptual questions—including those of qualia¹²³—in favor of higher cognitive and meaning-constituting systems associated with intentional (or A-conscious) mental states. These are directly germane to the next theoretical phase of the thesis.

¹¹⁹ Polger & Flanagan 1.

¹²⁰ Fred Dretske, “What Good Is Consciousness?” at URL cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/dretske.good.html on July 30, 1997, and Block. The italicized text is my emphasis. Block views the distinction between these two kinds of awareness as analogous to the P- and A-consciousness difference.

¹²¹ Dynamicists see a large causal role for sense modalities. This is discussed in the following section.

¹²² “Epistemology” at URL jerryd.prodentec.com/EPISTEM.HTM on March 8, 1998. This does not mean that senses necessarily provide true “data” about objective reality. Visual illusions or ambiguities between hot and cold sensations are examples of this. It does mean, however, that senses provide raw input devoid of meaning, sensations which are only curtailed in accuracy by prevailing conditions and the inherent capabilities of the sense modalities themselves. Meaning and interpretation are matters of intentional, cognitive and perceptual apparatus.

So, beyond the elements which comprise much of our qualia repertoire, we are characterized by *conception*, the highest level of consciousness, which binds together conceptualizations into systems known as *ontologies*. This will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. For now, let's ponder the origin of consciousness.

3.3. Origins of consciousness

Dynamism and Searlean physicalism. This thesis subscribes to a general neurophysiological basis for consciousness,¹²⁴ but does not excessively concern itself with the minutiae of the etiological and teleological debates¹²⁵ or the classic “mind-body problem.”¹²⁶ Searle refutes most contemporary attempts at the brain-mind problem as “gap-filling” efforts.¹²⁷ I agree and have decided not to get side-tracked on this issue.

Suffice it to say that herein I presuppose that pains,¹²⁸ the mind, and all conscious and unconscious mental phenomena—including “visual and auditory experiences, tactile sensations,

¹²³ Kevin B. Korb, “Stage Effects in the Cartesian Theater: A review of Daniel Dennett's *Consciousness Explained*,” *Psyche*, 1(4), December 1993, at URL psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v1/psyche-1-04-korb.html on January 18, 1998. [Korb] As Korb says: “[f]or many philosophers the crux of the matter of consciousness comes down to what to make of qualia—the phenomenal qualities of the things of which we are conscious, the raw feels and sensations that make up much of our conscious lives.” This is clearly tied to *dynamacism*, which is discussed in Section 5.

¹²⁴ Goldman, and Block. For example, Crick and Koch hypothesize that a synchronized 35-75 Hz oscillation of the larger pyramidal neurons in the sensory areas of the layer 5 neocortex gives rise to phenomenal consciousness. For more on this, Block recommends Francis Crick and Christoff Koch, “Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness” in *Seminars in the Neurosciences*, 2, 1990. Block suggests that distinctive and separate neurological “subsystems” may be responsible for both P- and A-consciousness.

¹²⁵ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology* (2nd ed.), Great Britain: Polity Press, 1993, p. 33. [Giddens, 1993a] According to Polger & Flanagan 1, this point of view, called *etioloical epiphenomenalism*, sees consciousness as the result of random drift—a spandrel, or accidental mutant feature—not as an evolutionary sensory and perceptual adaptation through natural selection to facilitate the processing of stimuli. It refers to consciousness as a whole and also to its “subordinate” levels such as dreaming, which *prima facie* appear to exhibit no etiological (beneficially adaptive) function. In addition, *causal-role epiphenomenalism* refers to the notion that “consciousness depends on the physical and itself has physical effects, but those effects are not ‘mechanistic functions’—they play no important causal role in the organismic system” and strict *metaphysical epiphenomenalism*, which holds that “consciousness depends on the physical, but cannot have physical effects, period.” In “Explaining the Evolution of Consciousness: The Other Hard Problem” at URL www.duke.edu/~twp2/tucson2.html. Polger & Flanagan mention that others, such as Dennett, fail to see the utility of debating the evolutionary status of consciousness. See also Daniel C. Dennett, “Evolution, Teleology, Intentionality” at URL www.tufts.edu/as/cogstud/papers/evoltele.htm and “Evolution, Error and Intentionality” at URL www.tufts.edu/as/cogstud/papers/evolerr.htm on January 4, 1998.

¹²⁶ Duniho, and Edward W. James in “Mind-Body Continuism: Dualities Without Dualism” at URL www.access.digex.net/~kknisely/4001.html on October 9, 1997 (in print form, see *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1991). Duniho articulates the “incompatible tetrad,” which states that (1) Bodies are physical, (2) Minds are not physical, (3) Minds and bodies interact and (4) The physical and non-physical cannot interact. James seeks to moderate dualism, physicalism and relativism through his *mind-body bounded continuism*. McGinn, attacks the embedded cognitive system by questioning epistemology and stressing a fundamental reevaluation of the concept of space (consistent with theoretical trends in, for example, quantum physics, curved space-time and multi-world theory) to encompass spatial possibilities for consciousness.

¹²⁷ Searle, 1984, p. 42. He mentions behaviorism, games theory, cybernetics, information theory, structuralism and sociobiology.

¹²⁸ Dilman, pp. 90-96. This notion concerning pain coincides with Searle. Dilman attempts to refute Searle's assertion that pain is ultimately a mental phenomenon, but falls short. His naïve critique does not consider the possibility that pain can exist in the absence of independent physical stimuli or that pain can be nullified purely as a result of certain mental states. Consider the cases in psychology in which pain is made to exist or cease to exist merely through suggestion. For example, some physicians as of this writing treat patients in the United States without anesthesia. This suggests that hypnosis, dream sleep and some other states of mind ultimately can conduce or negate pain.

hunger, thirst, and sexual desire”—result from and are realized in the brain and CNS.¹²⁹ Describing this basic *physicalist*¹³⁰ argumentation, Searle writes:

Types of living systems evolve through natural selection, and some of them have evolved certain sorts of cellular structures, specifically, nervous systems capable of causing and sustaining consciousness. Consciousness is a biological, and therefore physical, though of course also mental, feature of certain higher-level nervous systems, such as human brains and a large number of different types of animal brains. With consciousness comes intentionality, the capacity of the mind to represent objects and states of affairs in the world other than itself.¹³¹

Subscribing to biological causality for consciousness,¹³² one group of physicalists, the *dynamicists*, view consciousness as built out of all brain activity. In fact, many see sense modality as directly dynamically contributing to consciousness.¹³³ Fred Dretske goes so far as to suggest that anytime we perceive, we are conscious.¹³⁴ Or, put another way, “[t]he Mind is a machine made of time. It must be in motion to exist.”¹³⁵

Basic linguistic and cultural perspectives. Naturally, not everyone agrees with these notions. Wrangling over this point in the modern philosophical sense has raged for *at least* a few hundred years. At this rate, it’s likely to continue raging for hundreds more. For example, nine years before his death,¹³⁶ the French scientist, mathematician and father of modern philosophy René Descartes (1596-1650)¹³⁷ grappled with the notion that consciousness, a non-spatial thing, could emanate from a spatially ordered world.¹³⁸

His enduring philosophy considers the mind to be consciousness and thought, from which intelligent or intentional action (including speech) is derived. According to Cartesian doctrine, this

¹²⁹ Searle, 1984, pp. 18, 19, 24, 54.

¹³⁰ Peter Lloyd, “Is the Mind Physical—Dissecting Conscious Brain Tissue” at URL easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/phinow2.htm on October 9, 1997 (print version in *Philosophy Now*, No. 9, 1995). [Lloyd] Compare *physicalism*, which sees the conscious mind as a physical phenomenon occurring inside the brain, to *mentalism*, which denies the existence of the brain altogether.

¹³¹ Searle, 1995, pp. 6-7.

¹³² ArtLex at URL www.aristotle.com/skystorage/Art/ArtLex/Con.html on October 9, 1997. Consciousness, explained by a materialist model is seen as a byproduct of synaptic exchanges (whether described in chemical, electrical or neurological terms). On this basis, using cognitive and physiological psychology, scientists investigate neurological disorders like blindsightedness, prosopagnosia, anosognosia, epilepsy, parietal lobe lesions and localized brain damage to gain insight into consciousness.

¹³³ John McCrone, “Going Inside,” *New Scientist*, December 1997, at URL www.btinternet.com/~neuronaut/feature_page_two.html on January 6, 1998. Accordingly, “[e]very rung of mapping counts” as raw input is constantly sorted, refined and fine-tuned, giving rise to consciousness.

¹³⁴ R. McBride, “The representational theory and the focus of consciousness” at “Toward a Science of Consciousness” 1996, *Philosophy*, 1.1 The concept of consciousness, April 8-13, 1996 at URL www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/SPECIAL/01_01.html on January 5, 1998. Dretske’s Representational Theory of Consciousness, an alternative to the Higher-Order Theories, posits a constant perceptual input the whole of our lives, including during sleep.

¹³⁵ Melanie Anne Phillips, “The Mind” section of “Mental Relativity—A New Theory of Mind” at URL heartcorps.com/mental_relativity/basics.htm on January 6, 1998.

¹³⁶ “Descartes, René,” Encarta.

¹³⁷ Lloyd.

“deciding factor” distinguishes humanity, as Dilman writes:

For on Descartes’ view, while all animal behaviour and a good deal of human behaviour can be explained mechanically, speech and intelligent behaviour cannot. These are the sole property of human beings. They have their source in thinking or consciousness, and thought is the essence of the mind or soul. Human beings possess a mind or soul, and this makes them essentially different from animals.¹³⁹

This essential difference would come to the fore as the discourse matured over the centuries. For example, the ideas of another Frenchman, Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), focused on *dualism*, a view that this essential human difference has a binary character. Called *Homo duplex*, this creature is torn by the “complex balance of asocial passions and social reason”¹⁴⁰ as the merging of the corporeal creature with that of the intellectual and moral being. The latter, according to Durkheimian thinking, “we can know by observation—I mean society.”¹⁴¹ Thus we have the key discursive introduction of *social* aspects.

Durkheim may have been at least partially responsible for drawing the social factor into the mainstream, but Nietzsche (1844-1900), Marx (1818-1883) and Engels (1820-1895) elevated it to the causal level. They saw consciousness as an outgrowth of human social or “herd” needs—and therefore as a *product* of culture.¹⁴² Daniel Dennett, a well-known contemporary functionalist theorist, concurs in principle with this model. The Dutchman Geert Hofstede has his own opinions about this, as we shall see.

Dennett, Hofstede and cultural software arguments. As Ned Block indicates, Dennett occasionally employs *memes* (defined in footnote below) to explain his ideas. Dennett considers consciousness a massive meme amalgamation and its very existence contingent upon the *concept* of consciousness.¹⁴³ He says that human consciousness:

- (1) “is too recent an innovation to be hard-wired into the innate machinery,” and
- (2) “is largely the product of cultural evolution that gets imparted to brains in early

¹³⁸ McGinn. This contrasts with the abstract-physical debate, as the abstract is not considered a product of the material world as consciousness is. Searle, too, is fascinated by the apparent paradox of how a universe composed entirely of inert matter can not only combine such that it forms complex living systems, but that these organisms can be conscious and are capable of producing and maintaining higher-order mental states.

¹³⁹ Dilman, pp. ix-x in “Preface.” Behavioristic notions linked to Thomas Hobbes’ conception of man deny intentionality and contest these notions.

¹⁴⁰ Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society—Explorations in Social Theory*, Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1984, pp. 20-21 [Turner], and “Durkheim, Émile,” Encarta. See Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, New York, 1961.

¹⁴¹ Turner, pp. 20-21.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, pp. 242, 244. See also Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, New York, 1974 and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, London, 1974.

¹⁴³ Block. According to Block, Dennett suggests that consciousness is software operating on genetically determined hardware produced by biological evolution. See also Daniel C. Dennett, “Julian Jaynes’ software archeology” in *Canadian Psychology* 27:2, pp. 149-154, 1986 and *Consciousness Explained*, London: Penguin Books, 1991. *Memes* are considered the smallest, reliably self-replicating cultural units, seen as “cultural analogs of genes.”

training.”¹⁴⁴

According to the general proposition set forth by Dennett and others (let’s call it *culturally derived consciousness*, or CDC), our sense modalities and neurophysiology constitute but a *raw apparatus*. Alone they neither give rise to consciousness nor allow us to reach some form of individual and collective “understandings” of the surrounding world. If we follow this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, we are essentially “clean slates” without culture. As we enter this reality, then, we are empty vessels, unshaped clay and little more than manifest *potential*.

This *tabula rasa* mechanical view follows the British empirical philosopher John Locke’s writings on the subject.¹⁴⁵ Central to this argument, we are physically outfitted from birth with an impressive array of hardware, not unlike the robotic probes rocket scientists hurl into space to investigate our solar system (my analogy). Metaphorically speaking, we each possess a powerful central processor, sensors and receptors, testing instruments, various specialized mechanisms, input and output devices, communications systems, etc.

Yet, as impressive as our “equipment” may be, lacking consciousness, we *are* the sum of these our biological parts, nothing more (if one buys Dennett’s “cultural software” argument in its pure form). He believes that biology alone cannot and does not provide the necessary trigger to breathe life into human consciousness. Dennett feels that each half—physiology and culture—is inert and virtually useless without its counterpart. At the heart of the argument, Dennett intimates that hardware requires the instructions of an operating system and program code in order to *do* anything. Likewise, software, which contains those vital commands, organization and language, cannot *implement* them without the physical structure and capabilities of the hardware component.

Hofstede uses remarkably similar vocabulary to describe what he calls “mental software” and “cultural programming.” Although he fails to address consciousness *per se* in *Cultures and Organizations*, he does hint at biologically derived intentionality (psychology and emotion) and cognition in his discussion of “levels of culture.” This model bridges strict Searlean physicalism and Dennettian CDC approaches to culture and consciousness.¹⁴⁶

I don’t particularly like mechanistic analogies. Yet they do to some limited degree and in simple terms, help to demonstrate the relationship between biology, consciousness and culture

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Henry Plotkin, “Cognition and History--The Evolution of Intelligence and Culture,” Department of Psychology, University College London at URL www.iisg.nl/plotkin.html on April 24, 1998. [Plotkin]

¹⁴⁶ Hofstede, p. 5. I’m reading between the lines. Hofstede does not directly contemplate consciousness. He does, however, write of “human nature... the universal level in one’s mental software,” which “is inherited with one’s genes” and “determines one’s... basic psychological functioning. The human ability to feel fear, anger, love, joy, sadness, the need to associate with others, to play and exercise oneself, the facility to observe the environment and to talk about it with other humans.”

through computer metaphors.¹⁴⁷ If such metaphors aren't taken too seriously, they *conditionally* work fairly well. However, their utility is based purely on the *general and relative relationship* between these elements, not their individual forms, functions or properties.

This said—and in light of my personal views on the invalidity of an unqualified CDC argument—I do, nonetheless, see a larger (but limited) cultural causal role than Searle does. I think it's possible to weave a synthesis between these two philosophies that hits closer to the mark. To do so, we need to take a brief look at some of the insights afforded by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. The conclusions from this section demand a brief discussion of the roles of language, social interaction, enculturation, norms, institutions and the construction of social reality.

3.4. Insights from AI and cognitive science

Electronic consciousness. I take the position that human cognition, senses, perception and all the elements of higher-order consciousness cannot and should not be relegated to some mechanical computational reductionist status on par with the inner workings of the average pocket calculator. Quite the contrary. People are not machines, robots or drones. The difference, we shall see, is fundamental and cannot be replicated with any technology or architectures available today.

Contemporary musings surrounding the mysteries of *biological* consciousness consider possible applications for *electronic* counterparts. It is claimed that imminent breakthroughs will propel AI and cognitive science¹⁴⁸ out of the realm of conjecturable science fiction into science fact.¹⁴⁹ As specialists from a host of disciplines¹⁵⁰ actively endeavor to create a facsimile of the human mind, they rekindle old questions and stimulate new controversies. Among these, perhaps the central and most intriguing is can—or even should—AI be patterned after the human brain?¹⁵¹

On this matter, Searle does not reject the hypothetical possibility of non-human (including

¹⁴⁷ Chalmers 1, and “Artificial Intelligence,” *Principia Cybernetica Web* at URL pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/ARTIFI_INTEL.html on October 9, 1997. Chalmers says that “researchers in psychology and neuroscience often use computational models” and that AI scientists too incorporate these tools. Computer metaphors in theories of mental activities are rampant.

¹⁴⁸ Searle, 1984, pp. 42-43. The analogy of the human brain as digital computer and mind as software, Searle calls “strong AI.” According to Searle, this thesis also forms the basis for cognitive science, but does not necessarily claim that computers “literally have thoughts and feelings.”

¹⁴⁹ Lloyd, and Hans Moravec, “Truth Journal: Dualism Through Reductionism” (Carnegie-Mellon University) at URL www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth05.html on October 9, 1997. Sci-fi consciousness has lent inordinate creative material to many a writer in the forms of, for example, “consciousness transplanted,” transmigration (transference of one's essence from body to body, body to machine or body to some other storage medium), immortality and Star Trek-like matter transmission devices.

¹⁵⁰ Maurizio Matteuzzi, “Why AI Is Not a Science,” SEHR, Volume 4, Issue 2: Constructions of the Mind at URL shr.stanford.edu/shreview/4-2/text/matteuzzi.html on January 3, 1998. Such puzzling problems place the field at the intersection of many disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, linguistics, computer science and robotics.

¹⁵¹ Aaron Sloman, “Notes on Consciousness” (School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex) *AISB Quarterly*, 1990. Sloman argues that global architecture (sub-system types and the interaction between them and the environment) is more vital to achieving AI consciousness than the details of sub-system implementation. This is consistent with the belief that, imbued with a sufficiently complex “neural” network, structurally and functionally patterned after the human brain, achieving engineered consciousness is only a matter of time.

electronic) consciousness, provided that the “causal powers [be] at least equivalent to those of the human brain.” Software isn’t sufficient, in his view, because “computational symbol-manipulating programs” are incapable of, and therefore lack, mental states—intentional or otherwise.

Intentionality, meaning and resolution. This is the distinction, in his words, between syntax and semantics. Computer programs are defined by their formal syntactical structure. This structure *simulates* the formal procedure of rule-following and information-processing that occurs in human cognition, but has no psychological relevance. Only for people is this process characterized by semantic content and accompanied by mental states. Searle points out that rules in general have a definite causal relationship with human behavior, but for people the process is *literal*, for machines it is *metaphorical*. Computers, therefore, cannot and do not feel, think, understand or believe anything about anything. In this sense, they are no more conscious than stone. Searle’s “Chinese room” analogy posits that:

Understanding language, or indeed, having mental states at all, involves more than just having a bunch of formal symbols. It involves having an interpretation, or a meaning attached to those symbols.¹⁵²

In sum, *meaning* distinguishes the human mind from that of both other creatures and cognitivist AI models that rely on algorithmic computational processes. Searle points out that many animals have conscious mental states, which AI “brains” characteristically lack, but to our knowledge only people have the self-referentiality of social institutions and language. Melanie Anne Phillips refers to this as “resolution,” the range of emotional and mental possibilities afforded by intentionality. Only humans pass the self-awareness test with an unparalleled depth to their “palette of sophistications.”¹⁵³ This is, in part, expressed in and embodied by language. Let’s examine this element.

3.5. Consciousness, language and culture

Language as communication. Indeed, many animals can communicate, usually vocally or through series of movements. For instance, they convey various signals that alert others of threats, repel predators, enlist help or indicate the location of food. There is also evidence to suggest that some animals have the cognitive ability to form simple sentences.¹⁵⁴ Still, these “informative” communication systems are generally considered “to be biologically hard-wired, closed and

¹⁵² Searle, 1984, pp. 39-41, 45, 48-49.

¹⁵³ Melanie Anne Phillips, “The Nature of Animal Consciousness” at URL heartcorps.com/mental_relativity/animal.htm on January 6, 1998. She writes of a “Mental Relativity Test for Self-Awareness,” which looks at the ability to change the environment, knowledge of space and time, and the capability to act based on anticipation, not on purely immediate needs.

¹⁵⁴ Saveen Reddy, “Editorial” at URL www.acm.org/crossroads/xrds1-2/backup/editorial.html on January 5, 1998.

unintentional.”¹⁵⁵ They are mostly instinctual, script-like and simply lack intentional content. For this reason, Dennett sees human language as perhaps *the* pivotal discerning feature of conscious humanity.¹⁵⁶ Searle too points out that “many animals have conscious mental states, but as far as we know, they lack the self-referentiality that goes with having human languages and social institutions.”¹⁵⁷ This applies even to what are considered some of the most advanced non-human creatures, such as bottlenose dolphins, certain primates and killer whales.¹⁵⁸

Meaning-constituting systems. Language is, in fact, a special kind of human social institution. According to Tickner, Evelyn Fox Keller and other feminists see language as the subjective medium which transmits human knowledge and makes perception of the world through binary oppositions possible (discussed in section 10).¹⁵⁹ In poststructuralist feminist tradition, “language” in this sense refers to:

not simply words or even vocabulary and set of grammatical rules but, rather, a [verbal or otherwise] meaning-constituting system... [according to which] people represent and understand their world, including who they are and how they relate to others.¹⁶⁰

To our knowledge, no animal but the human animal has a meaning-constituting system. It appears that whales, bats, ants, sharks, mice, chimpanzees, chameleons and dragonflies are innately *incapable* of representing and understanding their world. E. Engdahl and T. R. Burns, like Dennett, see human consciousness as generated from normative and interactive sociocultural forces. However, they also view consciousness as “encoded in language” and a result of humanity’s capacity for symbol-manipulation. They feel that consciousness, therefore, is limited to one’s assimilation of “a shared code, a particular language, collective representations, and experience.”¹⁶¹

Theoretical synthesis. I cannot concur completely with this perspective without making a few clarifications. As mentioned previously, I instead agree with Bloom who feels that the foundation of conscious experience exists prior to, and independent of, language. I also find Bloom’s assertion

¹⁵⁵ S. Savage-Rumbaugh, “Language and non-human minds: what the evidence is trying to tell us” at “Toward a Science of Consciousness” 1996, Cognitive Science and Psychology, April 8-13, 1996 at URL www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/SPECIAL/03_06.html on January 5, 1998.

¹⁵⁶ “Daniel C. Dennett’s ‘Kinds of Minds’” at URL www.california.com/~rpcman/KOM.HTM on January 5, 1998.

¹⁵⁷ Searle, 1984, p. 81.

¹⁵⁸ E. Mercado III, “The mammalian mind” at “Toward a Science of Consciousness” 1996, Science and Psychology, April 8-13, 1996 at URL www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/SPECIAL/03_15.html on January 5, 1998. Investigations into the linguistic, conceptual, behavioral and cognitive abilities of dolphins and chimps have demonstrated compelling commonalities among mammalian minds, ours included. Some animals even pass along cultural knowledge, such as orcas in their hunting and leisure activities and by primates that teach the use of specialized tools.

¹⁵⁹ Tickner, 1992, pp. 7-8, 36.

¹⁶⁰ Scott, pp. 135-138. Scott says that feminism borrows from structuralist linguistics and anthropology the idea of language as the core tenet of poststructuralist analysis.

¹⁶¹ E. Engdahl and T. R. Burns, “Culture and Society,” *Sociology & Political Science*, (Department of Quantum Chemistry, Uppsala University, Sweden) at URL www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/SPECIAL/09_01.html on January 5, 1998.

valid and convincing that language has a limited capacity to expand and modify this experience.¹⁶² I call this phenomenon “global activation,” because I see social interaction and social institutions (language, perhaps, foremost among them) as “activating” certain latent potentialities of consciousness, including the sophistication of cognitive systems.

Language describes or “captures” the essence of intentional states (for example, one can articulate an emotion and say “I love you”). Language may also illicit states (one can hear “I love you” and be overjoyed by it). However, language itself is but communication without meaning, which is solely derived from intentionality, individual and collective. Thus, I resist the temptation to “jump ship” from consciousness in favor of language, as has become somewhat fashionable in social science. I do not “paradigm shift,”¹⁶³ because I see no—or, at most, a minimal—*causal* linguistic role behind consciousness. Henry Plotkin agrees with this assessment.¹⁶⁴ We’ve been down this path before. Therefore, we return to that singular, biologically innate and eminently distinguishing feature of human consciousness: intentionality. Language expresses, clarifies, contextualizes, encodes and communicates intentionality (to the degree that it is capable of doing so). It plays a vital epistemological role in reality-mapping (discussed in Section 4). Yet the bottom line is this: language may be consciousness-enhancing, but not consciousness-causing.

Intentionality and status-function. The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founder of phenomenology, coined the term in his work *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901), where he linked it with meaning and experience.¹⁶⁵ At present, perhaps one of the most influential of contemporary philosophers on this subject is John R. Searle. He defines *intentionality* as “the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer to, or are objects and states of affairs in the world other than ourselves.”¹⁶⁶ He goes on to explain that:

Human beings have a variety of interconnected ways of having access to and representing features of the world to themselves. These include perception, thought, language, beliefs, and desires as well as pictures, maps, diagrams, etc... [called] collectively ‘representations’. A feature of representations so defined is that they all have intentionality, both intrinsic intentionality, as in beliefs and perceptions, and derived intentionality, as in maps and sentences.¹⁶⁷

Most features of Block’s access consciousness I consider synonymous with Searle’s intentional mental states, in that both are most notably characterized by systems of socioculturally

¹⁶² P. Bloom, “Language and consciousness” (Department of Psychology, University of Arizona), Cognitive Science and Psychology at URL www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/SPECIAL/03_06.html on January 6, 1998.

¹⁶³ Barrett, pp. 205-206. The so-called “paradigm shift” in feminism refers to a switches from equality to difference models as well as the shift from consciousness to language. The latter, however, does not apply to this paper.

¹⁶⁴ Plotkin.

¹⁶⁵ Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Phenomenology,” Encarta.

¹⁶⁶ Searle, 1984, pp. 18, 84-85 and Searle, 1995, pp. 150-151.

¹⁶⁷ Searle, 1995, pp. 150-151.

assigned *meanings*. Language itself is a representative manifestation of our collective understandings and it, too, is recursive—it shapes understandings and understandings shape it. Sociologists point to this as one example of the many omnipresent and symbol-saturated elements in the pool of human experience.¹⁶⁸

When Searle speaks of meaning, he often refers to what he calls *status-functions*. These are exactly what they sound like: statuses and functions imposed on everything in our experience, from doctors and automobiles to microwave ovens and shoes. In addition, status-functions can be applied to existing status-functions to form interlocking systems of persisting relationships.¹⁶⁹ *Collective intentionality* assigns these status-functions (which, by the way, are not intrinsic features). Correspondingly, this label creates an institutional fact, which is maintained by human agreement.¹⁷⁰ Thus a web of meaning upon meaning is fashioned, that constitutes social reality.

Furthermore, creating institutional facts through labeling (assigning status-functions) is a matter of convention or collective agreement. It is not uncommon for its extreme manifestations to approach *arbitrariness*, for status-functions attached to status-functions and meanings built upon other meanings are further and further removed from the empirical. These are often unconscious associations and characterized by deontic, and not physical, properties. These have a normative status and delineate deviance and its penalty.¹⁷¹

Collective intentionality, according to Searle, refers to a propensity for cooperative behavior and the sharing of “intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions.” He feels that it is biologically innate and irreducible.¹⁷² In this sense, people are not alone among the animals.¹⁷³

Palette of sophistications. In the previous section we addressed briefly Melanie Phillips’ concept of a “palette of sophistications” *vis-à-vis* “lower” animal intentionality. The “high resolution” of human intentionality boosts the preeminence of *meaning* to the top of the list. Therefore, this establishes a clear delineation of the human conscious brain from other complex brains, biological and electronic alike. To expand this concept, it can be said that other conscious brains in the animal kingdom, besides our own, are capable of emotion and intentionality (individual and collective). Many also demonstrate amazing cognitive abilities and complicated social behavior,

¹⁶⁸ Giddens, 1993a, p. 715. Symbol is fundamental even in our conceptions of self and self-awareness.

¹⁶⁹ Searle, 1995, p. 80.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 46.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp. 28, 47-51, 81, 100. *Deontic* refers to “a system of collectively recognized rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, and powers...[and] privileges, entitlements, penalties, authorizations, permissions.”

¹⁷² *Ibid*, p. 37.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 23.

yet we are reasonably sure that they all lack meaning-constituting systems.¹⁷⁴ Likewise, although the symbol-manipulation and “problem-solving” capabilities of sophisticated computer systems are impressive, they too have no status-function network to call upon.

Recall the metaphor of the space probe. We’ve landed several robots on the surface of Mars, for example. They’ve proven infinitely more adept and accurate than a naked, gasping human counterpart would have been. We have the technological know-how to build machines with the autonomous capability to perform complex tasks. They can independently and reliably scoop up rocks and dirt to measure mass, temperature, moisture content, chemical composition and check for signs of life. Nevertheless, regardless of what they discover, sense, cause or react to, they simply don’t *care*. They are devoid of conscious experience; the data is raw and meaningless. They can’t feel the elation of finding microbial life or the joy of discovering water in the Martian soil. Exploration craft can be programmed to react on their own to changing environments and conditions, to interpret and respond to feedback and to deal with new situations. Conscious creatures with intentional mental states are also fully capable of this.

So, the very essence of what we are and what sets us apart is that ability and inclination to “confer sense and purpose on what [we] do.”¹⁷⁵ We perpetually attempt to *understand* the objects of our awareness (including ourselves) in the sum of reality that the German idealist philosopher G. W. F. Hegel called the “Absolute.”¹⁷⁶ The status-function network (known in other terms by other thinkers, as we shall see) allows humanity to “map” and construct ways of interpreting and understanding reality.

In subsequent sections, the above laborious arguments concerning human perception and consciousness culminate in, and revolve around, questions of culture and meaning. I agree with Searle that a recursive and symbiotic relationship exists between consciousness and culture. Implicit in the following analysis is the notion that culture clearly cannot exist without a consciousness precursor, but not the reverse. To recap, I have already argued, consistent with Searlean perspective, that consciousness and intentional mental states are biologically hardwired, that intentionality and meaning are uniquely human traits, and that higher-order features of intentionality are defined by meaning.

Now, I further link these assertions with the ideas that: meanings do not stand alone, but rather exist in complex interlocking webs; these meaning-constituting systems comprise all human

¹⁷⁴ Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, *Sociology (6th ed.)*, Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1985, p. 56. [Horton & Hunt] Many animals demonstrate social behavior, yet non-human social organization cannot be said to compose society in the human sense. Horton & Hunt suggest that humanity’s inability to wholly rely on instinct prompts culture to substitute by providing direction, thus freeing us from “perpetual trial and error.”

¹⁷⁵ Giddens, 1993a, p. 21.

¹⁷⁶ Robert M. Baird, “Hegel, G(eorg) W(ilhelm) F(riedrich),” Encarta.

knowledge; culture embodies, accumulates, stores and dispenses human knowledge; cultures, so defined, are essentially dynamic reservoir-systems of meaning; and much, but not all, of human behavior is motivated by these meanings. Let's investigate such notions more closely.

4.0. Social Reality: Meaning and Mapping

4.1. Cultural stock of knowledge

A-consciousness and cultural activation. Our investigation of perception, consciousness and intentionality, in the sociological sense, lays the groundwork for more intricate questions concerning the analysis of human behavior. Why do we create the things we create, communicate the way we do, believe the things we believe, do the things we do?

Higher-order A-consciousness and intentionality make culture possible. They also demonstrate the basic components of how we understand and order our relationship with reality. Culture takes this relationship to the next level by expanding our palette of sophistications (recall Durkheim’s suggestion about observing human social behavior).

Already a century ago, the American philosopher, psychologist and founder of pragmatism, William James (1842-1910), maintained that we must “admit consciousness as an ‘epistemological’ necessity, even if we ha[ve] no direct evidence of its [existence].”¹⁷⁷ Put simply, irregardless of how ambiguous our grasp of consciousness may be, it’s crystal clear that we can’t have world-views, beliefs, feelings or other manifestations of intentionality without it. The connection between certain features of access consciousness—namely intentional mental states—and epistemology is requisite and fundamental.¹⁷⁸

Considering the nature of status-functions, these our ways of viewing the world are never judgment-free, but rather meaning-laden. If we use a spatial metaphor, meanings can be thought of as three-dimensionally linked to other meanings like neurons in an intricate web. Such a complex system contributes depth to consciousness and expands the “resolution” of human intentional mental states. Within the collective intentional medium, some globally activated higher-order features of A-consciousness appear to be sparked by aggregate institutions, such as language and complex belief systems (Searlean collective intentionality).

In this sense, I *conditionally* buy a limited “cultural software” argument, insofar as social interaction and institutions may play a pivotal role in “activating” certain latent conscious potentialities. Specifically, in Searlean fashion on the subject, I deny cultural causality for all phenomenal conscious and many access conscious attributes. However, I favor the notion that perhaps advanced features of A-consciousness *are* directly awakened by the sociocultural reservoir.

Norms, enculturation and meaning. The debates and controversies over divine, CDC,

¹⁷⁷ William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (transcribed by Phillip McReynolds, Vanderbilt University) at URL wiredtap.spies.com/Gopher/Library/Classic/empiricism.txt on October 9, 1997.

¹⁷⁸ Put simply, *epistemology* can be considered the conceptual building blocks and underlying constitutive cognitive and perceptual processes/structures that organize and constitute our descriptions of reality (knowledge), including those of the social world.

linguistic or Darwinian origins of consciousness notwithstanding, the way people view, live in, express themselves and create things in their day-to-day world is undeniably largely *shaped* and *expanded* by culture.¹⁷⁹ Culture's stock of knowledge is correspondingly given form in *society*.¹⁸⁰ Many believe that society in turn is regulated by a skeletal structure of complex, constituent parameters and rules called *norms*.¹⁸¹ One school of sociological thought known as *norm theory* holds that we acquire these rules through a learning process called *socialization*, or *enculturation*, and are then to some degree channeled, governed and controlled by its dictates.¹⁸² This school postulates that we reference culture, day after day, as we collect, filter, process and interpret all the mundane information gleaned by our senses about the tangible, objective world around us.

We behaviorally comply with collective cultural perspective, the theory goes, because we are constantly inundated with normative pressure and influence to do so. Simply put, we internalize cultural programming and think and act accordingly.¹⁸³ This takes the form of various mechanisms of learning, such as conditioning, instruction, modeling, identification and rule-learning.¹⁸⁴ Norms define appropriate conduct, prescribe modes of thinking, delineate ways of seeing and interpreting the world and clarify the consequences of deviation.

In addition, these fingerprints are said to exist in all layers of higher thought. It is widely held that these guideposts provide cues to interpreting the many facets of social reality. In making sense of others' actions, for example, we consult the cultural "stock of knowledge"¹⁸⁵ or reference "resources."¹⁸⁶ The formulation and utilization of abstract concepts also fall under this domain, including notions of religious and cosmological consequence and the concepts of logic, philosophy and science. All are created, contemplated, modified, performed and perpetuated according to a given culture's inherited collection of ideas and perspectives, folkways,¹⁸⁷ language, symbols, values, world-views, institutions and belief systems. The overriding feature here, as Pertti Alasuutari has said, is that "reality and social life are always and essentially mediated through meanings."¹⁸⁸ That is to say:

¹⁷⁹ Horton & Hunt, pp. 52, 64. Horton & Hunt define *culture* as "not simply an accumulation of folkways and mores, [but] an organized system of behavior" or "everything which is socially learned and shared by members of a society."

¹⁸⁰ Giddens, 1993a, p. 32. *Society* is "the system of interrelationships which connects individuals together."

¹⁸¹ "Normative," *Principia Cybernetica Web* at URL pespmc1.vub.ac.be. A *norm* is considered "an authoritative standard or principle of right action binding on a member of a group."

¹⁸² Pertti Alasuutari, *Researching Culture—Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies*, London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1995, p. 31 [Alasuutari] Alasuutari says, "the values of the cultural system are institutionalized as structures of the social system, which in turn are internalized in the personalities of individuals, and... regulate[s] their activity through... normative coercion."

¹⁸³ Giddens, 1993b, p. 24. Both Émile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud arrived at this conclusion independently.

¹⁸⁴ Connell, p. 192. For the purposes of this paper, these activities are grouped under *socialization* and its synonym *enculturation*.

¹⁸⁵ Giddens, 1993b, p. 121. Think of this as a "norm library," a repository of, and center of exchange for, cultural knowledge. Not only does it maintain, disseminate and perpetuate this knowledge, but it also provides "reference material" by pointing to other cultural values.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 21, 121. Giddens sees a two-tiered structure divided into *mutual knowledge* (interpretive schemes for meanings in social life) and *common sense* (corpus of theoretical knowledge about the structure and workings of the world).

¹⁸⁷ Horton & Hunt, p. 76. *Folkways* are a society's customs.

¹⁸⁸ Alasuutari, p. 35.

“[p]eople do not respond to the world directly; they respond to meanings they impute to the things and happenings around them.”¹⁸⁹ Assimilated cultural understandings or knowledge claims, which impart these meanings, are often obtained independently of, or prior to, experience¹⁹⁰ through what Geert Hofstede calls a “collective programming of the mind.”¹⁹¹

The self-perpetuating nature of global activation or normative coercion—depending on one’s point of view—sees that this process emerges and endures (see *autopoiesis* in footnote 242). Cultural knowledge does not innately accompany consciousness, but rather is imparted and learned. It is also characteristically subjective. *Any* label, value judgment, status or function we associate with people, art, animals, institutions, tools, countries, deities or *anything* is culturally derived. Hofstede says that according to developmental psychologists, a basic and fairly rigid value system may already be in place by the age of 10.¹⁹²

Table Three: The Separation of Nature and Culture	
Nature (Biology)	Culture (Society)
Individual or micro structure	Collective or macro structure
Brain/CNS, senses, perception, cognition, experience	Norms, institutions, language, ontology, socialization
Intrinsic intentionality	Derived intentionality
P- and lower A-consciousness	“Globally activated” higher A-consciousness
Objective (meaning-free) hardware	Subjective (meaning-laden) software
<i>A priori</i>	<i>A posteriori</i>
Physicalism, non-institutional (brute) facts	Representation, institutional facts

Beyond normative discourse. According to Searle, through collective intentionality (which is biologically innate), the creation and maintenance of a hierarchical (power-based) web of *status-functions* emerges. For this reason, Alasuutari says, “[t]he world does not present itself to us ‘as is’, but always through the relationship we have to this world.”¹⁹³ This relationship has been philosophically conceptualized in many ways. Giddens, for example, envisions a system of behavior-

¹⁸⁹ Horton & Hunt, p. 15.

¹⁹⁰ “A Priori,” *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at URL www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/apriori.htm on July 31, 1997. This could reflect the literal use of the term *a priori* as “known to be true independently of or in advance of experience of the subject matter; requiring no evidence for its validation or support,” as defined by Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus (electronic version 1.0), based on Collins English Dictionary (3rd ed.), HarperCollins Publishers, 1979, 1986, 1991. For instance, one can know that Tibet is a real place, that lethal reptiles called “diamondback rattlers” exist, or that hot stoves burn skin, all without reference to first-hand experience. Note that these are surface examples; discussed later is how the knowledge stock is preexistent, and constitutive, of the most basic perceptual structures and processes. This paper considers all human knowledge to be *a posteriori*, merely “commenting” by way of (collective) experience on *a priori*, independent and tangible features of the world. This coincides with Searle’s division of “real world” and representational facts. In this context, *a priori* considered synonymous and interchangeable with objective and empirical, non-institutional facts and *a posteriori* with subjective, representational institutional facts.

¹⁹¹ Hofstede, p. 18. Hofstede says this “programming” parallels the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of *habitus*, the self-perpetuating, autonomous “system of permanent and transferable dispositions.”

¹⁹² Hofstede, 1991, p. 8.

¹⁹³ Alasuutari, p. 27.

directing meaning-frames. Foucault sees meanings as embedded in groups of signs—or discourses—which mold ontologies. Derrida is famous for maintaining that “there is nothing outside the text.” And Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe stress meaning in rules and conventions.¹⁹⁴

Naturally, the degree to which societal rules are referenced, the nature and amount of influence they exact¹⁹⁵ and the extent to which they can be “side-stepped” are debated topics in sociology. Many take issue specifically with the rules-directed behavior cornerstone of norm theory. Searle, for example, does not buy the idea of unconsciously following cultural rules, as cognitive science (CS) and linguistics generally describe. Neither does Searle subscribe to a mental causation theory, according to which

the agent is operating consciously or unconsciously, with a set of rational procedures over more or less well-defined sets of intentional states, such as preference schedules or internalized rules.¹⁹⁶

Finally, Searle likewise rejects brute physical causation (like behaviorism) or connectionism, rule-described or rule-governed behavior in which rule structure is seen as a causal explanation for human behavior. Searle does not deny that there are rules that we follow both consciously and unconsciously. However, he feels that causal and functional explanations concerning “unconscious dispositions and capacities... sensitive to the rule structure of the institution,” called “diachronic mechanisms,” coexist in a complex rule-governed system.¹⁹⁷ In any case, although the scientific study of human society is a matter of varied points of departure, there exist certain common threads. A number of “persistent debates” in sociology have revolved around the central themes of the individual’s relation to society; the nature of social order, control and regulation; and how society is possible.¹⁹⁸

To this end, much attention is afforded to meaning, interpretation, knowledge and discourse. For example, *hermeneutics* seeks social meanings in texts and discourses.¹⁹⁹ *Ethnomethodology* is the “detailed study of the nature and variations of mutual knowledge.”²⁰⁰ Cultural studies, “preoccupied with the mediation of social life through meanings or *semiosis*,” focuses on the elements of group cohesion through shared views and understandings of reality. The key concept is the “collective

¹⁹⁴ Barrett, pp. 202, 209. Jacques Derrida’s statement in the original French: *il n’y a pas d’hors texte*. See also Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, London: Routledge, 1989 and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,” in Ernesto Laclau (ed.), *New Reflections on the Revolution in Our Time*, London: Verso, 1990.

¹⁹⁵ Horton & Hunt, p. 158. They point out that few, if any, modern societies can be said to epitomize “perfectly” the socializing function at work.

¹⁹⁶ Searle, 1995, p. 138.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 142, 144-146.

¹⁹⁸ Turner, p. 2, and Alasuutari, p. 31. Alasuutari suggests that sociology tends to focus on norms in this investigation because it affords a look at power and power structures. Many gender-theorists would agree.

¹⁹⁹ Dalby, p. 5.

²⁰⁰ Giddens, 1987, pp. 65-66.

notions of how the world is organized and collective images of the good life” rather than the imposed “rulebook” approach cherished by norm theory.²⁰¹ This notion has been called *collective subjectivity*, which refers to “a way of life or outlook adopted by a community or a social class.”²⁰²

Alasuutari, speaking of cultural studies, writes of “‘meaning systems’, ‘cultural distinctions’, ‘models’, ‘schemes’ or ‘interpretation repertoires’,” by which people interpret and do things in the world. He continues to explain that:

it is stressed that models or distinctions commonly used in society constitute—that is, produce and reproduce—social reality (including the subjects themselves), and are an integral part of that reality... This concept seeks to unravel the juxtaposition between reality and conceptions of reality.²⁰³

Alasuutari goes on to hint at the immense size of the dynamic, recursive relationship we share with culture’s meaning system and related institutions and practices. The next section addresses this relationship in more detail.

It should be noted that the purpose here of introducing normative theory, social interactionism, rule-governed/rule-sensitive behavior and Searle’s diachronic mechanisms is not to *dwell* on them. The reader may come to his/her own conclusions concerning, for example, the nature and degree of normative influence on human motivations and behavior. The important point is that they and other cultural elements are composed of, defined by, and exist as agents of meaning creation, maintenance and transference. These have been included here to demonstrate the wider contextual picture. Therefore, the idea is not to get bogged down in these matters, but to move on to the metaphysical structure of ontologies.

4.2. Mapping, orienteering and reference points

Social constructivism. Meaning systems are alive, an “active creation.”²⁰⁴ As Searle points out, social features are human constructs at least partly shaped by our attitudes toward them. These are human *representations* or *descriptions* of brute features of reality or other representations. Thus, they need not accurately reflect any facet of objective reality, such as physical qualities. Their structures, institutions and activities are mutable. In this sense, beyond cognition, the cultural knowledge stock provides elaborate subjective perceptual frameworks, which are artificial and subjective, a matter of judgment and interpretation. Fluid in time and space, not only are they individually and internally subjective, but also variable from one culture to the next. Theoretically, an

²⁰¹ Giddens, 1987, pp. 36-37, 163, 167.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁰³ Alasuutari, p. 36.

²⁰⁴ Dalby, p. 5.

infinite number of perceptual and normative permutations could exist within this conceptual relativity. Yet, most cultures are believed to share some common composite and formative features.

Varied flux and reference points. These primarily take the form of a perceptual backdrop, which supplies reference points, and makes “mapping” of reality possible. This refers to how we conceive of and interpret the cosmos and how we orient ourselves within that worldview. By this I mean that mapping conceptualizes the totality of reality in terms of its constituent pieces. Each piece is recognizable and classified relative to every other. That is to say, grasping the universe entails, for instance, how each component part seems to exhibit similarity or difference, the appearance or lack of apparent structural or functional connectivity with other phenomena, or whether or not a causal link is discernible.

Through this “lens” of comparison and contrast, the world can be seen in terms of “boxes” of categories, compartments and labels—kind of taxonomy of everything. Every person, thing and idea has certain places, functions, responsibilities, roles and attached meanings, values and judgments in this culturally defined order. Culture weaves threads of understanding between categories, linking them together in a web so that we may comprehend and interpret them. However, I maintain that every single one of these cultural reference points cannot possibly be in a state of simultaneous *full-throttle* flux. Granted, we live in a dynamic universe, where nothing is fixed and static. Everything from tachyons, sub-atomic particles and light to planets, stars and entire galaxies are constantly on the move. Interestingly, the fluctuations of social reality appear to conform to a similar pattern.

For the natural and the social universes, not all change occurs at a constant, simultaneous or analogous rate, intensity or duration. As often happens, loud flashes of intense, explosive and radical change punctuate periods of calm, incremental and nondescript progression. However, considering the nature of “navigational” reference points—that *they must largely remain fixed to be useful*—how do we reconcile the fluidity of cultural frames with the apparent human need for some degree of relative stasis?

Partially fixed nodes and the GPS metaphor. Laclau and Mouffe provide a way out of this seemingly paradoxical conundrum. They suggest that some cultural references—though mutating and evolving like all others—do so in a staggered fashion, at a markedly slower rate, lower intensity and spread across a greater temporal span than others. Relatively speaking, these epistemological *nodes* are points of partly fixed meaning.²⁰⁵ In the metaphorical sense, these nodes function as a *global positioning system* (GPS). GPS is a very real satellite-based radionavigation system developed and operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It is an all-weather, 24-hour-a-day technological

wonder which permits land, sea and airborne users to determine their three-dimensional position, velocity and time anywhere in the world.

The so-called space segment, consists of 24 satellites in six circular paths 20,200 km (10,900 nm) above the earth, each equipped with ultra-accurate atomic clocks. Their orbital spacing is such that at any time at least six of them are viewable anywhere in the world. They are reference points. By *satellite ranging*, users' equipment measures the time delay for the continuous location/time data signal to reach their receiver, which equates to the satellite's apparent range. Measurements collected simultaneously from four satellites are processed to display where users are, how fast they are moving and what the current time is at any given location.²⁰⁶

It is an enveloping, overarching, omnipresent network, which orients people in time and space within a multidimensional and kaleidoscopic conceptualization of reality. Both GPS and cultural nodes provide an umbrella grid of transverse reference points, guideposts and markers. People need such references to find their way, as Pertti Alasuutari points out:

Reality is socially construed through and through; it is composed of interpretations of meanings and rules of interpretation on the basis of which people orientate themselves in their everyday life...²⁰⁷

Functionally, this is why binaries are absolutes or ideals that we cling to like anchors; they must be. They are, as we have seen, cultural navigational aids like channel marker buoys (or GPS satellites) are to ships. Left unsecured to fixed locations and allowed to simply drift around, their practical utility as plotting tools would be completely negated. Yet, as the paradigm shift in physics from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian model showed, reality is relative—it just depends on one's point of view.

Ironically, in a universe of relativity where the most celebrated natural scientific ideas distinctly refer to and demonstrate the relative, Western culture requires, prefers, celebrates and indeed is founded upon a perceptual system of absolutes and polar values. We look for explanatory laws, seek universal constants and devise grand theories. Equally relevant to human culture as it is to the natural world, this topic has been debated by the powerhouse philosophers in the social disciplines as well. So conceptualized, we can delineate suspected nodal *function*, but what of *structure*? And what does this mean to social science?

²⁰⁵ Pringle & Watson, pp. 65-66. Laclau and Mouffe see "articulatory practices' which temporarily arrest the flow of differences to construct privileged sites or nodal points which partially fix meaning." They feel that "non-discursive' complexes, such as institutions" derive meaning from discursive structures.

²⁰⁶ From the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center at URL www.navcen.uscg.mil on July 31, 1997. Additional data, such as distance and bearing to selected waypoints or digital charts can also be displayed using GPS. Besides navigation, GPS is used for surveying purposes, geophysical exploration, mapping and geodesy, vehicle location systems and more.

²⁰⁷ Alasuutari, p. 27.

4.3. Connections: binary metaphysics

Dialectic logic. The philosophical branch *metaphysics* views *all* categories as creations, all frames of reference as fabrications and as *synthetic* in the Kantian sense.²⁰⁸ There are only three recurring irreducible axiomatic concepts: existence, consciousness and identity.²⁰⁹ This paper has addressed the first of these from the beginning, presupposing an ontologically objective, external reality, which we subjectively interpret. Also, I have discussed at length the origins, nature and significance of consciousness, presupposing biological phenomenal and “lower” A-consciousness crowned by sociocultural, globally activated “higher” access consciousness. The last item—identity—is associated with how we reference culture and associate specific attributes with ourselves and others.

This is the realm of *ontology* (which deals with the structure of knowledge, the structure of *connections*), as opposed to *epistemology* (which theorizes about knowledge, critically investigating its nature, validity, methods and scope).²¹⁰ This is a critical point which AI scientists recognize, as they fashion ontology structures in an attempt to electronically mimic human connection-making ability. Concerning our capability to assemble interconnections, it’s been said that:

Comprehend[ing] the external world involves the ability to interpret, distinguish, and relate what seems to be singular things or, at least, singular groups of things... [by] forming interconnections between these singular things.²¹¹

Many contemporary metatheorists focus on these connections and their associated meanings. They believe that the fundamental building blocks of Western cultures’ “reality map” are binary categories—a system of culturally constructed diametric pairs. Each binary half is understood and defined relative to its counterpart. Categorically, they do not exist independently of one another. Feminists and others feel that due to an innate hierarchical nature of binary oppositions, one is considered the more inherently desirable of the two. Margaret Whitford writes that:

Western rationality, governed by the male imaginary, is characterised by: the principle of identity (also expressed in terms of quantity and ownership); the principle of non-contradiction (in which ambiguity, ambivalence or multivalence have been reduced to a minimum); and binarism (e.g. nature/reason, subject/object, matter/energy, inertia/movement)—as though everything had to be either one thing or another.²¹²

²⁰⁸ Elam, pp. 44-45. In this sense, synthetic judgment requires a consultation with experience.

²⁰⁹ “Metaphysics” at URL jerryd.prodentec.com/METAPHYS.HTM on March 8, 1998.

²¹⁰ “What is an ontology?” at URL www-ksl-svc.stanford.edu:5915/doc/frame-editor/what-is-an-ontology.html on March 8, 1998. Ontologies explicitly provide a vocabulary for representing and communicating knowledge about some topic and a set of interrelations among the terms in that vocabulary.

²¹¹ External Reality.

²¹² Margaret Whitford, “Luce Irigaray’s Critique of Rationality” in Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (eds.), *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy*, Hong Kong: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 42. See Luce Irigaray, *Parler n’est jamais neutre*, Paris: Minuit, 1985.

As Simone de Beauvoir wrote in *The Second Sex* (1953), “Evil is necessary to Good, Matter to Idea, and Darkness to Light.”²¹³ Such “dichotomies and polarities” in Western thought²¹⁴ are innumerable and “rest on metaphors and cross-references.”²¹⁵ In fact, binary logic can be said to inundate and constitute the most fundamental fibers of our cosmological structures. The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure called these mutually exclusive relations *paradigmatic oppositions*.²¹⁶ Harvey Sacks began referring to them in the 1960s as *standardized relational pairs*, and correctly identified their inherently hierarchical nature.²¹⁷ Geert Hofstede speaks of cultural values—standardized by norms—as having “a plus and minus side.”²¹⁸

Regardless of their label, the core of binary or dualistic metaphysics is characterized by a “structure of paired opposites,” which preferentially defines, separates and stratifies terms. Then, according to V. Spike Peterson, a feminist international relations scholar, “[t]he subordinated term is peripheralized, displaced beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable.”²¹⁹ Another feminist scholar Joan W. Scott describes this “concept of difference” as comprised of interdependent “fixed oppositions.” She writes that:

the notion (following Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist linguistics) that meaning is made through implicit or explicit contrast, that a positive definition rests on the negation or repression of something represented as antithetical to it. Thus, any unitary concept in fact contains repressed or negated material...²²⁰

This in and of itself is nothing new to the theoretical body, as Moira Gatens remarks: “[a] feature common of most, if not all, dominant socio-political theories is a commitment to the dualisms central to western thought.”²²¹ Later in this text, the research focuses on the gender binary, which has until relatively recently gone underrecognized and underutilized as a category of analysis. For now, however, let’s delve deeper into the nature of cultural dualisms and the consequences of such a way of thinking.

Biblical binarism. To illustrate, consider briefly a cultural icon: the Bible. Arguably, it is the single most influential piece of literature in the Western world. It is also perhaps the best representative cultural artifact of cosmology-shaping and worldview-engineering anywhere. In fact, one could say that the biblical cosmology is *the* account of dichotomous universal order and the

²¹³ Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (trans. H. M. Parshley), New York: Knopf, 1953, p. 72.

²¹⁴ Dalby, p. 17.

²¹⁵ Scott, p. 137.

²¹⁶ Silverman, p. 72. See Saussure’s *Course in General Linguistics*, London: Fontana, 1974.

²¹⁷ Alasuutari, pp. 66-67.

²¹⁸ Hofstede, pp. 8-9.

²¹⁹ Peterson, p. 185.

²²⁰ Scott, p. 137. See also Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

ultimate purveyor of a widely held, pervasive binary structure of all things. Biblical analogies, symbols, metaphors and worldview are so deeply ingrained and constitutive of the Judeo-Christian world that the two are fundamentally intertwined. Even in the modern day-to-day lives of ordinary people—regardless of their religious orientation—the Bible’s diagram for reality-mapping plays an important role.

From the very beginning, the biblical narrative in Genesis introduces the reader to a fixed order based on binary oppositions. The supreme deity’s very act of creation is a two-fold process—one of work and rest—which produces such diametrics as day and night, heaven and earth, light and darkness, plant and animal, land and sea, and man and woman. And, of course, following the introduction to life and death, the ultimate binaries of good and evil, right and wrong, Heaven and Hell. From Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel in the Old Testament (codified in the 5th century BC) to the account of Jesus (who described himself as the Alpha and the Omega) in the New Testament.²²²

A black and white world. Binary categories are status-functions charged with meaning. They are linked inextricably to a great expanse of other meanings, judgments, deontic expectations and assumptions. Cultural dualisms and their accompanying meaning structures can be extraordinarily pervasive. For example, Western cultures tend to prefer the color white over black, seemingly arbitrarily.²²³ Examples of this dualism alone are seemingly endless.

Not surprisingly, language teems with examples of this deeply symbolic relationship. Anyone who has ever had their name blackened, their record black-marked or been blackballed, blacklisted, blackmailed or labeled a “black sheep” can readily attest to their misfortune, hardship, ostracism and misery.

Table Four: Values Associated With White and Black	
White	Black
good, life, creation, law, order, day, light, security, safety, magic, clean, wizardry, god, Christianity, trustworthiness, truth, knowledge, enlightenment, civilization, honor, wisdom, hope	evil, death, destruction, anarchy, chaos, night, darkness, insecurity, danger, witchcraft, soiled, sorcery, devil, paganism, treachery, falsehood, ignorance, unenlightenment, barbarism, shame, foolishness, despair

²²¹ Gatens, pp. 121-122. For example, such binary analyses tend to focus on production-reproduction, family-state and individual-society.

²²² Hofstede, p. 101. As Hofstede points out, male dominance is evident in the biblical account from the very beginning.

²²³ One could credibly argue that white predilection dates back to the mists of human pre-history. The primeval fear of night and the creatures—real and imagined—that creep in the darkness would spawn associations with the negative (e.g., the lethal, evil, inhuman, malicious). In any case, this is a patently invalid basis for racial preference or an argument that white chess pieces are inherently better than their black counterparts. There may be *psychological benefits* (one could feel so strongly about white chess pieces that they actually play *worse* when stuck with black), but, under normal circumstances, no *a priori* reason for such a bias exists. This is a matter of intentionality—of perception and interpretation—not of other intrinsic properties of brute reality. As we shall see, this is a common feature of dualisms, including gender.

White clearly is the more desirable color due to its overwhelmingly positive connotations, as demonstrated above (and the list, of course, could go on and on). At first glance, it seems to offer little in the way of social significance other than nifty concept associations. How can there be notable, large-scale social consequences of preference of one color over the other? Put simply, if black and white are also interpreted as racial categories, the implications are clear.²²⁴ To be sure, the structures and effects of such binaries run deep. Concerning the impact of the sub-surface meaning web, Pertti Alasuutari explains:

In fact, a great deal of current research in sociology or cultural studies is engaged in studying the way in which elements of discourse are associated with other ones to then present our cultural world as given. For instance, race, gender, sexual orientation and class have been addressed in this perspective. Consider the semiotic approach to race. [African slaves bound for the Americas] were rendered 'black' by an ideology of exploitation based on racial logic—the establishment and maintenance of a 'colour line', which then produces the category 'white' as its contrasting counterpart... This distinction is then associated with other distinctions, such as individual differences and the nature/culture opposition, to legitimize institutional arrangements and inequalities...²²⁵

As we have repeatedly discussed, all these dualisms are institutional facts. They are representations and therefore discretionary, neither necessarily self-evident nor natural. Attached values and judgments are also subjective. Saussure recognized this, and further maintained that no *a priori* justification for enforcing such categories exists.²²⁶

On this basis, in the next sections, we shall investigate feminist claims concerning the Man-Woman diametric, in particular the notion that any discussion concerning binaries is inherently a discussion about power relations, “including negative and positive, conditional and categorical, collective and individual powers.”²²⁷ To begin with, let's take a look at the conceptual relationship between sex and gender. We will then move on to gender as an element in understandings of Self and Other and the consequences of the pervasiveness of gender in constructing and understanding social reality. In particular, this will focus on gender as defined by opposition—as any binary is—with women generally taken to be the inferior half.²²⁸

Identity: notions of Self and Other. Perhaps the most fundamental binary is that of Self and Other, which serves as the basis for defining *identity*. After all, higher consciousness means that we

²²⁴ Mary Daly, *Gyn/Ecology—The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*, London: The Women's Press Ltd., 1991, p. 278. [Daly]

²²⁵ Alasuutari, p. 65.

²²⁶ Elam, p. 47. There are implicit and explicit justificatory claims, however.

²²⁷ Searle, 1995, p. 94.

²²⁸ Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (eds.), "Introduction" in *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy*, Hong Kong: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 6.

are not just embodied, we are *enselved*.²²⁹ Self-Other provides equilibrium in the form of “security of being” or “ontological security.”²³⁰ In binary metaphysics, Self implies Other, and each is defined *vis-à-vis* its diametric counterpart. Their construction is multifaceted.²³¹ The Self-Other binary orientates. It separates that which is similar, familiar, domestic, inclusive and near from that which is different, alien, foreign, exclusive and distant. Ultimately, it classifies all individuals and groups according to these socioculturally defined criteria of difference. Dalby elaborates:

Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and crucially a political act; it constructs a space for the Other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference.²³²

G. H. Mead’s (1863-1931) concept of the *generalized other*²³³ showed that from earliest infant experience, knowledge of self and self-understanding are acquired through knowledge of others. Wittgenstein and “certain versions of existentialist phenomenology” echo this sentiment.²³⁴ In the same interactionist vein, C. H. Cooley (1846-1929) referred to the “looking-glass self,” where the “perception of the judgments of others... is the active factor in the self-image forming process.”²³⁵ Giddens writes of the phenomenological process of *typification*, “whereby the actor applies learned interpretive schemes to grasp the meanings of what they do.”²³⁶ Michael Lewis, approaching Self from a traditional developmental approach, suggests a two-tiered model comprising the *existential self* and the *categorical self*. As Valerie Gray Hardcastle summarizes Lewis’ position:

The existential self captures our knowledge of ourselves as apart from others. It develops quite early and persists relatively unchanged throughout our lifetimes. The categorical self, on the other hand, develops later and changes as we continue to grow and mature. It refers to the ways in which we define ourselves in terms of categories found in the external world.²³⁷

Lewis’ categorical self, which concerns us in this debate, defers to the cultural knowledge stock for direction. Cooley saw society and the abstract “separate individual” as aspects of the same

²²⁹ Turner, p. 1.

²³⁰ Giddens, 1993b, p. 124 and Giddens 3, p. 178. *Security of being* is seen by Giddens as partly “the sustaining of a cognitively ordered world of self and other” and “the maintenance of an ‘effective’ order of want management.” *Ontological security* is R. D. Laing’s term from *The Divided Self*, Pelican, 1964. Laing wrote of a sense of belonging, purpose and affinity imparted by routinization in large-scale societies and by continuity of local practices in traditional cultures.

²³¹ Dalby, p. 27. Three constitutive axes: (1) *axiological* (encompassing value judgments, such as is the Other bad, equal, likeable or inferior?); (2) *praxeological* (characterized by a distancing or rapprochement with the Other); and (3) *epistemic* (demonstrating an ignorance or knowledge of the Other’s identity).

²³² *Ibid*, p. 7. He attributes these to Todorov.

²³³ Horton & Hunt, p. 97. The generalized Other is a composite of “others’ roles, feelings and values” and the “expectations of the community.” See George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934.

²³⁴ Giddens, 1993a, pp. 23-24. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, 1972.

²³⁵ Horton & Hunt, 1985, pp. 95-96, 98. See Charles Horton Cooley, *The Nature of Human Nature*, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1902.

²³⁶ Giddens, 1993b, p. 35.

²³⁷ Hardcastle. See also Michael Lewis, “The Role of The Self In Social Behaviour.”

phenomenon, neither capable of existing without the other.²³⁸ Indeed, separating the Other in space and time is a Foucauldian conception.²³⁹ These ideas concern international relations, for they entail the central concepts of modern territorial sovereignty and the territorial state.²⁴⁰ Dalby mentions that in the positivist approach to science, knowledge about the Other gives the knower power over the known by giving mechanisms to manipulate and control.²⁴¹ Self-Other constructs are fundamentally power relationships. That which is different is often considered a threat—“what is different, is dangerous,” as Hofstede writes. In IR theory, the fear of the unknown underlies realist assumptions about power and security. This is discussed more in ensuing sections.

Cultural frameworks of understanding behind foundational individual notions of Self are constituent of, and congruent with, the collective categorical system that produced them. They are, in fact, merely two sides of the same coin. If one prescribes to classical analytical levels, these can be understood as analogous contextual social values expressed in micro (individual, interpersonal and intracultural) and macro (inter-group, international and intercultural) terms. These employ the same categories for evaluating reality; the same system of beliefs, symbols and meanings; and the same synthetic frames of reference.

After all, individuals internalize the form and function of cultural understandings from the normative web. The annular knowledge claims are therefore reinforced and perpetuated by autopoietic processes.²⁴² The circle is complete. Notions of Self and Other, therefore, appear to be partly based on individual experience and partly infused with *a posteriori* understanding. This takes on more significance in the next section, where we discuss engendered segments of identity.

²³⁸ Horton & Hunt, p. 98. Compare to Freud's "antisocial self" which presupposes fundamental conflict, not harmony, with society.

²³⁹ Dalby, pp. 20-21.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 22.

²⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 21.

²⁴² "Autopoiesis," *Principia Cybernetica Web* at URL pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/AUTOPOIESIS.html on October 9, 1997, defines autopoiesis as "the process whereby an organization produces itself... [through] an autonomous and self-maintaining unity which contains component-producing processes. The components, through their interaction, generate recursively the same network of processes which produced them... Literally, self-production... e.g., a biological cell, a living organism and to some extent a corporation and a society as a whole."

5.0. Gender Theory and IR

5.1. Constructing gender

Sociobiology and the sex-gender debate. Common sense tells us that men and women are obviously and incontrovertibly different. It would be absurd to deny, at least, the empirical and self-evident biological contrast. There are brute, physical, non-institutional facts that attest to this—most obviously *vis-à-vis* the organs of generation.²⁴³ But, as we have seen, purely physiological considerations are but one element among many that characterize us as a species. Considering the conscious, intentional and social human creature, biology in many ways doesn't even *begin* to define or explain what we are, what we are capable of, or why we do certain things.

Historically, though, studying the origins, nature, depth and (social) consequences of *sex* difference has often been the basis of *gender* difference debate. A deterministic biological thesis, such as one based on *sociobiology*,²⁴⁴ “asserts that innate biological factors determine a person’s morality.” In Hegel’s view, for example, the two “natures” of the sexes made man a creature of “reason” and woman intuitive, man as “powerful and active” and woman as passive and subjective.²⁴⁵ These attempts at naturalizing and essentializing sex differences, Tickner says, are often used to justify and reify reproductive and domestic roles.²⁴⁶ Granted, it is perfectly understandable that deontic considerations about gender and gender roles would be rooted in matters of sexual status-function, particularly in light of childbearing and breastfeeding responsibilities.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, in all fairness, compelling physiological differences exist that surpass primary or secondary sexual characteristics. Recent research suggests that the very structure and functioning of the brain differs between men and women.

²⁴³ Hofstede, p. 80. Hofstede refers to differences directly related to procreation as *absolute*. Other differences can be characterized as *statistical*, which refer to “on average” contrasts such as height, weight, fatigue and metabolic rates, manual dexterity, etc.

²⁴⁴ Giddens, 1993a, p. 35. *Sociobiology* holds that social life and social activities can be explained by genetic analysis. For more on this see also Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis and On Human Nature*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, (1975 and 1978 respectively). Helen Longino and Evelyn Hammonds point to sociobiology’s examples of “coyness in females, and sexual aggressiveness in males,” which are considered evolutionary adaptations but are “untenable on ‘internalist’ scientific grounds” as Anne Fausto-Sterling suggests in her book *Myths of Gender*. See Helen E. Longino and Evelyn Hammonds, “Conflicts and Tensions in the Feminist Study of Gender and Science” in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds.), *Conflicts in Feminism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 166. This is important to gender studies as the concept of *essentialism*, which posits some “essential” natural behaviors that are biologically based and therefore gender-specific. Marina Lazreg points to “some men’s inability (or reluctance) to accept sexual difference as the expression of modes of being human” and Western gynocentrism’s essentialism of motherhood as examples. See Marina Lazreg, “Feminism and Difference: The Perils of Writing as a Woman on Women in Algeria” in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds.), *Conflicts in Feminism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 338.

²⁴⁵ Alison Assiter, “Autonomy and Pornography” in Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (eds.), *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy*, Hong Kong: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 62. See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right* (trans. T. M. Knox), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

²⁴⁶ Tickner, 1992, p. 98. Ironically, such devices are employed in masculinist and feminist agendas alike. In the instance cited above, Tickner refers to tactics used by eco-feminists themselves to link what they see as natural maternal instincts with environmental awareness and protection.

²⁴⁷ Hofstede, p. 81.

This leads some to favor biology in explaining, among other things, psychological contrast. A good example was Sigmund Freud, who hoped to prove a biological basis for psychology during his work with psychoanalytic techniques. Ultimately, however, his research “produced detailed and sophisticated accounts of femininity and masculinity as psychological forms constructed by social processes.”²⁴⁸ This is a fundamental philosophical cleavage, Connell explains, because:

Socialization theory treats gender formation as the acquisition and internalization of social norms. It stresses continuity between social context and personality, and the homogeneity of personality itself. Psychoanalysis treats gender formation as the effect of an encounter with power and necessity rather than normative prescriptions. It emphasizes discontinuity between social context and personality, and points to radical division within personality.²⁴⁹

Subsequently, most sociological—especially feminist—theses focus on gender, not sex, and therefore stress cultural “factors such as environment, upbringing and social context.” Although they may invoke class, structural or other factors, most feminists feel “that the salient and overriding cultural phenomenon *is* gender.”²⁵⁰ Tickner cites examples of contemporary feminist approaches critiquing *realpolitik* (discussed in detail in a moment), which employ social interactionist and psychoanalytic methodologies.²⁵¹ In principle, this is nothing new. Feminist views on gender have a rich history.

Over 200 years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft’s feminist milestone *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) rightly recognized sex hierarchy as social and not natural.²⁵² Today, this is an institutionalized feature of a mature feminist philosophy, as gender is recognized as a social construct and product of culture, an institutional fact fashioned and maintained by human agreement. This sentiment is now a common feature in feminist literature. Tickner clarifies that “biology may constrain behavior, but it should not be used ‘deterministically’ or ‘naturally’ to justify practices, institutions, or choices that could be other than they are.”²⁵³

With the causal role of biology so reduced, Runyon and Peterson announce that “feminists have exposed the inscription of an essentialized dualism of sexual identities as neither ‘natural,’ self-evident, nor apolitical, but an arbitrary, strategic, and political construction of ‘gender as difference’.”²⁵⁴ Investigating the “extreme” cases in this regard provides more than simple anecdotal evidence, which helps dissolve prevailing myths about absolute and polar opposites and

²⁴⁸ Connell, p. 28.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 191.

²⁵⁰ Brenda Almond, “Women’s Right: Reflections on Ethics and Gender” in Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (eds.), *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy*, Hong Kong: Indiana University Press, 1988, pp. 50-51. A belief in a patriarchy is the extension of this.

²⁵¹ Tickner, 1992, pp. 45-46.

²⁵² Ann Snitow, “A Gender Diary” in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds.), *Conflicts in Feminism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 28.

²⁵³ Tickner, 1992, p. 7.

“universalizing definitions.”²⁵⁵

Alfred Kinsey’s classic studies of American males dispelled the notion of two distinct sexual orientation categories. This and other research has consistently shown that mainstream Western culture sees “error” and “freak”²⁵⁶ in homosexuality and hermaphroditism.²⁵⁷ These are often considered aberrations, mental defects or physical illnesses. Gays and lesbians are viewed as “victims of sex-role confusion.”²⁵⁸ Foucault has shown that ambiguity over the sexual identities of hermaphrodites demonstrates that one’s “true” sex is the outcome of medical/cultural practices.²⁵⁹ This considered, I am not alone in holding the opinion that metatheoretical debate over sexual difference as a category—the biological male-female delineation itself—is *less relevant than the interpretation of it*.²⁶⁰ Elam is right to point out that nature can’t be changed, but our perception of it can. Sex may be *absolute*, but gender is *relative*.²⁶¹ For this reason, this paper chooses to concentrate on the social (gender) and not the natural (sex).²⁶² To sum, I take the position that:

- (1) **the *a priori* nature of sex** (a biologically determined difference) is a result of pre-determined chromosomal variation and is a brute, non-institutional fact; how it is defined and represented, however, is a cultural matter, and
- (2) **the *a posteriori* nature of gender** (a socially constructed difference) is a category of human invention and therefore an institutional fact; notions of advantage, disadvantage and preference are inherent in its formation.

Gender difference socialization. Because of cultural practices like those Foucault referred

²⁵⁴ Runyon & Peterson, p. 76.

²⁵⁵ Peterson, p. 192. Peterson writes of “totalizing assumptions” about physical ability, race, class, ethnicity, age, nationality, etc.

²⁵⁶ Horton & Hunt, p. 134, “Kinsey, Alfred Charles — Encarta® Concise Encyclopedia Article” at URL encarta.msn.com/index/concise/OVLOB/0146c000.asp on May 10, 1998, and Turner, pp. 59, 246-247. Alfred Charles Kinsey (1894-1956) was an American biologist, who investigated human sexual behavior at the Institute for Sex Research, which he founded in 1942. He produced two influential, though controversial, studies, based on interviews with some 18,000 men and women. These were published in *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948) and *Sexual Behavior of the Human Female* (1953). These studies concluded a hetero-homo continuum, on which no one is purely one or the other, but somewhere in the middle. Turner writes that “[b]iology and physiology are themselves classificatory systems which organize and systematize human experience, and they are therefore features of culture not nature.”

²⁵⁷ Elam, p. 51. See also Suzanne J. Kessler, “The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of Intersexed Infants” in *Signs* 16:1, 1990 and Anne Fausto-Sterling, *Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men*, New York: Basic Books, 1985.

²⁵⁸ Horton & Hunt, p. 135.

²⁵⁹ Turner, pp. 59, 246-247. See also M. Foucault, *Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-century French Hermaphrodite*, Brighton, 1980 and M. Howell and P. Ford, *The True History of the Elephant Man*, Harmondsworth, 1980.

²⁶⁰ Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson, “Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism” in Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism*, New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1990, pp. 28-30. Feminists have investigated sexism also via public-private sphere arguments and premises of the psychoanalytical “deep self.” However, Fraser and Nicholson suggest that since the late 1970s, feminist social theorists have “given up the assumption of monocausality” in abandoning “biological determinants or a cross-cultural domestic/public separation.” See also Jacques Lacan, “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious,” *Écrits: A Selection*, New York: Norton, 1977; Joan Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 and Teresa de Lauretis, *Technologies of Gender*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

²⁶¹ Hofstede, p. 10.

²⁶² Elam, pp. 42, 59. Elam calls the sex-gender debate a “vicious circle.” She ponders the question: “is ‘women’ a primarily natural or cultural category? The rough distinction between sex and gender can be made as follows: either sex is privileged as a biological attribute upon which gender ideology is imposed, or sex is denied as merely the ideological mystification that obscures cultural facts about gender. Thus, if women are a sex, they are oppressed by gender; if women are understood as gender, they are oppressed by sex.”

to, it would seem that gender difference socialization is one of the first and most pronounced forms of cultural influence. According to Holly Devor, children by the age of two already “understand that they are members of a gender grouping which consists of stereotypes.”²⁶³ This demonstrates how deeply ingrained gender is in constituting conceptions of Self and Other, with all the related status-functions and deontic associations. It also suggests that gender identity is at least partly a cognitive act,²⁶⁴ one fueled by direction from sociocultural forces.

Shulamith Firestone’s *The Dialectic of Sex* (1972), for example, investigates notions of sexually differentiated natures, based upon criticism of Simone de Beauvoir’s category of otherness.²⁶⁵ Although we don’t see ourselves as *only* gendered beings, as Valerie Smith elucidates,²⁶⁶ we experience and act in the world as gendered subjects. This means that the categories through which we understand and act upon the world are shaped by gender meanings. All social life, to varying degrees, is interpreted in gendered terms.²⁶⁷ According to feminist theorists such as J. Ann Tickner and Joan Scott, gender is understood by “normative concepts that set forth interpretations of meanings and symbols.”

In Western culture, these concepts take the form of fixed binary oppositions that categorically assert the meaning of masculine and feminine and hence legitimize a set of unequal social relationships.²⁶⁸

Moreover, many feminists see this as a universal, ubiquitous feature of social reality. They maintain that attached status-functions, or value judgments, tend to prefer men and masculine qualities throughout a wide spectrum of cultural frames. The bias is so subtle and deeply enmeshed, they feel, that it ranks among the most fundamental, potent and prevalent of systemic discriminatory structures. For this reason, it is seen as one side of the tripartite analytical categories of race, class and gender.

Often feminist theorists focus on the theme that Western civilization is rooted in a long,

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 52, and Hofstede, p. 253. For more on early gender socialization, see Holly Devor, *Gender Blending: Confronting the Limits of Duality*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. Hofstede points out that stereotypes are “half-truths,” which result from “assumptions about collective properties of a group... applied to a particular individual from that group.”

²⁶⁴ Connell, p. 194. Connell also maintains that: “The notion of ‘gender identity’ at the core of femininity and masculinity is the psychological counterpart of the notion of a ‘sex role’ into which one is socialized.”

²⁶⁵ John Charvet, *Feminism (Modern Ideologies)*, London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1982, pp. 124-126. She saw difference as not directly based in biology, but rather that biology produces the family, which in turn produces masculine and feminine. See Shulamith Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex*, London: Paladin, 1972.

²⁶⁶ Valerie Smith, “Split Affinities: The Case of Interracial Rape” in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds.), *Conflicts in Feminism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 285, and Hofstede, p. 10. She makes the valid point that people are not only gendered beings, just as they are neither purely racial, economic or (sub)cultural beings. The social sciences can, for the purposes of analysis, concentrate on one or more segment, but should never forget the multiplicity of identity. Hofstede mentions the national, regional, ethnic/religious/linguistic, class and employment levels as other segments of identity.

²⁶⁷ Silverman, 1994, p. 25. See L. Stanley and S. Wise, *Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research*, London: Routledge, 1983. Stanley and Wise write of the very gendered nature of meaning.

²⁶⁸ Tickner, 1992, pp. 7-8.

unbroken patriarchal tradition. They see it is an asymmetrical, global cultural heritage,²⁶⁹ which autopoietically perpetuates and reinforces the masculinist advantage *by* men, *about* men and *for* men in its knowledge claims. Feminists, therefore, seek to undermine a perceived *masculinist hegemony* (discussed in more detail below).²⁷⁰ The aim of feminism, then, according to Ann Snitow, is to reveal “the social reality of unequal treatment, sexual discrimination, cultural stereotypes, and women’s subordination both at home and in the marketplace.”²⁷¹ In like fashion, Peterson believes that:

gender is a systematic social construction that dichotomizes identities, behaviours, and expectations as masculine and feminine. It is not simply a trait of individuals but an institutionalized feature of social life.²⁷²

As any antithetical construct, gender is imbued with attached meanings that clearly prefer one over the other: in this case, man and the masculine over that of woman and the feminine. Feminists claim that male bias is an omnipresent, pervasive feature of culture, with embedded structures of power and privilege partial to men. In addition, they feel, human qualities, activities, concepts and institutions, which are generally regarded as valuable, noteworthy, noble and admirable, are disproportionately associated with men. For example, according to Brenda Almond:

There is a view that is as old, probably, as the human race, and certainly as old as Homer and the ancient Greeks, that there is one ethical structure that represents right for men: a composite of manly virtues, such as courage, endurance, physical stamina, wiliness and political judgement, and a corresponding but complementary conception of what is right for women, womanly virtue being seen as a mixture of timidity, tenderness, compliance, docility, softness, innocence and domestic competence.²⁷³

It should be noted, however, that some non-feminists too see Western culture’s dictates concerning gender and its roles as *biased against men*, just in different ways. One such author in the so-called Men’s Movement is Warren Farrell. Interestingly enough, Farrell, a self-proclaimed ardent former feminist, shares some key features with feminist contemporaries. Foremost among them: the centrality of deontic schemes in his argumentation.²⁷⁴ In *The Myth of Male Power* (1996), Farrell

²⁶⁹ Sylvia Walby, “Post-Post-Modernism?—Theorizing Social Complexity” in Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips (eds.), *Destabilizing Theory—Contemporary Feminist Debates*, Great Britain: Polity Press, 1992, p. 45. [Walby]

²⁷⁰ Tickner, 1992, pp. 6-7. This term refers to what Tickner sees as the glorified, stereotypical ideal of masculinity, which she says is evident in the realist power tradition of IR.

²⁷¹ Runyan & Peterson, p. 90. R&S quoting Mary G. Dietz, “Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship,” in Jill Conway, Susan C. Bourque and Joan W. Scott (eds.), *Learning About Women*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987.

²⁷² Peterson, pp. 194-195.

²⁷³ Almond, p. 42.

²⁷⁴ Warren Farrell, *The Myth of Male Power*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 395-396. Farrell cites examples of disparate male risk in deontic structures. He writes of key male disadvantages and “male disposability,” citing longer working hours (both domestic and paid labor) in more treacherous and less desirable employment options (including higher occupational mortality rates in so-called “death professions”), higher suicide rates, higher stress, higher incidence of disease and lower fulfillment. “Bodyguard” and soldier obligations (draft and combat) contribute to higher death rates in addition to disproportionately higher occurrences of assassination, hostage-taking, executions and homelessness.

shows how these culturally imbued gender expectations and assumptions provide inequities *to both men and women*. These manifest in various benefits and disadvantages, roles, responsibilities and risks. Similarly, Herb Goldberg's *The Hazards of Being Male: Surviving the Myth of Masculine Privilege* (1976) discusses, among other issues, men's emotional isolation, overwork and guilt.²⁷⁵ At least partly recognizing this, Connell writes:

Men in general are advantaged by current social structure, heterosexual men more so than others. What the debate about 'men's liberation' nevertheless showed is that there are costs for men in their social advantages, sometimes serious ones. It also showed that there are some groups of men who can recognize injustice when they see it and are far from comfortable with the position they have inherited.²⁷⁶

As one perceptive feminist has stated, these considerations point to the need for feminist "rights" discourse to "be evaluated not in the abstract but always in the social context."²⁷⁷ Gender is an oppositional construct: both sides are getting the short side of the stick in one way or another.

Nodal reference point. One important point should be mentioned at this juncture. The apparent durability of nodal points is *not* a reliable indicator of their relative truth content. Put another way, one should not automatically assume that nodes are highly accurate representations of objective reality, as defined by the correspondence theory of truth. Here's an example. Just some 25 generations or so ago, much of the world believed that the earth was as flat as a pancake. This was an *institutional fact*, a truth claim supported, it seemed, by irrefutable evidence: sea-faring vessels inexplicably disappeared all the time. Everybody *knew* that ships routinely sailed too far out into the realm of storms and giant sea serpents and simply dropped off the edge of the "disc." Yet the fact that virtually everyone believed this tale *didn't make it empirically true*. The same applies to understandings of the sexual orientation binary (as mentioned above, questioned by the Kinsey Reports) or to matters of gender.

Like all institutional facts, the norms, deontic aspects, stereotypes and status-functions of sexual relations, sex roles and concomitant considerations evolve over time. They also vary from place to place. As evidence of this, sexual mores have shifted dramatically, for example, in just the last generation. This does not deviate from the larger trend of rapid historical change and momentous societal upheaval. Correspondingly, notions of class, race, nationality and age, for instance, have transformed significantly in a relatively short period of time.

However, the gender binary appears to be a consistently stable and *fundamentally* unchanged node of reference in Western culture, suggesting a relative—but not absolute—stasis. Sylvia Walby

²⁷⁵ Doug Schocke, "Men's Movement History and the Term 'Masculist'" at URL www.vix.com/pub/men/history/schocke.html on April 6, 1998.

²⁷⁶ Connell, p. xi in "Preface."

²⁷⁷ Pringle & Watson, p. 68. Attributed to Carol Smart, *Feminism and the Power of Law*, London: Routledge, 1989.

refers to the “number of overlapping, cross-cutting discourses of femininities and masculinities which are historically and culturally variable [and, therefore] shifting, variable social constructs which lack coherence and stability over time.”²⁷⁸ She is referring to Class B definitions characterized by a high degree of subjective interpretation and thus farther and farther removed from the empirical. This in mind, she is right to counter her postpositivist contemporaries by saying that:

post-modern critics go too far in asserting the necessary impossibility and unproductive nature of investigating gender inequality. While gender relations could potentially take an infinite number of forms, in actuality there are some widely repeated features and considerable historical continuity. The signifiers of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ have sufficient historical and cross-cultural continuity, despite some variations, to warrant using such terms.

She goes on to question the theoretical applicability for large-scale geographical and temporal distribution, but admits “that in practice such generalization is possible” due to “sufficient common features and sufficient routinized interconnections.”²⁷⁹ This seems to be the case, because gender difference is linked (perhaps universally) to sex difference, which, presumably, has changed little since before humans even became self-aware. Although, gender roles, stereotypes and deontics could theoretically be interpreted and represented in countless ways along the “fact axis,” the number of realistic permutations is probably finite (reflecting the distinction between “hardcore relativism” and relational thinking.).

Thus, many gender theorists recognize that “the symbolic division of the world by gender appears to be a relatively constant and fundamental way of articulating experience,” a common (binary) denominator which takes remarkably similar forms throughout human histories, societies and cultures. On the basis of sex difference, “historically gender-coded dichotomies” have been justified and perpetuated as *a priori* truths. Recognizing this, Peterson explains that:

The concept of gender enables feminists to examine masculinity and femininity as fundamental but not ‘given’ identities: they are learned and therefore mutable... Feminists analyse gender as a pervasive bias. In one sense, gender is a socially imposed and internalized lens through which individuals perceive and respond to the world. In a second sense, the pervasiveness of gendered meanings shapes concepts, practices, and institutions in identifiably gendered ways.²⁸⁰

These two “senses” are another way of expressing systemic recursion: culture both shapes and is shaped by gender meanings. Alexander Wendt concurs with this (as we shall see below), when he writes of institutional structures, their normative content and the influence they exact in terms of identity and interests.

²⁷⁸ Walby, p. 34.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 36, 43.

²⁸⁰ Peterson, pp. 194-195.

Social constructivism. The preceding sections lead our investigation to the doorstep of *social constructivism*, the notion that society is constructed by way of identity and other points of reference. This paper's argumentation thus far culminates in this very concept. In fact, we have been discussing this phenomenon all along by way of analogous terms. Social constructivism refers to the very amalgamation of epistemological acts and processes that build the "cultural stock of knowledge." When we speak of creating, maintaining, referencing and perpetuating networks of institutional facts, we are talking about social constructivism. Likewise for "reality-mapping" (both in the cognitive and intentional sense), normative theory, social interaction, language, palette of sophistications, access consciousness, status-functions, socialization and meaning.

As established in the previous sections, this process entails a higher consciousness precursor: primarily individual and collective intentionality. What follows includes the acquisition of language, the internalization of symbol-manipulation techniques and the appropriation of meaning-constituting systems. Ontologies, intricate and extensive webs of three-dimensionally linked and cross-referenced bits of knowledge, shape and are shaped recursively. Though ultimately rooted in objective reality, every last fragment of knowledge is interpretive and characterized by varying degrees of subjectivity as meaning-laden institutional facts. Indeed, Alexander Wendt writes of institutional "intersubjective [and] collective knowledge." These represent "a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identities and interests... [which] are often codified in formal rules and norms." He says that "[i]dentities and such collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they are 'mutually constitutive'."

A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.²⁸¹

Therefore, Wendt confirms several points made earlier in this text, namely concerning:

- (1) the (inter)subjectivity of knowledge (institutional facts),
- (2) the existence of relatively stable sociocultural structures (institutions, alternatively nodes),
- (3) identity is partly a cognitive act and influenced by culture (norms, rules, meaning), and
- (4) culture and its constitutive segments are mutually constitutive (systemic recursion).

The following sections contemplate the wider social ramifications (particularly in IR) of gendered identity. For example, how is gender relevant to international relations, in particular as an indicator of nation-state behavior? If admitting states and the international as gendered entities/systems means recognizing the dominance of male perspective and systemic male bias, what are the implications for alternative discourses, science in general and masculinist IR assumptions

specifically? Let's take a look.

5.2. Feminist perspectives

Challenging the malestream. Feminist social theorists challenge “malestream”²⁸² ideologies by focusing on the oppression of women via culture, class, race, gender and so on. IR's traditional, largely masculinist²⁸³ paradigmatic history is seen as having omitted and denied women, women's perspectives and women's experiences.²⁸⁴ To counter this, gender-specific epistemological *metatheories* present alternative investigatory mechanisms to the dominant “powerhouse” prescriptions.²⁸⁵ Within this movement, radical feminism deviates from its predecessor sister approaches that cling to positivistic methodologies.²⁸⁶ In contrast, it often scrutinizes knowledge claims through poststructuralist deconstruction,²⁸⁷ a “tool for breaking apart binary oppositions”²⁸⁸ used to dispel gender myths. The core function of gender analysis, then, by revealing hidden foundational cultural meanings, stigmas and hierarchical judgments, is to illuminate:

- (1) how gender ideologies affect global processes, world politics and human activities by shaping perceptions and definitions of science, theory and practice, and
- (2) how this patriarchal phallogocentric dualistic system inherently prefers the masculine over other representations and discourse (typically the feminine and less masculine).²⁸⁹

Postpositivism has been an invaluable tool in this endeavor, by taking a second look at those “foundations” as “inherited boundaries,”²⁹⁰ Peterson explains that:

²⁸¹ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” originally in *International Organizations*, 46 (2) (Spring), pp. 391-425, reprinted in James Der Darian (ed.), *International Theory—Critical Investigations*, London, 1995, pp. 135-137.

²⁸² This term borrows from Aino Saarinen. It refers to the mainstream male perspective, which as a matter of practice usually excludes women's experiences and viewpoints. It can be thought of as the mainstream defined in masculinist terms (see following footnote). Cf. Aino Saarinen, *Feminist Research—an Intellectual Adventure?*, Research Institute for Social Sciences, University of Tampere, Centre for Women's Studies and Gender Relations, 4/1992, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Printing Ltd., 1992. [Saarinen] Note that in Peterson, it is spelled *male-stream*.

²⁸³ Roughly speaking, *masculinist* can be thought of as male perspective with its masculine assumptions, exclusionary practices, biases and deontics (not limited to men). Masculinism and its inherent associations of ideological privilege are embedded in the sociocultural sub-strata. Feminism does not share this position of advantage. Thus, masculinism is not, in the strictest sense, merely the male equivalent of a feminist political ideology or social movement.

²⁸⁴ Saarinen, p. 40. This also applies to gender as analytical category.

²⁸⁵ Peterson, p. 185. *Metatheory* is theory about theory or thinking about thinking itself and the nature of thought and theorizing. It questions the nature of social knowledge, its acquisition and utility, by reexamining the discipline's constructs and theoretical frameworks—in particular, IR's roots in “instrumentalism, empiricist-positivism, Enlightenment rationality, or logocentrism.”

²⁸⁶ Tickner, 1992, p. 15. For example, *Marxist feminism* concerns itself with capitalism; *feminist socialism* examines production/reproduction and gender socialization, and *psychoanalytic feminism* focuses on gender socialization and its psychological impact, whereas *radical feminism* investigates patriarchy and devalued femininities.

²⁸⁷ Scott, pp. 135-138. As described by Jacques Derrida and his followers, this involves dismantling and analyzing dichotomies to reveal their inner structure, their interdependence and their values.

²⁸⁸ Elam, p. 41. See, for example, Mary Poovey, “Feminism and Deconstruction” in *Feminist Studies* 14:1 (Spring 1988) and Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

²⁸⁹ Peterson, pp. 202-203.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 184.

post-positivism was particularly significant for feminists in that it permitted a theorization of positivism, instrumental reason, and science itself as gendered. Feminists argued that if knowledge claims are necessarily grounded in lived experience, not some transcendent reality, then elite male experience cannot be used to ground claims about human social reality; to do so distorts our knowledge of that reality. Finally, they exposed the distortions of androcentrism in privileging ways of knowing that are partial because they are also derived exclusively from male experience, as that experience is constructed under patriarchal relations.²⁹¹

Peterson says that feminist critiques of IR parallel those of postpositivism in several ways, in particular it emphasizes a shift from oppositional to relational thinking. It also hopes to transform hierarchical dichotomies into non-mutually exclusive dualities, such that “contrasting, but non-oppositional terms may be related along multiple dimensions and their non-binary structure permits more than two possibilities.”²⁹² However, feminist postpositivism differs from non-feminist postpositivism in that it:

- (1) explicitly names gender difference as the locus between positivism and objectivism;
- (2) recognizes that androcentrism inaccurately portrays “real world” events because it renders women and gender relations invisible; and
- (3) sees feminism’s transdisciplinary nature as an asset to IR’s third debate.²⁹³

One step further, just as postmodernism differs from hermeneutics in that it investigates power relations in meaning systems and discourse, postmodernism diverges from its parent class postpositivism. According to Runyon and Peterson:

Whereas postmodernist critiques are alike in exposing the domination dynamics of binary metaphysics, feminist postmodernists expose the essentializing, instrumentalist move at the core of this metaphysics as itself a consequence of masculinist experience and standpoint. Without destabilizing the fundamental dualism of ‘gender difference’ (essentialized sexual identities), nonfeminist postmodernists effect a reinscription of the universal-particular (identity-difference) problematique as exclusively oppositional; they retain rather than transgress the oppressive boundary-systems of Western metaphysics.²⁹⁴

The ultimate goal is a nongendered IR perspective²⁹⁵ or “gender blindness”²⁹⁶ which doesn’t bring about a feminist paradigmatic alternative, but rather encourages multiple viewpoints.²⁹⁷ Toward this objective, feminists believe that laying bare the inequality in gender categories reveals them as

²⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 195.

²⁹² *Ibid*, p. 188.

²⁹³ *Ibid*, pp. 197, 205. Non-feminist postpositivism leaves boundaries in place and does not challenge naturalized gender difference. It therefore leaves its “oppressive dynamics” in place

²⁹⁴ Runyan & Peterson, p. 76.

²⁹⁵ Tickner, 1992, pp. 24-25, 137. The pitfall to be avoided is merely reversing the bias by claiming that women have essentially superior abilities that make them better suited for IR. Some radical feminists have been accused of doing just this.

²⁹⁶ Runyan & Peterson, p. 75.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid* n, p. 99.

“interlocking systems of domination... [in which] women’s labour and bodies, the earth, and native peoples all become ‘objects’ under the control, possession and sometimes ‘protection’ of scientific, governmental and military elites.” This control is a function of “socially constructed, historically contingent practices” which “treat hierarchies as natural” and “subjugate all those constructed as ‘other’.”²⁹⁸

In control. Feminists maintain that this control takes a simple form: the dominance of the political domain by male elites. Disproportionate numbers of men occupy (key) positions in academia, diplomacy, statesmanship, soldiering and other institutions. It follows that masculine values and perspective would permeate asymmetrically, perpetuating systemic bias and exclusionary practices. Tickner feels that enculturation is partly to blame. She explains that:

through a kind of gender stereotyping... international politics has always been a gendered activity in the modern state system. Since foreign and military policy-making has been largely conducted by men, the discipline that analyzes these activities is bound to be primarily about men and masculinity.²⁹⁹

The resulting intolerance of alternative discourse (particularly of those deemed feminine or less masculine) arises, according to Peterson, because men look through an “androcentric lens” that resists feminist perspective.³⁰⁰ Thus, men’s perception (and therefore that also of masculinist science and the mainstream) is decidedly partial and prejudiced; for all *human* experience, knowledge and perspective are autopoietically equated exclusively with *men* (Peterson calls this “male-as-norm”).³⁰¹

The solution to this askewed state of affairs, feminists feel, is to employ gender-sensitive analyses which include women and other “subordinated, marginalized groups.”³⁰² Indeed, since women’s experiences have traditionally been relegated to the “margins of society and interstate politics,” their perspective may offer more salient insights, particularly *vis-à-vis* IR’s peripheralized.³⁰³ Many feminists point to the need to speak for the oppressed and excluded, while stressing the need for diversity and variety within the discipline itself.³⁰⁴ The marginalization of women in the private space and, for instance, the treatment of native peoples, are seen as part and parcel of the same phenomenon³⁰⁵—namely “social processes of subordination” and “systematic dominance.”³⁰⁶

Hence, while women’s voices are relegated to the sidelines, men’s experiences are equated

²⁹⁸ Tickner, 1992, p. 70, and Peterson, pp. 203-204.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 5.

³⁰⁰ Peterson, p. 198.

³⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 192.

³⁰² Tickner, 1992, p. 200. This refers to groups such as “the colonized, racial and ethnic minorities, [and] the underclass.”

³⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 18.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 16.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 110.

with “high” politics and *realpolitik* (recall Hegel’s deterministic views on the “natures” of the sexes in connection with the sex-gender debate?). Just as the black-white binary (discussed earlier) is constructed of certain powerful oppositional value associations, so is the man-woman diametric. In the political sphere, these are often expressed thusly:

Man	Woman
public power	privacy
agency	passivity
culture	nature
reason	irrationality
freedom	necessity

Tickner points to a strong enculturation role. As we will see in the following section, national culture, or collective gender identity, is a product of similar—if not the same—process(es). She explains that:

we are socialized into believing that war and power politics are spheres of activity with which men have a special affinity and that their voices in describing and prescribing for this world are therefore likely to be more authentic...[whereas] women... are generally considered irrelevant to the traditional construction of the field.³⁰⁸

Realpolitik concerns itself with coercive power: the threat of its use, its projection, its application, its balance, its maximization. Power and power politics are the domain of men, understood, ordered, discharged and studied in masculine terms. As the creation of men, IR thus mirrors the character of its masters. Qualities associated with men, masculinity and manliness—“toughness, courage, power, independence, and even physical strength”—are linked with violence and the use of force. Once projected onto the international behavior of states, they are legitimized through the glorification of war and exemplified in the citizen-warrior.³⁰⁹ Understandably, violence, feminists say, is embedded in the gender hierarchies of dominance and subordination.³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ Runyan & Peterson, p. 76. Authors quote Sarah Brown, “Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality” in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Volume 17, London: Millennium Publishing Group, London School of Economics, Winter 1988.

³⁰⁷ Peterson, p. 193.

³⁰⁸ Tickner, 1992, pp. 4-5.

³⁰⁹ Tickner, 1995, p. 6, and Tickner, 1992, p. 37.

³¹⁰ Tickner, 1992, p. 30.

The trappings of political realism.³¹¹ Unmistakably positivist, political realism is the predominant, preeminent paradigm in international relations. It self-perpetuates staunch definitions of a singular, eminent reality and seeks “generalizable laws... [for] universalistic explanations for the behavior of states across time and space.”³¹² Due to its position of dominance, to a considerable degree it is capable of creating the very states of affairs it purports to comprehend “through the constant reproduction of them in narrative and practice.” However, it is ill-equipped to address or provide comprehensive and true security, because it fails, as Runyan and Peterson point out, to

adequately conceptualize or deliver the very things it says it is all about—security, power, and sovereignty, or, more positively, safety, efficacy, and self-determination whether for states or people... [it is] a representation only of a reality that maintains the haves over the have-nots, although imperfectly and ultimately at the peril of both.³¹³

Realism envisages self-interested, unitary nation-state actors locked in a perpetual feud. They struggle in a conflict-ridden, chaotic and lethal anarchic system. In this high-stakes world, fierce competition rages over scarce and dwindling vital resources. This metaphor of the dangerous external space has its modern roots in Enlightenment science³¹⁴ and 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature.³¹⁵ Hobbes felt that states, like men, must rely on their own resources for self-preservation.³¹⁶ Niccolò Machiavelli, too, equated human excellence with the competitive striving for power.

Morgenthau saw conflict as an unavoidable feature of human nature. Security, in his opinion, can only be attained and maintained through the maximization of power, particularly military power. This includes secure geographical boundaries, large territorial size, natural and industrial self-sufficiency and a strong technological base—all which contribute to military capability. The balance of power is seen as the avenue to peace.³¹⁷ In addition, in the dehumanized realist tradition, morality takes a back seat to survival.³¹⁸ This refers to Morgenthau’s “political man,” who is “abstracted from other aspects of human behavior” and therefore amoral in his quest for power.³¹⁹ Kenneth Waltz saw

³¹¹ Runyan & Peterson, p. 69. It may come as some surprise that feminists also criticize idealism on the basis that it “impose[s] a single (decidedly Western) world order on a world of diversity, though it is generally seen as too soft and utopian (feminine) for realism’s world of power.” In any case, realism’s core tenets are latently present in idealist philosophy and thus naturally draw feminist fire for this reason alone.

³¹² Tickner, 1992, p. 11.

³¹³ Runyan & Peterson, p. 70.

³¹⁴ Peterson, pp. 80, 81-82, 99, 101, 104.

³¹⁵ Tickner, 1992, p. 45.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 38.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35. See Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969; David McClelland, *Power: The Inner Experience*, New York: Wiley, 1975; and Jane S. Jaquette, “Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism” in *World Politics* 34(2), January 1982.

the system of self-help.³²⁰ All refer to power in terms of man-over-man control.³²¹

Postpositivist feminists reject this notion and point to realism's contradictory view of security, particularly in the age of nuclear weaponry and other WMDs.³²² E. H. Carr wrote of this at the end of the Second World War.³²³ It is pointed out that absolute security is an elusive and ultimately futile goal in an anarchic system preoccupied with self-preservation and lacking an overarching authority. The security dilemma is perhaps the best example of this foolhardy pursuit.

Hegemonic masculinity. Demeaning sexual semantics notwithstanding,³²⁴ preoccupation with zero-sum power-brokering and maneuvering is indicative of a larger value structure. This entire enveloping structure aspires to a masculine archetype, or ideal conception of manliness and manly virtue, called *hegemonic masculinity*. This term encompasses a whole system of ontologies and webs of meanings, norms and status-functions that prescribe certain (male-biased) ways of thinking, being and doing.

Understandings about gender and its deontic apparatus of roles, expressions and stereotypes are embedded in this mindset. Hegemonic masculinity (HM) stipulates clear and sweeping preference for masculine "virtues." It is a socially constructed stereotypical ideal image of masculinity, sustained through subservient femininities and devalued, "secondary" masculinities (such as actual or perceived homosexuality). It is therefore heterosexual in nature and subordinates through "both direct interactions and a kind of ideological warfare."³²⁵

Binaries in IR are typically expressed in terms of domestic-foreign, inside-outside, order-anarchy and center-periphery. HM's binary assumptions are correspondingly raw and simple. It requires the construction of an external Other, which must be repelled through the exercise of power. Similarly masculine Others are particularly dangerous, but noteworthy opponents insofar as they more closely approach the HM ideal. Masculine counterparts are, after all, probably ideologically and culturally similar and thus demand a certain amount of fraternal respect.

Non-white and tropical Others, on the other hand, are frequently portrayed as irrational, unstable, ignorant and incompetent—characteristics associated with women.³²⁶ The masculine white man (such as the United States) considers itself a "civilizing warrior, a suitor, or a father." It repeatedly and pejoratively brands the Third World and ex-colonies as pejoratively effeminate. For example, in dealings with Latin America, the Other is portrayed as emotional and unpredictable, "a

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³²¹ Tickner, 1995, p. 61.

³²² Runyan & Peterson, p. 71.

³²³ J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security" in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 175. [Tickner, 1995b]

³²⁴ Tickner, 1992, pp. 44-45. See Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 12(4), 1987, pp. 687-718. Cohn writes of sexual metaphors and vocabulary in defense language.

³²⁵ Connell, pp. 6, 186. This is why "heterophallogocentrism" is part of the title of this paper.

lesser male, a female, or a child.”³²⁷ Hartsock says that this stratagem is also true of Orientalism.³²⁸ These gendered interstate activities closely parallel our personal understandings of gender imparted through socialization.

Concretely, the influence of masculinist thinking and prioritization in IR has meant a focus on Great Power relations³²⁹ and the dominance of the field by U.S. and British scholarship. The result has been the marginalization of weaker, smaller and/or less aggressive states, which don’t conform to the Anglo-American mold. They find the discipline markedly Eurocentric, rigid, closed, inaccessible and obsessed with matters which clearly do not relate to them. According to Steve Smith:

The central problem is that the Realist definition of the subject stresses focal points— notably order and control, that are irrelevant to the foreign policy concerns (whether political or economic) of non-hegemonic states.³³⁰

So, in response, postmodernists call for a new (meta)theoretical framework and point to the need for “different models of analysis, models not based on an exclusionary definition of national sovereignty.”³³¹ To this end, feminists have not fielded a uniform attack against the malestream ideologies,³³² but many have been accused of vilifying realists along the way.³³³ It isn’t necessary to get into all the tit-for-tat volleying between feminist peripheralists and the mainstream center. At this point, however, it makes sense to explore feminist redefinitions of IR’s principal concepts.

Redefining power and security. Like Tickner, I do not deny that the pervasive state of affairs in IR *is* power as domination. Perhaps not right or moral or equitable, it is the *reality* in the state system. Yet, seeing power exclusively in this way obscures joint action in theory and practice. It buys into Morgenthau’s focus on conflict and de-emphasis of cooperation and regeneration.³³⁴ Definitions of security based on characteristics associated with HM achieve security *at the expense of someone else*.³³⁵ Tickner says that “[f]eminist reformulations of the meaning of security are needed to draw attention to the extent to which gender hierarchies themselves are a source of domination and thus an obstacle to a truly comprehensive definition of security.”

³²⁶ Tickner, 1992, pp. 8-9.

³²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 8-9, 48-49.

³²⁸ Nancy Hartsock, “Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?” in Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism*, New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1990, p. 162.

³²⁹ Tickner, 1992, pp. 12, 16, 18, 29, 33.

³³⁰ Steve Smith, “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science” in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds.), *The Study of International Relations—The State of the Art*, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1989, pp. 22-23. **[Smith, 1989]**

³³¹ Tickner, 1992, p. 133. She mentions the EC, which accelerated its integration into the EU.

³³² Runyan & Peterson, pp. 67-68. See also Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross (eds.), *Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986 and Shoshana Felman, “Women and Madness: The Critical Phallacy” in *Diacritics* 5, Winter, 1975.

³³³ *Ibid*, p. 70.

³³⁴ Tickner, 1995, pp. 53, 62.

³³⁵ Tickner, 1992, pp. 129-130.

Although the prevailing (though still few) feminist definitions of security take different paths, all appear to agree that a realist zero-sum approach necessarily contributes to a state of insecurity. They feel that security is worthless if it is built on the insecurity of others. Instead, they focus on joint survival rather than mutual destruction or “common security.” Tickner makes the point that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) invalidate boundary protection and blur the lines between domestic-international, soldier-civilian and protector-protected.³³⁶ Alternative definitions of power feature mutual enablement rather than domination. They stress that the Other’s views are as equally legitimate as our own. Examples of such redefinitions include those of:

- (1) **Hannah Arendt**, who sees “power as the human ability to act in concert or action that is taken with others who share similar concerns”;
- (2) **David McClelland**, who views female power as shared rather than assertive; and
- (3) **Jane Jaquette**, who considers female power as persuasive and coalition-building rather than coercive.³³⁷

Autonomy is associated with masculinity, interdependence with femininity. This need not have negative connotations. Feminists say that the human need for attachment and community is as fundamental as the desire for independence, which is associated with alternative ways of defining security and how to achieve it.³³⁸ On Arendt’s views, Jean Bethke Elshtain writes of “rescu[ing] politics by separating violence from power.”³³⁹ Contemporary feminist “post-postmodern” attempts to reconstruct the discipline have tackled such issues. One recent conference in the United States:

used feminist analytical tools to rethink concepts like international cooperation, decision-making, war, and peace. They contended that the feminist emphasis on non-hierarchical decision-making, (shifting) identity and empathetic cooperation is well-suited to a post-cold war world.³⁴⁰

“Shifting identity” could be interpreted as Lewis’ “categorical self” (see Section 4), which is constantly experientially defined and redefined by internalized cultural elements. Collective identity, an underlying IR feature, mirrors how the categorical self is referentially constructed. Through Us-Them, societies map the international (including themselves) and evaluate differences by way of certain sociocultural criteria. Of course, these take gendered forms, as Hofstede writes:

³³⁶ Tickner, 1992, pp. 51-52, 53, 55.

³³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 65.

³³⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 64, 132.

³³⁹ Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Feminist Themes and International Relations” in Der Darian (ed.), *International Theory—Critical Investigations*, London, 1995, p. 356.

³⁴⁰ Kathryn Norberg, “Gender in International Relations: Reconstructing Theory” at URL www.humnet.ucla.edu/cs/projects/genderrelations.html on April 28, 1998. The UCLA Center for the Study of Women hosted a “Gender in International Relations: Reconstructing Theory” conference as part of its Gender and Politics Project in April, 1995. It consisted of a feminist panel of scholars, which included Spike Peterson (Dept. of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson), Christine Sylvester (Dept. of Political Science, Northern Arizona University) and Ann Tickner (Dept of Political Science, Institute for International Relations, University of Southern California).

The main cultural difference among nations lie in values. Systematic differences exist... with regard to values about power and inequality... [or] with regard to the social roles expected from men and women.³⁴¹

The following section delves into these gendered identities, their sources, their effects and the implications for international relations.

5.3. Gendered national character

Omnipresent gender. As mentioned, gendered binarism is thought to inundate all levels of higher human activity and thought. Beyond the individual and intermediate collective levels of society, they are transposed onto the international. The same essential phenomenon occurs throughout: gender helps define Self and Other. As a common denominator, it thus prescribes certain predispositions, modes of thought, guidelines for expression and interpretation, and ultimately certain behavioral parameters, patterns and preferences. The normative factor is significant.

Indeed, Tickner feels that gender difference socialization parallels how we are taught to think about international politics.³⁴² Connell too writes of collective gender, gender-structured social practices and a “society-wide gender order.” He maintains that, “[g]ender relations are present in *all* types of institutions... [and] can be characterized by their gender regimes.” He also feels that states and their industrial and economic systems are built on the masculinist ideas of technical rationality and calculation. The “bureaucratized state,” he says, “is in fundamental respects a pattern of gender relations.”³⁴³ Joan Scott, too, writes that feminist history is tasked with “the exposure of often silent and hidden operations of gender that are nonetheless present and defining forces in the organization of most societies.”³⁴⁴ Geert Hofstede, an academic, management consultant and researcher of culture, writes that:

The values and shared understandings that mark out international society must be culturally generated and sustained, which, of course, implies that international and/or world order is equally dependent on such cultural generation and maintenance.³⁴⁵

Hofstede’s Masculinity Index. Hofstede’s work is particularly relevant at this juncture. In *Cultures and Organizations—Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival*, he studies

³⁴¹ Hofstede, p. 236.

³⁴² Tickner, 1992, p. 9.

³⁴³ Connell, pp. 120, 131-132, 139, 182, 183. Connell defines *gender regimes* as “[t]he state of play in gender relations in a given institution.” Connell refers to the feminization of welfare services, as women constitute the largest consumers of pensions, maternity allowances, tax breaks, health care, day care, etc. This also applies to the state’s internal ideologies, which affect sexuality, labor, criminalization of homosexuality, reproduction and birth control, the age of consent and so forth.

³⁴⁴ Elam, p. 38.

³⁴⁵ Rengger, p. 88.

cultural differences in work-related value orientations. In this study he surveys more than 88,000 employees of the multinational IBM corporation, which has branches in 66 countries. Based on the information obtained in 40 countries, Hofstede identifies four dimensions along which dominant cultural patterns can be ordered. These indices, as any axes, are binary-structured. Individual values are plotted relative to each other between absolute poles. His quad-axis model is comprised of:

- (1) power distance (PDI),
- (2) uncertainty avoidance (UAI),
- (3) individualism-collectivism (IDV) and
- (4) masculinity-femininity (MAS).³⁴⁶

MAS, alternatively known as the “achievement-nurturance” index, contributes substantially to this research. This thesis follows Hofstede’s own admonishment that his research be treated as merely a *relative indicator of general cultural difference*, a starting point for discussion, not a reference table of absolute values. Nonetheless, the issues it does raise are vital to this thesis, because Hofstede:

- (1) addresses gender as a category of social scientific analysis,
- (2) recognizes gender as a quantifiable feature of collective identity (national character),
- (3) demonstrates gender as a causal/explanatory agent for certain behaviors and predilections,
- (4) sees gender as a social construct imparted by the cultural stock of knowledge, and
- (5) shows that gender stereotypes and deontics are key factors in the international arena.

By far most importantly, the Hofstede study showed that gender is among the clearest and most pronounced categories of separation between nations. For example, the gap disjointing the Nordic countries from the larger economic, political and military powers, such as the United States and the former USSR, is positively compelling.³⁴⁷

This MAS measures the relative degree of cultural value placed on such behaviors as assertiveness, achievement, acquisition of wealth, caring for others, social supports and the quality of life. According to Hofstede, a high MAS score (denoting a “masculine” culture) indicates a belief in achievement and ambition, in ostentatious manliness, with very specific behaviors and products associated with male behavior. On the other hand, a low MAS score (denoting a “feminine culture”) cares less for external achievements and/or manliness, and stresses more quality of life issues, such as the aiding others and sympathy for the unfortunate.

In masculine countries, there is a clear delineation of gender roles, where “men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success whereas women are supposed to be more

³⁴⁶ Hofstede, and “Hofstede’s Cultural Patterns” at URL www.siu.edu/~ekachai/Hofstede.html on March 31, 1998.

³⁴⁷ Hofstede, p. 100. Today, mainstream Russian culture appears to have strong feminine components, whereas Soviet Russia was opposite.

modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” Feminine cultures prefer equality between male and female and advocate less prescriptive gender behaviors. In these countries there is an overlap between gender roles. Both men and women can undertake feminine activities and demonstrate feminine qualities without this being frowned upon.³⁴⁸ The table below lists Hofstede’s main points concerning a given nation-state’s relative femininity or masculinity.

Feminine Cultural Traits	Masculine Cultural Traits
(1) Welfare society ideal: caring for others and preservation paramount	(1) Performance society ideal: material success and progress paramount
(2) People and warm relationships are important	(2) Money and things important (materialism)
(3) Everybody is supposed to be modest; both men and women are allowed to be tender and concerned with relationships	(3) Men are supposed to be assertive, ambitious and tough; women are supposed to be tender and caretakers of relationships
(4) Both parents deal with facts and feelings	(4) Fathers deal with facts, mothers with feelings
(5) Both sexes may cry, but neither should fight	(5) Boys don’t cry, but fight; girls may cry, but not fight
(6) Sympathy and help for the weak and needy	(6) Sympathy and support for the strong
(7) Average is the norm; failure is a minor incident	(7) Best is the norm; failure is a disaster
(8) Boys and girls study the same subjects	(8) Boys and girls study different subjects
(9) Friendliness in teachers appreciated	(9) Brilliance in teachers appreciated
(10) “Work in order to live”	(10) “Live in order to work” (workaholic culture)
(11) Leaders use intuition and strive for consensus	(11) Leaders are decisive and assertive
(12) Stress on equality, solidarity and quality of life	(12) Stress on equity, competition and performance
(13) Conflict resolution by compromise and negotiation	(13) Conflict resolution by fighting it out
(14) Small and slow are beautiful	(14) Big and fast are beautiful
(15) Environmental preservation highest priority	(15) Maintenance of economic growth highest priority
(16) Percentage of governmental budget to armaments low and assistance to poor countries high	(16) Percentage of governmental budget to armaments high and assistance to poor countries low
(17) Percentage of women in workforce and elected offices relatively high	(17) Percentage of women in workforce and elected offices relatively low

Disclaimer and words of caution. As mentioned before, there is no *a priori* reason for supposing that most activities, traits or properties *should* be interpreted as associated with one gender or the other (e.g., gossiping and knitting are feminine activities or spitting and sharp-shooting are masculine activities). However, the reality is that such understandings are widely shared as definitive individual and societal features and *they recursively shape the behaviors they describe*. I report what I feel are predominant gender assumptions—partly from my own experience—but the reader should keep in mind that, as a reporter of these assumptions, *I* am not the one describing women as “chicks”

³⁴⁸ Hofstede, pp. 82-83. Curiously, an apparent predictor of cultural femininity is latitude. Masculine cultures tend to be situated in warmer equatorial climates, while feminine cultures are likely to be located in colder regions, further removed from the equator (keep this in mind when MAS-comparing nation-states). N.B. In this paper, putting every single gender reference in quotation marks (e.g., “masculine” countries, “feminine” cultural traits, etc.) is unnecessarily annoying, repetitive and hard to read. The reader may consider all such appropriate references so marked (they are, after all, explicitly recognized as subjective).

³⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 96, 103

or gays as “queers.” Let me clarify: these are not words of my choosing—yes, I wrote them, but, for the record, they do *not* reflect my own feelings about men, women or homosexuals.

This is precisely the point: a masculinist hegemon doesn't give a damn about political correctness or the feelings of “subordinates.” HM loathes what it perceives to be weak, scorns what it sees as deficient. Its very vocabulary drips with derisive sexism and contemptuous homophobia. This serves only to reinforce the stereotypes, sweeping generalizations and bigoted assumptions it draws from. HM sees everyone and everything else that falls short of the ideal as diluted and ineffectual and thus inferior and expendable; *that's* what I'm trying to communicate. The only way I know how to do this is to turn one of HM's own weapons—its abhorrent word-choice—onto itself.

Additionally, bear in mind that there is, of course, no such thing as a masculine country or a feminine culture. States like other collective organizations are human creations, as John Garnett puts it, “not empirically or physically of course—but *notionally*, in the mind so to speak.”³⁵⁰ Using common references and predominant associations within the Western gender deontic web, I describe and characterize them in gender terms. Gender is a category of analysis and a metaphor of limited potential (like all categories, it, too, is a construct). So, I employ an *abstract ideal of masculinity*, not of men *per se* or any particular individual (and certainly not myself!). The hegemonic masculinist ideal is a radical, harsh and cold metaphysical concept-tool. Some countries are more masculine than others and more closely mirror its precepts, but no real-world counterpart exists in its absolute form. Finally, it is not my intention to vilify men, elevate women above men or otherwise perpetuate the HM agenda. This said, what follows is a brief description of gendered characteristics transposed into the international *from the HM perspective*.

The hero. Masculine “hero” cultures revere the hegemonic masculine ideal and view the world through this myopic ideological lens. The hero is the strong, ambitious, individualist conqueror, who bends women and weaker men to his will. He is mighty security-provider—the soldier, the policeman, the guard, the protector—thus tends to solve problems by the sword. They are alternatively the teacher and mentor, the patriarch. The hero is large and powerful, driven by instinctual competitiveness, aggression and assertiveness. Masculine countries are the world's major players, usually large and super powers, often nuclear states. They occupy the very center of political, economic and cultural life. They are projectors of power and brute strength, almost always with sizable and potent military capability. They have tasted victory in war and often achieve goals by flexing martial muscle. They command a global presence and define their relationships through threat assessments, spheres of influence, fortress territoriality and geopolitics.

³⁵⁰ John C. Garnett, “States, State-Centric Perspectives, and Interdependence” in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas in World Politics—International Ethics in a Changing World*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 78.

Power is defined in terms of force, opposition and the adversary. The security dilemma is a constant and implacable irritation in an anarchic environment of self-help, intimidation, confrontation, suspicion, mistrust, fragmentation and polarization. Security is zero-sum and fleeting, which prompts a pessimistic and rather simplistic worldview. These cultures are high-profile and bask in center stage. Their language and culture extends well beyond their jealously defended physical borders. These cultures stress difference and are accordingly largely intolerant. They fear what they do not understand. Xenophobia, homophobia, chauvinism, sexism, egocentrism, ethnocentrism and, to some degree, isolationism are defining characteristics. They are often accused of cultural imperialism, with an exported value system endemic of cultural, political and economic—and sometimes military—expansionism. If it's not communism, it's usually Coca-Cola.

The chick. Feminine “chick” societies are small and usually quiet (sometimes forced into this state). They are often isolated on the political, climatic, linguistic, economic and cultural periphery. Their population, language group and geographical size tend to be correspondingly small. Their token military forces—usually defensively structured—lack WMDs. They do not enjoy a global presence and cannot muster credible assets for the projection of power beyond their frontiers. They are familiar with defeat in war. Even if they wanted to, these countries understandably cannot rely on their tiny arsenals to solve most problems, certainly not *external* ones. They thus are more likely to stress similarities, compromise, empathy, coexistence and bridge-building. Their non-violent nature fosters strong consensus on the virtues of transparency, disarmament, demilitarization, CSBMs, non-offensive defense and similar ideals. However, they prefer to focus on issues of environmental impact, socioeconomic consequence, human rights, quality of life questions and the like.

Culturally, they are generally tolerant, pragmatic, pluralistic and egalitarian. They have a strong sense of civic responsibility and collective identity, so tend to focus on restrained, rational and creative solutions to conflict or disagreement. They are optimistic and integrative, choosing to attempt circumvention of the security dilemma by redefining security, autonomy and power.

The manly hegemon pejoratively sees feminine cultures as “chicks.” Chicks are the masculine culture's diametric counterpart, but less worthy, less capable and less valuable. They are, in fact, frequently innocuously invisible from the lofty position where masculine states grin with scepter in hand and survey their vast kingdoms. Chicks are incapable of the grand deeds and coercive exercises of raw power so fundamentally definitive of the masculinist mentality. These feminine cultures are more nurturing, more environmentally aware and more tolerant. They are small and weak, preferring conflict resolution through consensus, cooperation and compromise. In an anarchic international (dis)order, they are insignificant players at best, burdens to larger states at worst. For this reason, masculine cultures see them as merely consumers of security resources, parasites that depend upon the umbrella of safety the benevolent hero provides. Feminine initiatives are summarily dismissed, for they are too soft, idealistic, naïve, inconsequential or inapplicable to real world


problems. Chicks do have redeeming qualities, but only insofar as their subservience and support caters directly or indirectly to the needs and desires of the master.

The queer. Somewhere in the incoherent middle-ground between the prominent (or, perhaps, polar at the abstract level) masculine and feminine cultures lies the “queer.” The mixture of masculine and feminine MAS attributes parallels the perceived sexual orientation aberration (or ambiguity) at the micro-level. Considering diametric logic, an unclear or mixed identity (at least, so defined from the *outside* by the hegemon) is considered deviant. It is not wholly feminine, nor does it conform to, or even approach, the qualities so revered in the HM archetype. It is an impure hybrid, a freak. Masculine states therefore revile it for its feminine weaknesses, yet simultaneously regard its (lesser) masculinity with suspicion and fear. What cannot be easily identified or categorically pigeonholed is a threat by default. Either way, the queer, just as the chick, is *not-masculine*. It therefore must be dominated by force, intimidation and coercion to guarantee one’s own security and demonstrate one’s own efficacy.

The queer state therefore is subject to a mixed reception, but as a general rule is only an average or nominal player in international affairs. They contribute limited security, but also require some degree of custodianship from more powerful agents. They can propel what military might they have beyond the limits of their borders, but alone cannot sustain extended or high-intensity offensive operations for any significant amount of time or at any great distance. Only other masculine powers possess the means to advance a mortal threat. Queers are medium powers and only a few are equipped with WMDs, particularly nuclear capability. More powerful chess pieces than feminine pawns, their manipulation offers more lucrative strategic, political and economic benefits. As both benefit and liability, they are, however, difficult to control and tend to consume as much security resources as they produce. They are in every way a composite of masculine and feminine traits.

That should suffice. It is unnecessary to spend too much time at this point describing masculine and feminine traits *ad nauseum* and then plugging them into the Hofstede Masculinity Index. I won’t insult the reader’s intelligence by belaboring the point. Unless the you were born in a cardboard box and had no contact with anyone or any cultural cues the whole of your life, the dynamics of gender deontics are surely well-defined, familiar and readily recognizable. Women are expected to do or not to do certain things; men are expected to do or not to do certain other things. These complex standards for behavior and all associated deontic expectations are not analogous between them. Period. Let’s move on, then.

MAS chart. Below is a Microsoft *Excel*-spawned bar chart visually representing Hofstede’s numerical data. It can be read left-to-right or top-to-bottom as a *feminine-to-masculine* relative gradient. The U.S. and Finnish positions have been highlighted in dark blue for quick reference.



5.4. Country profiles

As a prelude to the following “Maiden Finland” section, it is appropriate to draw some gendered conclusions about the main players: the Americans, the Germans, the Finns and the Soviets/Russians. This project does not seek to duplicate Hofstede’s work. However, it is necessary to demonstrate in broad terms certain masculine and feminine indicators for a credible discussion of their implications on the behavior of nation-states in the international system.

It should be noted that there is no Soviet/Russian data available from the Hofstede study. To keep things simple and stay within the limitations of this study, the profiles for Germany and the USSR will not be presented in detail. Hofstede suggests that, although Russian culture appears to exhibit rather strong feminine features, the Soviet system contrasted sharply with this and was clearly masculine. I don’t see how there could be much argument against this. Plus, *reliable* figures on Soviet trends are difficult to obtain. We will thus have to make inferences from other sources.

In any case, the USSR is dead and is therefore less interesting and relevant than the USA. So, for simplicity’s sake, this profile section will compare and contrast Finland and the United States. If, as I believe, masculine and feminine cultures exhibit identifiably similar features with their “gender” counterparts abroad, then this Finland-U.S. focus should suffice in showing gender as a viable

category of analysis. This study is, after all, concerned primarily with *general trends* as part of “intermediate” applicability—a bridge between metatheory and empirical research.

MAS rankings. To begin with, take another look at the relative scores on the MAS. It is instantly apparent that the major players in the Second World War were all highly masculine. The Axis Powers—Italy, Japan and Germany—rank 1, 3 and 10 respectively. All the Anglo countries (except Canada which sits just above center on the scale) also rank in the top third as strongly masculine cultures. Great Britain ranks 9th, the USA 15th and Australia and New Zealand 16th and 17th. They form a clear MAS “bloc.” On the other hand, notice the Fenno-Scandians on the opposite pole. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (plus the Netherlands) occupy five of the seven most feminine positions on the chart. This represents a strong geographic (and partly linguistic, as with the Anglos) positive correlation.

The USA in a nutshell. America survived the dark days of the Cold War relatively unchanged and today exists as the lone Super Power in the post-communist era. It is a large country of 9,372,610 km². On a worldwide basis, the U.S. is by far the largest contributor to global military spending. It spends more than the next 13 biggest military spenders combined. In 1994, U.S. military expenditures accounted for 41 percent of the world’s total at about \$280 billion.³⁵¹ On the other hand, as one of the richest nations in the world, the U.S. ranks dead last (in percentage of GDP) among major Western donors of foreign aid. In fact, U.S. *pizza sales* alone in 1995 exceeded all U.S. government international humanitarian and development assistance by about *five times*!³⁵² U.S. Aid, including Ex-Im, accounted for \$90.5 billion during FY1980-1988.

Considering the grand possibilities, America’s score-card on the participation of women in government is rather disappointing. As of this writing (1998), there are a few women in Cabinet posts, but they occupy only 11.6 percent (62/535) of seats in the 105th Congress. Across the country in the same year, women hold 25.7 percent (82/323) of statewide elective executive offices. In June 1994, women accounted for 20.9 percent (4,413/21,601) of mayors and municipal council members (and their equivalents) serving nationwide in cities with over 10,000 inhabitants.³⁵³

The U.S. is a country of workaholics, a driven “live-to-work” performance culture. For example, in 1965, women worked (paid and unpaid labor) an average of 56.5 hours and men 58.4

³⁵¹ Diana Holder, “Reducing Global Military Expenditures” at URL www.napf.org/reducing.html on May 17, 1998.

³⁵² “Social-justice statistics” at URL www.claret.org/~salt/stats/1997/sep/sep1.html on May 19, 1998. Pizza sales reached a record level at some \$31 billion.

³⁵³ “Women in Elective Office 1998,” Center for the American Woman and Politics (CAWP), National Information Bank on Women in Public Office, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University at URL www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cawp/electv98.html on May 17, 1998. The Congressional breakdown is 9.0 percent (9/100) of Senate seats and 12.2 percent (53/435) of House of Representatives seats. This does not include two women House delegates from the Virgin Islands and Washington, DC. Municipal data supplied by the National League of Cities (NLC).

hours per week. These figures in 1986 were 56.4 and 59.5 work-hours, respectively.³⁵⁴

A snapshot of Finland. Finland is a small country at 337,030 km². Social expenditure is no less than 18.5 percent of budget, whereas military spending is about 5 percent of budget or 1.5 percent of GNP.³⁵⁵ Finland was hit hard by the recession in the early 1990s. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland's unemployment rate remained consistently safely below the OECD average. Starting in 1990-1991, this trend reversed, and by 1994, Finland had one of the highest unemployment rates in the developed world at more than double the OECD average.³⁵⁶

To a lesser degree, all of Scandinavia suffered similarly under the 1990s economic slump. This caused some of the steepest falls in aid, for, historically, these countries had boasted the best *per capita* long-term aid records around. In 1992-1993, for example, donations per person *halved* in Finland (\$141 to \$70), but still remained above the U.S. figure. Aid contributions also dropped sharply in Sweden from \$270 to \$203, yet still out-contributed the Americans by *five times*. The Norwegians also slipped from \$288 to \$236, but managed nonetheless to exceed the Canadians by *three times*.³⁵⁷ Finnish ODA/OOF commitments from 1970-1987 accounted for \$1.7 billion in aid.

Finland has one of the most impressive records in the world with regard to women, women's rights and women's participation. Finland was the third country in the world to legislate universal suffrage in 1906 (behind Australia and New Zealand—this didn't happen until 1920 in the United States). Today, women occupy significantly higher numbers of seats of power in Finnish government than in the U.S. Fully half of MEPs in 1996 were women. Those elected to municipal posts (local councils) the same year accounted for 31.4 percent—10.5 percent more than their American counterparts. In the 1995 parliamentary elections, more women (73.1 percent) turned out to vote than men (70.6 percent). The result was 67 women elected to Parliament, accounting for 33.5 percent of seats—three times higher than in the U.S. Other indicators, such as education, employment and wage structures are less divergent between the sexes than in the United States.³⁵⁸

Finns work considerably less than Americans, preferring the “work-to-live” motto so they can spend more time lounging at their summer cottages. In 1979, Finnish women worked an average of 47.3 and men 41.7 hours a week. In 1987, the figures were 47.5 and 44.3 work-hours—almost 9 hours less for women and 15 hours less for men than in the U.S.³⁵⁹ A little math reveals that, over the course of a year, that's an entire month less work for men and almost 3 weeks less for women!

³⁵⁴ “Table 5-6A,” United Nations, at URL www.un.org/Depts/unsd/gender/5-6all.htm on May 18, 1998.

³⁵⁵ Eskola, pp. 67, 85.

³⁵⁶ Johnny Åkerholm (trans. Kristina Puranen and Matti Helelä), *Economic Survey 1995 Finland*, Economics Department, Ministry of Finance, Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy, 1995, p. 1, and “Finnish Industry Report,” Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers, February 1995, p. 19. Unemployment was at least 17 percent and edged over 20 percent in mid-1993. As of this writing, there are places in Finland still over 20 percent (including the Tampere region, if I am not mistaken).

³⁵⁷ “Aid programmes cut, only 4 reach 0.7% target” at URL www.unicef.org/pon95/aid/0004.html on May 18, 1998.

³⁵⁸ “Women and Men in Finland,” Statistics Finland at URL www.stat.fi on May 17, 1998.

These are cursory examples provided to briefly reinforce Hofstede's findings with some concrete, quantitative support. These seem to demonstrate a clear separation in national priorities and thus delineation between gendered national characters. If the reader wishes more data, additional figures have been included in the "Appendices" section. These tables include:

- (1) **Appendix A:** Development assistance (feminine indicator) [percentage of GNP],
- (2) **Appendix B:** Military spending (masculine indicator) [percentage of CGE],
- (3) **Appendix C:** Social welfare 1 (feminine indicator) [percentage of GDP],
- (4) **Appendix D:** Social welfare 2 (feminine indicator) [percentage of CGE], and
- (5) **Appendix E:** Women in government (feminine indicator) [percentage, ministerial level].

For now, let's delve into the paper's empirical section: "Maiden Finland in a Masculinist World."

³⁵⁹ "Table 5-6A," United Nations, at URL www.un.org/Depts/unsd/gender/5-6all.htm on May 18, 1998.

6.0. Maiden Finland in a Masculinist World

6.1. Four seasons

Independent Finland was born on December 6, 1917 in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. Despite her relative youth in the family of modern nation-states, Finland has run the full gauntlet of gender roles and identities in her search for a niche in the international community. Her 20th century history, for the purposes of this study, can be seen in terms of the following four distinct periods:

- (1) the inter-war, or League of Nations, period (1918-1939)
- (2) World War II (1939-1945)
- (3) the Cold War era (1945-1992)
- (4) the post-Soviet, or post-Cold War, period (after 1992)³⁶⁰

These gender transition movements, or “seasons,” if you want to be poetic about it, parallel Farrell’s changes in micro-level gender deontics. This refers to oscillating shifts between *Stage I* (confrontation, the exercise of power, apathy, distance, a focus on survival, division, disagreement, strict role division and mutual dependence) and *Stage II* (cooperation, coexistence, recognition of responsibility, empathy, proximity, fulfillment, commonality, consensus, role convergence and choice).³⁶¹ Throughout the following historical sketch, you will see Finland variously regarded as a feisty little fighter, a weak (and seemingly willing) victim of Finlandization, a crafty manipulator and a *de facto* Soviet satellite among others.

Finland’s former president Kekkonen quite adequately summed up his country’s historical geopolitical imperatives in 1967, when he said that, “The vital issue for the Finnish people has always been the relationship with the Eastern neighbor, irrespective of whether its name has been Novgorod, Muscovy, Russia or the Soviet Union.”³⁶² Naturally, as a small and feminine country, at the crux of Finland’s problems was the masculine USSR: its proximity, its overwhelming relative brute power and the politicomilitary and socioeconomic isolation it imposed.³⁶³

The reality was that Finland lived on the razor’s edge as a borderland in the Soviet Union’s “security zone.” Nearby loomed St. Petersburg, a metropolis the size of Scandinavia’s capitals combined, along with the USSR’s northwestern economic and military sector it was amply prepared

³⁶⁰ These years mark major periods of change, such as the outbreak of war or the official end of armed conflict. The end of the Cold War for Finland can be said to have formally extended to 1992 as a result of the FCMA Treaty.

³⁶¹ Farrell, pp. 21-25.

³⁶² Ries, p. 225.

³⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 226.

to defend.³⁶⁴ Finland was absorbed with the primary task of avoiding inducement of the military clauses of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty (FCMA) to preclude Soviet military occupation and operations in Finland.

After a good fight, but an even worse defeat in World War II, Finland's Cold War posture *vis-à-vis* the USSR easily appeared to be something of a paradox. For Finland, any policy that distanced Helsinki from Moscow was a good one. Yet Finland could not seek support in alliances directed *against* the USSR and union *with* the Eastern neighbor was completely out of the question. From this quandary evolved the country's complex foreign and security policy embodied in the so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Long-time politician and Finnish president Kekkonen considered it the singular rational choice between two simple possibilities: "an anti-Soviet political line or a policy of neutrality."³⁶⁵

Nevertheless, not to Soviet displeasure, neutrality also distanced the Finns from closer integration with Western institutions and created a *de facto* East-West buffer, multifarious and segregating, which incorporated elements of each, yet was independent of both. To some degree, this effectively locked Finland into an era of political, cultural and economic isolation on the periphery of Europe. A quasi-isolation—largely self-imposed, in the opinion of some critics—that would die only with the very demise of the Soviet Union itself. In this sense, it has been said that Finland's status as "some kind of half-member in the empire" was a calculated tactical compromise to avoid absorption into the Warsaw Pact. But this begs the question, was the principle of non-alignment designed to extract the widest range of advantages available during the Cold War power configuration?³⁶⁶ Or, on the other hand, was there such latitude to maneuver between the two counterpoised behemoths?

In the realist tradition of Darwinian dog-eat-dog international relations theory, all states, big and small, seek to maximize their station and resources against the backdrop of perpetual conflict and competition with other nation-states. But for the smaller actors, like Finland, sandwiched between two confrontational nuclear Super Powers, the inherent limitations of such a worldview are obvious. Because of her modest size and therefore limited influence, Finland could hope to achieve nothing in redefining and reshaping the perceptions of the international world at large.

Underpinned by a credible independent defensive capability, Finland endeavored through neutrality policy, Nordic cooperation/links and peacekeeping operations to reinforce the image and assertion of an autonomous country free of Russian influence in its affairs. Gaining universal

³⁶⁴ Jukka Valtasaari, "Changes in Europe and Russia: A Finnish Perspective," transcript of a speech by the Finnish Ambassador to the U.S., delivered before the Buffalo World Affairs Council, Buffalo, New York, January 21, 1994. That is, Karelian lumber resources and the exceptional mineral deposits at Murmansk (where Russia still deploys half of its strategic naval forces).

³⁶⁵ Maude, p. 57, and Kekkonen. He was Minister of Justice from November 17, 1944 to March 26, 1946, involved in the prosecution of Finnish "war criminals." He went on to become Prime Minister from March 17, 1950 to November 17, 1953 and October 20, 1954 to March 3, 1956. He became president in 1956.

recognition of her efforts ultimately proved to be a long and difficult process.

Still, as late as 1989, the mere anticipation of this external influence, or *Finlandization* as it came to be called, succeeded in keeping Finland out of the Council of Europe and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). It also forced the Finns to forge a middle-of-the-road approach between remaining outside the predecessor of the European Union, the European Community (EC), or joining it. These, and other related examples, are considered contentious, as many contribute Finland's non-participation as a function of choice through neutrality, not the forced hand of Finlandization.³⁶⁷ Was Finland voluntarily neutral or neutralized? Either way, it can be said that Super Power bickering even had the tertiary effect of keeping the country out of the United Nations until 1956.³⁶⁸

In this regard, Finland's predicament was a unique one, and directly linked to its relationship with its Eastern neighbor. Today, with "new" security concerns to tackle, these legacies of the Cold War can still be discerned in Finnish political culture, decision-making and national psyche. Finland's much-maligned feminine qualities during the Cold War are now paying off in the age of European integration.

6.2. The Inter-War period

In the aftermath of World War I, battle-scarred countries around the world were highly motivated to find an alternative avenue for interstate dialogue and constructive resolution of conflict. The ruin, destruction and death of another Great War had to be avoided at all costs. At this time, Finland was a newly independent nation filled with optimism. She was also one of the model countries that proved that differences could be worked out peacefully. Finland looked to a glorious future, where nation-states rejected war by applying "feminine" methods. Finland practiced what she preached. In 1921, mediated by the newly created League of Nations, she and Sweden hammered out a heatedly debated but amicable resolution to the Åland Island question.³⁶⁹ Fledgling nation-state Finland sought security through the League from 1918 to 1939.³⁷⁰

When the system collapsed, Finland was deeply impacted. As other weaker states from all over the globe — including the East Central "succession" states, the Latin American countries and other Nordics — Finland initially viewed the League of Nations as the protectorate of smaller states' rights. This proved to be an illusion, as "the League gradually came to be merely a function of the

³⁶⁶ Riste, p. 313.

³⁶⁷ Hannu Mäntyvaara, "Finland's Foreign Policy" at URL www.vn.fi/vn/um/forpolic.html in July, 1995. Ambassador Hannu Mäntyvaara is among those who reject Finlandization as a catch-all explanation for every facet of Cold War Russo-Finnish relations.

³⁶⁸ Maude, pp. 136-137. The West refused the admission of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Mongolia, so the USSR opposed on principle the admission of other states, including Finland.

³⁶⁹ Hofstede, p. 100. This group of islands off the southwestern Finnish coast was territorially disputed by Sweden. The League's arbitration gave possession to Finland. Today, the Swedish-speaking inhabitants continue to enjoy a large degree of autonomy.

European balance of power.”

Indeed, the hope of idealists had been to fashion an alternative to power politics, rather than simply create another arena for its application.³⁷¹ In the end, however, the “toothless” and static nature of the League failed to curtail “fascist and communist dictatorships from undermining the collective security system.”³⁷² It was simply too early for such a noble attempt. The world of masculinist power was not ready for trying the “women’s way.”

Thus Finland, too, came to realize the futility of trying to construct an idealist global institution in a realist world driven by the aggressive and power-hungry. She found that alliances failed in the 1920s and turned instead to neutrality and isolation with cautious stabilization in Soviet relations.³⁷³ As we shall see, she nevertheless got caught between the lusts and ambitions of both sides during the Second World War and ended up fighting both the Allied *and* the Axis Powers.³⁷⁴ On the eve of entering the field of battle, Finland had to choose between dying for ideals or simple survival. She would choose survival and fight like a she-demon to preserve it, proving that women, too, can fight like hell.

6.3. World War II

Finland’s World War II confrontation with the Soviet Union actually occurred in two separate major military campaigns. The USSR initiated the first phase—known as the *Winter War*—which lasted over three months in 1939-1940. The Finns technically launched the second phase—known as the *Continuation War*—which lasted over three years from 1941 to 1944.³⁷⁵ There was a brief period of war against the Nazis that will be discussed later.

As the dark storm clouds of war swirled around Finland, it quickly became apparent that in the saber-rattling, chest-beating masculine international system, the Golden Rule was brutally simple: it was literally every man for himself. Other than perhaps a clean conscience, intervening on Finland’s behalf offered little in reward. There was negligible strategic value and no material benefits of any kind—the political and military risks, however, were unthinkable. Partly for these reasons,

³⁷⁰ Mauno Koivisto, *Foreign Policy Standpoints 1982-92: Finland and Europe*, England: Biddles Ltd., 1992. [Koivisto, 1992]

³⁷¹ William Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then & Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*, London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991, pp. 57-58, 79.

³⁷² David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System” in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.), *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1994, p. 78 (reprinted from *A Working Peace System* (Quadrangle Books, 1966), and Jaakko Blomberg, “Finland’s Evolving Security Policy” in *Nato Review*, Number 1, Volume 41, February, 1993, p. 12. Text by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. [Blomberg] Mitrany attributed the League’s failure to “weaknesses in its own constitution and machinery” and inability to manage the “process of continuous adjustment... [i.e.] ‘peaceful change’.”

³⁷³ Tomas Ries, *Cold Will: The Defence of Finland*, Great Britain: A. Wheaton & Co Ltd., 1988, p. 33. [Ries]

³⁷⁴ Olav Riste, “Janus Septentrionalis? The Two Faces of Nordic Non-Alignment” in *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l’histoire*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, pp. 319-320. [Riste]

Finland was essentially abandoned by the West. As Max Jakobson wrote in *Finnish Neutrality*:

Before the war Finland had been hailed as an outpost of the Western world against Communist Russia. When the outpost had come under attack in 1939 the rest of the world had cheered and applauded its defenders, but no nation had hastened to their rescue. This experience had a profound and long-lasting effect on Finnish political thinking.³⁷⁶

It was the toughest challenge Finland had ever faced. As we shall see, she learned the hard way two things as a result: that there was no one on whom she could rely but herself, and that it was in her best interest to remain detached from Great Power conflicts. Finland was an insignificant player. Stepping in between the “big boys” meant being trampled underfoot.

The Winter War. In September 1939 the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact³⁷⁷ relegated Finland to the Soviet sphere of influence. Almost immediately the USSR demanded areas of the Karelian Isthmus and the Finnish port of Hanko. The Soviet Union initially seemed willing to bargain, as it offered an area in Eastern Karelia twice the size of ceded territory in a land trade. Stalin would also “allow” fortification of the Åland Islands (provided it was done by Finland alone) would abandon his initial demand for a mutual assistance treaty. All of this was motivated by simple proximity: Finland’s southeastern border placed Leningrad within the reach of long-range modern artillery. It would seem that Stalin lost sleep mulling this over, until he concluded that the border had to be pushed farther north.³⁷⁸ Stalin obsessed over a perceived strategic deficiency in the protection of St. Petersburg and was determined not to get caught with his pants down.³⁷⁹

The Finnish government was willing to make some concessions in Karelia and in the Gulf, but not as much as Stalin wanted. The idea of leasing the Hanko base was rejected outright, and Stalin answered with a proposal to move the Soviet base to some islands off Hanko.³⁸⁰ This notwithstanding, the Finns, uncertain of the USSR’s true intentions, ultimately refused to make any deals. The Finns knew well the hazards of giving in to Soviet pressure as the Baltic States had done

³⁷⁵ Koivisto, 1992, p. 39.

³⁷⁶ Max Jakobson, *Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, Great Britain: Hugh Evelyn Limited, 1968, pp. 31-32. **[Jakobson]**

³⁷⁷ Martti Häikiö, *A Brief History of Modern Finland*, University of Helsinki/Lahti Research and Training Centre, Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1992, p. 24. **[Häikiö]** A secret protocol between the USSR and Nazi Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement divided Europe in such a way that Finland, the Baltic countries and parts of eastern Poland were handed to the USSR’s sphere of influence.

³⁷⁸ Matti Klinge, *A Brief History of Finland*, Keuruu: Otava Printing Works, 1994, p. 106 **[Klinge]**, and Jakobson, p. 11. Stalin wished to procure Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as the western part of the Fisherman’s Peninsula near Petsamo on the Arctic. He also wanted to lease the Hanko Peninsula near Helsinki. He was convinced that coastal artillery at Hanko would effectively seal the Gulf of Finland off from naval invasion. These demands were probably made in secret as early as 1938.

³⁷⁹ Stuart Hood, *Flame in the North*, BBC documentary film, 1973. **[Hood]** This film partly explains in its analysis of the Winter War Stalin’s obsession with the maritime approaches to St. Petersburg-Leningrad. Stalin had burned in his memory British Admiral Cowan’s 1918 daring naval raid against the Bolsheviks at the Kronstadt naval base. As the main target in a series of attacks, Cowan ordered eight coastal torpedo-boats to penetrate the harbor mouth and strike the Baltic fleet unaware. He thus managed to sink four docked battleships. At the time, Stalin was the representative of the Soviet Defense Council at Kronstadt. The fact that the Finns had not interfered with these British operations also did not go unnoticed by Stalin.

³⁸⁰ Jakobson, p. 12.

with dreadful consequences. Latvia and Estonia had acquiesced to similar demands for forward bases and were invaded within weeks by the Red Army, in part through active use of those same bases.³⁸¹ Moscow was reclaiming bases it had lost in World War I³⁸².

There is no historical doubt that on the afternoon of November 26th the Soviets fabricated a Finnish mortar or artillery attack at the Soviet Karelian village of Mainila.³⁸³ This action was designed to give the Kremlin an excuse to discard the 1932 Non-Aggression Pact with Finland and proceed on this pretext toward war — both of which it did within days. Although the offensive force was massive, additional Soviet deception (*maskirovka*) measures so well concealed the Soviet buildup north of Ladoga that the timing of the ensuing attack took the Finns by surprise.³⁸⁴ Still and all, unlike Estonia's crisis management method, Finland *did* mobilize for war at the outset.³⁸⁵ Finnish troops were at full military readiness and prepositioned,³⁸⁶ dug in and amply supplied for the forthcoming offensive. They weren't kept waiting long; the ensuing Soviet invasion came on November 30, 1939 without a declaration of war.³⁸⁷

Materially speaking, the Red Army was a quantitatively superior force: it was highly armored and mechanized, with heavy firepower and enjoyed the support of a large tactical air force. It was, nonetheless, qualitatively inferior, with poor training, scanty discipline, deficient coordination and characterized by an “abysmally ineffective use of artillery.”³⁸⁸ Additionally, the Soviet army lacked competent professional military leadership, as Stalin had subjected it to a series of drastic purges in

³⁸¹ Ries, pp. 49, 67-68, 162, and Kalervo Hovi, “The Neutrality of the Baltic States before the Second World War” in Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l'histoire*, Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, p. 153. On September 18, 1939 Stalin began pressuring Estonia, maximizing the political leverage of a “neutrality slip” in a September 15th incident. The Polish submarine *Órzel* had remained at Estonia's port Reval for three days and was through empathy, apathy or inability allowed to depart unmolested (the vessel was not disarmed and the crew not interned). The USSR immediately accused Estonia of the inability to guarantee her neutrality, since Poland was now a Soviet enemy power and the sub was allegedly using Estonia's port as a base for combat operations. The Baltic Fleet entered Estonian territorial waters, even penetrating into the Gulf of Riga. Soviet aircraft began systematically violating Estonian airspace. By the end of the month three to four Red Army divisions were massed on the border. The Foreign Minister signed a Mutual Assistance Pact in Moscow on September 28 leasing several naval bases. Soon, however, further extra-agreement concessions were demanded, most notably the stationing of Army units on the mainland, the use of several airfields and the appropriation of Reval as a support naval base. The sub incident gave the Soviets a “legal” pretext to intervene, which happened immediately. Estonia's independence crumbled within weeks (on October 18-19) the capital was taken without resistance by but one infantry division, one armored brigade and one air brigade. Incidentally, Estonian air bases were later used for bombing raids on southern Finland.

³⁸² Jakobson, p. 10.

³⁸³ Ries, p. 61. This charade was later admitted in Khrushchev's memoirs, in which Artillery Marshal Kulik was named as the personal supervisor of the seven-round bombardment. Three Finnish observation posts confirmed that the shelling originated on the Soviet side. Soviet prisoners later captured during the Continuation War described in detail the deceit. In any case, it was virtually impossible for the Finns to have fired; previously Mannerheim had personally ordered all artillery back away from the border and out of range of Soviet territory.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 61, 77-78.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 69. On October 6, the day after the Soviet call for negotiations, Finland's Covering Force of 21,600 was deployed to the eastern frontier and southern coast. The day before Paasikivi departed for Moscow, the Finnish government authorized the discrete, but full mobilization of the 300,000 men of the Field Army. This contrasts sharply with Estonia's marked absence of war preparations, which ultimately resulted in capitulation.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 79, 164.

³⁸⁷ Encarta.

³⁸⁸ Ries, p. 85.

1937-1938. The result was Stalin's complete political control over the military, but a military which no longer constituted an effective fighting machine.³⁸⁹

At the outbreak of war, Finland's standing army consisted of only three infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade and a tank company. However, trained and partly trained reserves³⁹⁰ meant that the opposing force was ultimately met by 135,000 Finnish troops in nine divisions. Based on the formidable size and might of the Red Army, the international community summarily wrote Finland off as a casualty of war. But a numerical analysis doesn't tell the whole story.

The sheer size and deployment of the Soviet force thrown against the Finnish front indicated that Stalin would not be content taking a small sliver of Karelia, but was instead intent on invading and subjugating the entire country of Finland. This massive force at the outbreak of the Winter War accounted for a 3-to-1 superiority in men; 80-to-1 superiority in tanks; 5-to-1 superiority in guns, howitzers and mortars; and 5½-to-1 superiority in aircraft. Deployed Red Army divisions would almost double by the end of the war, amounting ultimately to half of all Soviet military resources.³⁹¹ Tomas Ries describes the Soviet invasion force thusly:

The initial offensive consisted of 23 divisions plus support forces, with 2,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft, for a total force of 450,000 men. This represented a little less than one quarter of the total Red Army ORBAT [Order of Battle: the size, organization and equipment of military forces] in 1939, with the divisions collected from almost every western military district in the Soviet Union. This was obviously a major and very costly maneuver which would not have been carried out for minor objectives.³⁹²

Despite the overwhelming odds, the Finns continued to inflict impressive losses on the Red Army through January. They destroyed a Soviet division and a tank brigade as well as portions of other Red Army divisions, which were attacking in the central and northern parts of Finland. As a result of recurring defeats, the Soviet military leadership was reorganized. Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko assumed command of all Soviet operations against Finland, and, as was intended, the character of the war changed immediately. Timoshenko concentrated about 300,000 troops against the Mannerheim Line³⁹³ and supported the offensive with artillery and air power.

From February 1-10, 1940, Finnish fortifications on the Mannerheim Line were subjected to artillery bombardments peaking at 300,000 shells a day.³⁹⁴ The Soviets' main thrust was against a 15-kilometer sector between Muolajärvi and Karhula. There they concentrated 60 percent of infantry and 66 percent of artillery assets, accounting for up to 4.5 battalions and 40-70 cannons per kilometer

³⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 56. Roughly 35,000 officers were liquidated, of which the highest ranks were hardest hit: 90 percent of generals and 80 percent of colonels disappeared.

³⁹⁰ Encarta.

³⁹¹ Ries, p. 90.

³⁹² *Ibid*, pp. 88, 377.

³⁹³ The legendary—but much overrated—series of Finnish reinforced positions, trenches and bunkers.

of front. At the most heavily concentrated area near Summa, more artillery shells poured onto Finnish positions in *one day* than the Finns had held in their entire arsenal at the beginning of the war!³⁹⁵

Sympathetic volunteers from elsewhere in Norden arrived over the course of the war to aid Finland: some 1,100 Danes, 750 Norwegians and 7,000 Swedes.³⁹⁶ Though with considerable Swedish materiel assistance,³⁹⁷ a sizable number of Swedish volunteers, and the capable military leadership of Marshal Mannerheim,³⁹⁸ certain defeat was only a matter of time. Going it alone, little Finland could delay the inevitable for only so long. She was overwhelmingly outgunned and outmanned. The enemy's new tactics and fresh provision of direly needed reinforcements and supplies turned the tide of the war clearly in the favor of the Soviet attackers.³⁹⁹

In addition, Finland had been promised Allied assistance, but the reality was that these troops — if they had, indeed, come at all — would have been too little too late. Undoubtedly, their involvement in Finland's war would have unraveled the World War's power alignments and probably would have plunged all of Scandinavia into total war. Still, this question of accepting Allied military aid or suing for peace with the Soviets weighed heavily on Finland through February and into the first week of March. On March 7, 1940 a delegation headed by PM Risto Ryti traveled to Moscow. On the last day set as the deadline to accept Allied aid, the peace treaty was signed. Fighting came to an end on the following day.⁴⁰⁰

The Winter War ended on March 12, 1940 with harsh concessions to the Soviet victor. Hanko was to remain occupied for 30 years as a Soviet military base. Finland's eastern frontier on the Karelian Isthmus was forced back away from Leningrad, from 30 kilometers to 180 kilometers. The entire province of Viipuri,⁴⁰¹ as well as parts of the districts of Salla and Kuusamo in the northwestern part of the country. Stalin required Finland to cede the islands he originally wanted. He also dictated that Finland build a railway from the new border at Salla up to Kemijärvi where it could be linked up

³⁹⁴ Encarta.

³⁹⁵ Ries, p. 117. This two-kilometer stretch was the main objective assigned to the elite 100th and 113th Divisions, supported by the 123rd and 138th Divisions, 980 tanks and 104 artillery batteries. Incidentally, all this was pitched against Col. Paalu's 3rd Division on an eight-kilometer sector with 16 artillery batteries.

³⁹⁶ Erling Bjørn (ed.), *Ensimmäinen ja toinen maailman sota* [The First and Second World Wars], "Toinen maailman sota" [The Second World War] section, Thomas Magnusson et al. (translated into Finnish by Kirsti and Arto Ingervo), Keuruu: Kustannusokakeyhtiö Otava, 1995, p. 225. [Bjørn]

³⁹⁷ Torbjörn Norman, "Stages in Swedish Neutrality" in *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l'histoire*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, p. 305. During the Winter War, the Swedes did not issue a declaration of neutrality, but rather adopted a policy of non-belligerence. War materiel to Finland was supplied to the point of depleting Swedish stores to dangerously low levels.

³⁹⁸ Koivisto, 1992, p. 164, and John Lukacs, "Finland Vindicated" in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 71, Number 4, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, Fall 1992, pp. 52-53. [Lukacs] Baron Carl Gustaf Mannerheim rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General and served with distinction in the Czar's army until his appointment as CIC of the Finnish Army by the young Finnish senate in December 1917. He defeated the Reds in the bloody Finnish civil war and resigned to go abroad in 1918. He returned later for a failed presidential bid in Finland's first election and was appointed Field Marshall in 1933 a few short years before the outbreak of war.

³⁹⁹ Klinge, p. 108.

⁴⁰⁰ Jakobson, pp. 14, 38.

with the line leading to the Swedish frontier⁴⁰² and the Soviet Kantalahti-Salla line.⁴⁰³

The treaty ended the first phase of World War II for the Finns. According to an official Finnish communiqué, Finnish casualties totaled 19,263 killed and 43,500 wounded.⁴⁰⁴ Relatively speaking, the Soviets fared even worse, with human losses ten times their Finnish counterparts. The Finnish campaign was a costly and embarrassing fiasco for Moscow. Finnish estimates placed Russian losses at 200,000 or more.⁴⁰⁵ This would prove to be just the beginning. As we will see, by the end of the Second World War, overall losses to battle, climate and starvation — though estimates vary—may have been as high as one million Russian men.⁴⁰⁶

The Continuation War. As an immediate reaction to the fall of France to the Germans, Stalin annexed the Baltic States.⁴⁰⁷ Their forcible incorporation into the USSR in August 1940 was a crystalline sign to the Finns that a similar fate probably awaited a Finland choosing to remain passive.⁴⁰⁸ There was no place for femininity any more. Kekkonen once said that:

Soviet activity in the spring of 1940 gave well-founded cause for the fear felt in Finland that the Moscow Peace was only a truce for the Soviet Union and that its intention was to make Finland a Soviet vassal.⁴⁰⁹

In April Hitler occupied Denmark and Norway, cutting Finland off from the West and militarily isolating her next to the Soviet Union. Finland initially attempted to maintain a diluted neutrality during the events leading up to the second round of conflict with the USSR, but the deck was stacked against her. Although Finland certainly worked hard to avoid confirming Russian suspicions of Finnish collusion with the Nazi regime, the fact is that already by autumn 1940 Finns had succumbed to rapidly intensifying involvements with the Germans. In addition to economic and other agreements, by December informal military contacts between senior German and Finnish General Staff officers took place. A Finnish-German treaty on technical cooperation was later signed in the spring of 1941.

Although a high German official in Helsinki assured President Risto Ryti that there would be no war before 1942,⁴¹⁰ by May the German foreign office began secretly negotiating with Finland on the forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. The following month Finland's political and military

⁴⁰¹ Häikiö, p. 25. This are included the cities of Viipuri (Finland's second largest city at the time), Käkisalme and Sortavala.

⁴⁰² Jakobson, p. 15.

⁴⁰³ Ries, p. 122.

⁴⁰⁴ Encarta. Soviet estimates of Finnish losses, of course, were considerably higher.

⁴⁰⁵ Bjørli, p. 226.

⁴⁰⁶ Ries, p. 124. Ries says that even Khrushchev would later confirm this figure in his memoirs.

⁴⁰⁷ Jakobson, p. 15.

⁴⁰⁸ Matti Eskola (ed), *Facts About Finland*, (trans. Michael Wynne-Ellis) Keuruu: Otava Publishing Company, Ltd., 1994, p. 54. [Eskola]

⁴⁰⁹ Urho Kekkonen, "Good Neighbourliness With the 'Hereditary Enemy'," transcript of a speech given at a Swedish Agrarian Union meeting in Stockholm, December 7, 1943. [Kekkonen] Kekkonen was Minister of Justice at the time.

⁴¹⁰ Jakobson, p. 17.

leadership agreed to take part and Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee approved the military arrangements. Although the timing of the strike was not then revealed, the Finns were told to mobilize and be prepared for action by June 28th.⁴¹¹

The Third Reich in *Operation Barbarossa*,⁴¹² emboldened by the poor performance of the Red Army on the Finnish front, betrayed the Ribbentrop Agreement and attacked the Soviet Union in the early hours of June 22, 1941. Already around 75,000 German troops were in northern Finland using Lapland as an area of military operations.⁴¹³ The massing of these soldiers was in full swing during the second week of June, ostensibly as Norway-to-Germany troop transfers.⁴¹⁴ Soviet bombing of southern Finnish cities prompted the president to notify Parliament the nation was forced to defend itself.⁴¹⁵ Finland seized the opportunity to take simultaneous action. Four days after the launch of *Barbarossa* the Finns themselves initiated the second phase of conflict by declaring war on the Soviets. Only 15 short months had elapsed since the Treaty of Moscow in March 1940 that ended the Winter War.⁴¹⁶

This time, conscription service extended to two years and German armaments assistance meant that a better-equipped army of Finnish troops was on hand to confront the Red Army. Standing forces were five Army Corps of 15 brigades, with a Field Army doubled to 16 Divisions and several detached brigades.⁴¹⁷ By the end of July when full mobilization was completed, 13 percent of the Finnish population was in uniform.⁴¹⁸ These troops may have numbered as many as 475,000, of which 280,000 were immediately dispatched to engage the 114,000 Russians on the Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga-Karelia frontline.⁴¹⁹

Though not entirely correct, Hitler announced that in the north his troops stood "side by side" with their Finnish comrades.⁴²⁰ Finland did not ally *per se* with the *Führer*, but rather considered itself a "co-belligerent."⁴²¹ There were no abstract ideological ties, no fraternal affinity, nor any underlying allegiance based on linguistic, racial or religious bonds. Finland was not a German satellite. In this sense, it deviated from the pattern of all other German allies and associates.⁴²² Finns

⁴¹¹ Ries, pp. 127-128, 131.

⁴¹² Henri J. Warmenhoven, *Western Europe*, Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., 1991, p. 61.

⁴¹³ Encarta, and Klinge, p. 109.

⁴¹⁴ Jakobson, p. 17.

⁴¹⁵ Ries, 1988, p. 132.

⁴¹⁶ Lukacs, p. 54.

⁴¹⁷ Ries, p. 131.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 134.

⁴¹⁹ Häikiö, p. 26.

⁴²⁰ Jakobson, p. 17.

⁴²¹ Jukka Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality" in *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l'histoire*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, p. 38. [Nevakivi] Nevakivi compares Finnish "cobelligerence" to the doctrine of "parallel war" used by Italy, Hungary and Romania to characterize their relationship with Germany during the Russian campaign.

⁴²² Lukacs, p. 55.

rejected the ideological seeds of Nazism, which, therefore, withered and died in Finland.⁴²³ From the Finnish point of view, quite simply, two separate armies were simultaneously engaging a common foe. Nothing more.

However, this was no small matter, as it fortuitously coincided with Finnish ambitions to regain Winter War losses. President Koivisto, who himself went through the war, admitted that it took him 20 years afterwards to painfully realize that Finns actually *wanted* war in 1941.⁴²⁴ True, the Finns had been wronged and violated in the Winter War. One could even argue that abuse victims often themselves become perpetrators of the horrible crimes they suffer. There were, after all, cries for Russian blood from some and the yearning for revenge and retribution ran high across-the-board.

Pro-German sentiments increased sharply in the fall of 1940, fueling the notion that Finland's fate intertwined with that of the Reich. Proponents fell into two main camps. The first faction saw the opportunity to regain lost territory through close affiliation with Nazi Germany, regardless of how the Germans and Soviets rectified their differences. The second group, however, had its eye on all of East Karelia for the establishment of a strategic zone, which would, they felt, solve the country's eastern security problems once and for all.⁴²⁵ Referring to Finland's own agenda, according to Henri J. Warmenhoven:

The carefully planned attack by Adolf Hitler's juggernaut seemed, at least initially, so promising that it posed a dilemma to Finnish nationalism. On the one hand, as a democratic nation, the Finns abhorred Nazi totalitarianism and violence; but on the other, the Soviet Union had clearly been their most recent enemy... The Finns insisted that... theirs was a separate war, unrelated to the general conflagration in the rest of Europe.⁴²⁶

In any case, any attempt at remaining outside the conflict would have meant occupation by Hitler's army or subjugation to the Soviet communist regime. Both were equally repugnant. As Mauno Koivisto once described the predicament, "Even the less wise can make the right choice between a good and a bad alternative. But choosing between two very bad alternatives is difficult and painful."⁴²⁷ It would seem that the masculine solution—armed conflict—was the only viable option. The bottom line was that, reluctantly, the Finns were forced to embrace a German counter-weight to the impending Soviet threat. Finland did try to keep its distance from the Reich in some token ways. Unlike Germany, Finland's separate objectives did not include the encirclement of Leningrad or the cutting of the Murmansk railroad. Consequently, Finland did not participate in either operation.⁴²⁸

⁴²³ Jakobson, p. 18.

⁴²⁴ Koivisto, 1992, p. 129.

⁴²⁵ Bjørn, p. 272.

⁴²⁶ Warmenhoven, p. 61.

⁴²⁷ Koivisto, 1992, p. 128.

⁴²⁸ Häikiö, p. 26.

This “technicality” was certainly meaningless to the Soviet leadership. If this was even a conscious thought at the frontline, it was probably equally abstract to the soldiers on both sides, as they lay dying in muddy trenches or losing arms and legs to shrapnel and frostbite.

In retrospect, the state of war was no new phenomenon in the country. Finland had been the *cordon sanitaire* between Sweden and Russia for eight centuries, a battleground at the intersection between the Great Powers, where 20 wars and hundreds of smaller skirmishes had been fought with its Eastern neighbor. Now for the first time, a free Finland was determined to fight to preserve its independence. The days of being the doormat of Northern Europe were over.

As part of increasing cooperation with the Germans—although, at this point, a comparatively minor commitment⁴²⁹—the *Wehrmacht* had been granted complete freedom to transit through Finland. The Germans had secretly offered in exchange large quantities of armaments in August 1940. This in mind, incontrovertibly, Finnish neutrality was compromised from the beginning. Undoubtedly, Soviet intelligence new of, or at least strongly suspected, these contacts and cooperative activities.

Additionally, Finland subordinated units above Oulu to German High Command and Germans used Finnish airfields for bombing runs against Soviet targets.⁴³⁰ Finnish covert support also included submarine mine-laying operations off Soviet harbors and permission for the German Navy to use Finland’s archipelago as a staging area for its own laying of mines in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. General Staff liaison officers were exchanged.⁴³¹

With their assistance, the Red Army suffered heavy initial losses. Finns reached the pre-Winter War frontier at Sietsajoki on the Karelian Isthmus within two months.⁴³² They then penetrated deep into Karelia, beyond the old border, where the lines stabilized in protracted trench warfare until the immense Soviet counter-attack in the summer of 1944.⁴³³ With this enormous summer offensive, the tide turned decisively in favor of the Soviets. The Red Army accumulated roughly half a million men and 50 percent of available artillery for the ensuing battle, the largest ever waged in Northern Europe.⁴³⁴ At the same time as the Allied Normandy landing, the Soviet Union threw more than 20 divisions, backed by more than 400 bomber aircraft against the Finns at the narrow Karelian front.⁴³⁵

Particularly after the German defeat at Stalingrad, the Finnish government became actively interested in separating itself from Germany.⁴³⁶ Finland began investigating a separate peace as early

⁴²⁹ Jakobson, p. 16. Compared to Sweden, for instance, German troop movements through Finland was but a trickle. By May 1941 only 14,000 men had used the Finnish route, while more than a quarter million had used Swedish transport in 1940 alone.

⁴³⁰ Nevakivi, p. 38. This was, however, seen as a counter-weight to transit rights granted to the Russians to transport troops and materiel to the Baltic Fleet at Hanko.

⁴³¹ Ries, p. 132.

⁴³² *Ibid*, pp. 127-128.

⁴³³ Häikiö, pp. 26-27, and Eskola, p. 54. During this time Finland became dependent on Germany for military supplies and food.

⁴³⁴ Ries, p. 145.

⁴³⁵ Jakobson, p. 18.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 18.

as 1943, but did not achieve this until September 1944 (the Finnish overture was accepted on August 25th). In Moscow, the Finnish delegation led by Paasikivi reached a compromise. Severing the German connection, however, was particularly difficult due to the Reich's use of grain, foodstuffs and other economic weapons to dissuade the Finns from a separate peace. This was principally true during the last year of the war, when about 90 percent of Finland's foreign trade and vital raw material imports came directly from Germany.⁴³⁷

Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop and Marshal Keitel tried through flattery, promises and threats to preserve the Finnish bond, but to no avail—Mannerheim and the Finnish government rejected them.⁴³⁸ By the time the armistice was signed, the front had been static for over a month at almost the same place as at the end of the Winter War. In many ways, Finland was at her peak. Finnish forces had been increased through mobilization to their highest level ever — 530,000 men — and ample reserves of armaments and ammunition were still available.⁴³⁹ But this was in no way a position of superiority in real terms. It was, in fact, merely the apex of an ultimately losing position. The Finnish leadership knew well that continued combat would steadily deteriorate the country's bargaining position. Eventually, it would degrade to the point of absolute surrender to occupying Soviet forces.

For this reason, slowly she came to realize that for a small country, military solutions alone were grey ghosts and phantoms. They lacked substance, were subject to the whims of larger states and ultimately spelled doom for weaker nations. Pushed into a corner, though, Finland had resisted like a banshee. No country after Poland in 1920 had ever succeeded in thwarting the advance of the Soviet Army long enough to create a deadlock, which could be used to bring about an honorable peace (as opposed to succumbing to demands for unconditional surrender).⁴⁴⁰ Finland managed to do so, but the price of peace, too, was harsh.

In the end, the 1941-1944 *Continuation War* — so called because it was viewed as an extension of the previous, unfinished conflict — cost Finland 65,000 dead and 158,000 wounded of its four million inhabitants. Karelian refugees requiring repatriation numbered 423,000.⁴⁴¹ Of the Winter and Continuation wars, the human toll exacted was 2.3 percent of the Finnish population. Of these, some 90,000 were combatants.⁴⁴² Territorial concessions amounted to considerably more than

⁴³⁷ Ries, pp. 130, 132, 144.

⁴³⁸ Bjørli, p. 274.

⁴³⁹ Ries, p. 156.

⁴⁴⁰ Krister Wahlbäck, "Mauno Koivisto as President—A View from Abroad" in *Pitkä linja—Mauno Koivisto: valtiomies ja vaikuttaja* [The Long Perspective—Mauno Koivisto: Statesman], Rauma: Kirjapaino Oy West Point, 1993, p. 355. [Wahlbäck], and Nevakivi, p. 39.

⁴⁴¹ Klinge, pp. 110, 112, 115. This accounted for 11 percent of the population at the time.

⁴⁴² Häikiö, p. 27. The percentage of the population killed was consistent with other combatant nations on the periphery of Europe.

the initial Soviet demands.⁴⁴³ With 10 percent of its industrial capacity lost, Finland nonetheless was forced to pay heavy reparations valued at 300 million gold dollars. This took the form of finished goods: two-thirds being ships, machinery and other engineering products and one-third traditional timber and paper products.⁴⁴⁴ Foreign Minister Enckell pointed out to the Soviets at the August 1946 Paris Conference that it was the same amount as Hungary and Romania, both larger countries, were asked to pay. His request for a reduction by a third was harshly rejected.⁴⁴⁵

In addition, all “fascist” organizations had to be banned, German assets and property were to be frozen and later turned over to the Soviets, persons accused of war crimes were to be arrested and tried, and the Finnish merchant fleet was to be placed at the disposal of the Allied powers.⁴⁴⁶ The 1944 truce, later ratified at the 1947 Peace Congress, returned Karelian borders to their 1940 (post-Winter War) locations. The Hanko lease was traded for a 50-year lease of the Porkkala naval base (just 18 kilometers west of Helsinki). The vast Finnish Petsamo area obtained in 1920, which represented Finland’s sole Arctic Sea access, was returned to the Soviets. Finland’s military was limited in size and equipment.⁴⁴⁷ The Soviet terms had, indeed, penalized and punished Finland for its Continuation War audacity, relegating any hopes of regaining lost Karelia to a faint echoed saying that can occasionally be heard today: “Take Karelia back.”⁴⁴⁸

The Lapland War: expulsion of the Germans. Oddly enough, the war for Finland did not end with the Soviet armistice. The forthcoming Lapland War was a distasteful and harrowing, however necessary, task to undertake. At the core of the problem was the understanding that if the Finns did not rid themselves of the remaining *Wehrmacht* forces, the Russians would enter Finland and do it for them. Once the Red Army occupied the country, it might just as easily remain indefinitely.⁴⁴⁹ Most certainly, this was not an option; Finland’s course of action, therefore, was clear.

The remaining Germans, reluctant to leave Lapland — still numbering some 200,000⁴⁵⁰ to 220,000 of the XXth *Gebirgsarmee* (GA) — were to be expelled from Finnish soil by September 15th. These troops were well-trained with some eight to 12 months of supplies, consisting of 180,000 tons

⁴⁴³ Kekkonen, and Warmenhoven, p. 61, and Encarta. Finland conceded over 11 percent of its total area (an even larger percentage of arable land), 12 percent of forest and 25 percent of water-power resources. To put this in perspective, a rough equivalent to the United States in terms of pure land area would mean the huge loss of California and Texas.

⁴⁴⁴ “Background Note—Finland 3/97,” Background Note: Finland, March, 1997, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, at URL www.state.gov/www/background_notes/finland_bgn.html on May 19, 1998, and Hood, and Jakobson, p. 27 and Martti Häikiö, p. 31. To meet Stalin’s decree, Finland had to double its shipbuilding and engineering industrial capacity. The goods nearly doubled in actual value (\$570 million when paid off in 1952) from the sum outlined in the Armistice Agreement due to an imposed 1938 price level fix. This war indemnity accounted for 15 to 16 percent of Finland’s post-war budget, which, calculated on a *per capita* basis exceeded the reparations demanded of Germany after World War I.

⁴⁴⁵ Jakobson, pp. 26-29. Although the Soviet response was swift and severe, maintaining basically that Finland got off lightly, less than two years later the USSR unilaterally reduced the amount nearly to the level of Enckell’s request.

⁴⁴⁶ Jakobson, p. 20. An Allied Control Commission was installed in Helsinki to ensure Finland’s compliance with the peace agreement.

⁴⁴⁷ Häikiö, p. 27.

⁴⁴⁸ In Finnish, *Karjala takaisin*.

⁴⁴⁹ Jakobson, p. 55.

of war materiel. In September, four Finnish divisions and two brigades—combat-weary from long fighting in the southeast of Finland—arrived in Lapland to deal with the Germans.

Originally, the German withdrawal towards Norway took place under peaceful agreement between senior German and Finnish commanders. Few shots were fired. However that soon changed. Pressure from the Allied Control Commission to expedite the removal of the German troops effectively caused German retaliation.⁴⁵¹ Limited engagements on or about September 20th⁴⁵² lead headlong into bitter and bloody combat that stretched into the spring of 1945. This cost around 4,000 killed or wounded Finns.⁴⁵³

As revenge for what Hitler called Finland's treachery for securing a separate peace, German scorched earth tactics destroyed virtually every road and structure in Lapland, halved the pre-war reindeer population and left in its fiery wake large minefields and booby-trapped areas.⁴⁵⁴ Pursued relentlessly by the Finns, though, the fleeing Germans were forced to destroy their supplies and abandon their equipment. Although some Germans survived and were finally driven off Finnish soil at Kilpisjärvi on April 27, 1945, the majority of them were killed or captured by the Finns and turned over to the Soviet armies as prisoners-of-war.⁴⁵⁵ In the rush to expel the Germans, the Finns neglected to officially declared war on the Reich until March 3, 1945, though a state of war had existed between the two since the beginning of hostilities in mid-September.⁴⁵⁶

6.4. The Cold War era

In the highly charged, uncertain years following the Second World War, European international relations were dominated by a constant state of suspicion, mistrust, manipulation and paranoia. Russo-Finnish relations were no exception. The immediate four post-war years (1944-1948), known as the "Dangerous Years," were characterized by constant fears of a communist takeover. What Koivisto calls "doomsday predictions" about Finland's future abounded.⁴⁵⁷ There were even rumors of a communist *coup d'état* in the spring of 1948 that prompted a presidential martial response.⁴⁵⁸ Such dramatic changes in the country's foreign and domestic policies took place that some Finns have referred to this post-war time as the "Second Republic."⁴⁵⁹

Finland at the conclusion of hostilities was a largely economically crushed nation. It was,

⁴⁵⁰ Warmenhoven, p. 61.

⁴⁵¹ Koivisto, 1992, p. 50. According to Koivisto, the Germans attacked their former "brothers-in-arms" first at Suursaari in the south.

⁴⁵² Ries, pp. 158-160.

⁴⁵³ Häikiö, p. 27.

⁴⁵⁴ Jakobson, p. 20, and Ries, p. 160.

⁴⁵⁵ Koivisto, 1992, pp. 50-51, and Warmenhoven, p. 61

⁴⁵⁶ Jakobson, p. 55.

⁴⁵⁷ Koivisto, 1992, p. 41.

⁴⁵⁸ Jakobson, p. 44. President Paasikivi put troops and police on alert. A gunboat covered the Presidential Palace from South Harbor.

nonetheless, the only portion of the czarist empire not reclaimed by the Red Army and the only European border-state not to become communist.⁴⁶⁰ It was, in fact, the only European nation involved in the Second World War besides England and the Soviet Union not militarily occupied.⁴⁶¹

The FCMA: cornerstone of Finnish *Ostpolitik*. Seriously battle-wounded, Finland exited the war wishing to normalize relations with the USSR. Because she emerged unoccupied, her socio-political system remained intact and constitution continued to function. Also, within six to eight years, the displaced Karelians were successfully resettled inside Finland and reintegrated into society, thus potentially stronger revengist sentiment was diffused.⁴⁶² This also helped make constructing a new relationship with the Soviets more likely to succeed. At the end of the war, Finnish president Gustaf Mannerheim and General Aarne Sihvo, Commander of the Defense Forces, spoke of entering into a security arrangement with the USSR.⁴⁶³

On February 23rd in the form of a personal letter⁴⁶⁴—in conjunction with the 1948 communist takeover in Czechoslovakia — Stalin requested that Finland's Paasikivi travel to the Russian capital to conclude such an agreement. Diplomats were eventually dispatched and the first meeting between Soviet and Finnish representatives took place on March 25th.⁴⁶⁵ The resulting agreement was the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) Treaty, signed in Moscow on April 6th. This treaty was no new concept in Soviet thinking.⁴⁶⁶ In conjunction with Finland, the idea had come up several times through various channels since at least as early as 1938 (it was a component in the secret Fenno-Soviet talks, which rejected Stalin's territorial demands before the Winter War).⁴⁶⁷

Apart from lesser points, the FCMA stipulated that any armed attack on Finland (or the USSR through Finland) by Germany or any of its allies would require Finnish resistance and, if necessary, armed assistance by the Soviet Union. It further called for Fenno-Soviet consultations in the event of attack or threat of attack. Alliances against each other were forbidden, and each party pledged to respect the sovereignty and integrity of the other, stressing “non-interference in the internal affairs of

⁴⁵⁹ Häikiö, p. 28. The so-called “First Republic” was from 1918-1944.

⁴⁶⁰ Robert W. Matson, “Finlandization, an Ahistorical Analogy” in *Research Studies*, 51:1, March, 1983, p. 1. [Matson]

⁴⁶¹ Jakobson, p. 21.

⁴⁶² *Ibid*, p. 26.

⁴⁶³ George Maude, *The Finnish Dilemma: Neutrality in the Shadow of Power*, Great Britain: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Limited, 1976, p. 28. [Maude]

⁴⁶⁴ Jakobson, p. 35.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 38-39.

⁴⁶⁶ Maude, pp. 13, 29. Other such Soviet bilateral agreements were concluded with Czechoslovakia (1943), Poland and Yugoslavia (both in 1945). Unlike in these countries, a communist *coup* did not occur in Finland. The FCMA more closely resembled the 1948 Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian pacts (with military aid provisions) than the Austria State Treaty (November 1955).

⁴⁶⁷ Jakobson, p. 37-39. A brief response was sent on February 27th explaining that such a treaty with a foreign power would require parliamentary approval. Over the next month Finland handled the situation openly, democratically, in accordance with the constitution and parliamentary consent and with full public disclosure. The signatories were Finnish PM Mauno Pekkala and Viacheslav Mihailovich Molotov, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This agreement was the only one of its kind in the post-war era that was never reworded or changed. As Paasikivi had allegedly committed Finland to open-ended extension of the agreement, the treaty was subsequently renewed three times (in 1955, 1970 and 1983).

the other state.” Kekkonen’s interpretation in 1965 added a further stipulation: Finland would not allow any other country to attack a third party through Finnish territory.⁴⁶⁸

The FCMA did not bind Finland to the Eastern bloc and the country remained outside the Warsaw Pact during its 1955 inception. Finland worked hard to avoid the close relationship of an alliance which would have relegated it to satellite status.⁴⁶⁹ The FCMA as the cornerstone of Finland’s *Ostpolitik*, does hold the distinction of being the first foreign policy line of a Western country to stress common security with the East. It provided credible confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to Russia by reassuring a safe and secure strategically vital northwestern theater. At a price, it bought Finland a little personal space to call its own with intact independence.

The Note Crisis. This would be tested throughout the Cold War, but one of the most significant events surrounded the general deterioration in East-West relations around the time the Berlin Wall was erected in August 1961 and the “German question” vexed Khrushchev.⁴⁷⁰ During the time that Kennedy estimated a one-in-five chance of a nuclear exchange, Finland debated the likelihood of a FCMA consultations request, which came to the government’s attention through a briefing by the Finnish Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General Viljanen.

The Finns had to wait only two and a half months before this became a reality. On the day that Soviet nuclear tests culminated in the detonation of a 50-megaton device (October 30th), the Finnish ambassador in Moscow was handed a lengthy note, which sparked Finland’s “Note Crisis.”⁴⁷¹ The note referenced the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and increased naval presence in the Baltic as grounds for a common Finnish-Soviet defense effort under FCMA provisions. Khrushchev particularly feared German acquisition of nuclear weapons.⁴⁷²

When the note was made public in the West, the press plainly considered Finland a lost cause. One Swedish newspaper sent its correspondents to Finland’s eastern border to be the first to record Soviet tanks streaming into Finland! Most saw that Finland had no choice but to enter discussions with the Soviets, which inevitably led down the path to incorporation into the “evil empire.”

Kekkonen was abroad vacationing in Hawaii at the time after a three-week U.S.-Canada tour. After consulting with his advisors, he decided not to cut his trip short, and instead dispatched his foreign minister Ahti Karjalainen to the USSR for talks.⁴⁷³ After reassuring the Finnish people via a November 5th radio address,⁴⁷⁴ Kekkonen himself flew to Novosibirsk on November 22nd to meet with Khrushchev. Finland’s president diffused the situation by warning of “war psychosis” spreading

⁴⁶⁸ Wahlbäck, p. 369.

⁴⁶⁹ Maude, pp. 13, 29.

⁴⁷⁰ Häikiö, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁷¹ Jakobson, p. 70.

⁴⁷² Maude, p. 17.

⁴⁷³ Jakobson, pp. 71-72, and Maude, p. 22.

throughout Scandinavia, which he said would kick off an arms buildup on the peninsula.⁴⁷⁵ Also, at this time Norway made it clear to the Soviets that increased pressure on Finland would lead to Norway's reevaluation of its self-imposed restrictions on NATO membership (namely nuclear weapons and foreign troops permanently deployed on its soil as was the case in West Germany). In the opinion of numerous analysts, this proved that the Nordic Balance was real and *worked*.⁴⁷⁶ The Nordic Balance is discussed more later.

In retrospect, it's debatable whether or not this was merely an attempt to keep Finland in line or that the perceived German-NATO threat was a legitimate concern.⁴⁷⁷ As Max Jakobson has pointed out, one element overlooked in the ensuing panic surrounding the receipt of the note was that *it did not explicitly address any impending threat of armed attack as justifying talks under the Treaty*. It did, in fact, only enumerate in general terms the USSR's views on the perceived threatening consequences of NATO-German policy. It is not such a leap of faith, therefore, to believe the report that Khrushchev later admitted the event as part of a larger scare-tactic campaign against the West, one which already virtually out of steam by the time he met with Kekkonen anyway.⁴⁷⁸

Finns tend to interpret the incident as Soviet regional policy and not dissatisfaction with Finnish relations.⁴⁷⁹ As a result of the relatively positive outcome of the Note incident, some confident Finns by the end of the 1960s argued that the right to call for FCMA Article 2 consultations had fallen under *Finnish* domain. The Russians indicated this was an erroneous perception.⁴⁸⁰

Nevertheless, this Cold War posture was alternately praised and condemned. The terms "neutrality" and "foreign policy" under the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line were, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with the FCMA umbrella. Proponents saw Finland as a model of viable, sustainable East-West cooperation and coexistence; critics viewed the arrangement as overt Soviet influence in the affairs of a neighboring democratic, and decidedly Western, state. Finland was castigated for what was considered the country's conciliatory, often self-effacing appeasement of its great Eastern neighbor.

The gender overtones are obvious. Maintaining the *status quo* of this relationship was afforded top priority at the highest Finnish levels. In President Koivisto's inauguration speech in

⁴⁷⁴ Jakobson, p. 73.

⁴⁷⁵ Maude, p. 60.

⁴⁷⁶ Ole Wæver, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War" in *International Affairs*, Volume 68, Number 1, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Cambridge University Press, January, 1992, pp. 78-79. [Wæver] Wæver mentions the "Nordic balance" as the political balance in Norden that exploited the "divided, highly armed, and... level of tension" elsewhere in Europe to find a niche in the "stable European constellation," thus deriving a lower level of tension. This "Nordic identity" was part of Europe and thus integral its security complex, yet different and apart from Europe. This concept was developed by the Norwegian security analysts Johan Jorgen Holst and Arne Olav Brundtland in the 1960s.

⁴⁷⁷ Häikiö, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁷⁸ Jakobson, pp. 74, 79-80.

⁴⁷⁹ Maude, p. 20.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 61.

1982, he underscored what he considered his prime mission: to “follow to the letter,” the Paasikivi-Kekkonen legacy, to strengthen the FCMA, to continue Nordic cooperation and to preserve Finland’s “active peace-seeking neutrality policy.” Over the years, he repeatedly returned to this theme. Let’s look at Finnish neutrality policy.

Finnish neutrality. The country’s obsessed adherence to a policy of absolute and strict neutrality coalesced as a direct consequence of the Second World War, when Finland turned away from purely masculine problem-solving. However, the war demonstrated that Finland required a different approach to neutrality. Finland’s tendency to avoid Great Power considerations led to the country’s isolation during the Winter War. In sharp contrast, Finland’s post-war premise stressed the opposite strategy.⁴⁸¹ That is to say that Great Power concerns needed to be addressed head-on. Theoretically, neutrality didn’t have to mean passivity, isolationism, pacifism or abstention from cooperation and constructive dialogue. As we will see, in practice Finland suffered isolation in any case.

Viewed as necessary to ensure national independence, such a policy’s credibility had to be backed by a correspondingly capable military deterrent, assurances in the forms of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and firm political will. To the Finnish mind, Estonia fell short of meeting all these criteria. Strictly speaking, it failed to remain outside military entanglements, did not address Soviet security concerns and never mobilized a defensive effort. Subsequently, it undermined its own credibility and was forcibly annexed by the USSR — to some extent due to its own faulty execution of its neutrality dogma.⁴⁸²

Finnish neutrality, as one of the fundamentals of Finnish-Russian relations and central foreign policy, was as interchangeable with the legendary Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line as FCMA was. Just as Östen Undén came to personify Swedish neutrality, Finland’s version was widely associated with its two architects. Established by J. K. Paasikivi, it was nourished by Urho K. Kekkonen, who asserted that neutrality did not necessarily dictate passivity.⁴⁸³ It may have had its roots in the Old Finn Party’s conciliatory approach to 1899-1917 russification efforts.⁴⁸⁴ “Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line” was one of the less ambiguous terms the Soviets used to describe Finnish neutrality and foreign policy orientation. Interestingly, the synonym was adopted and widely used abroad, even by Finland itself.

Although Finnish soldiers were compelled to serve in foreign armies since even before the

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁸² Ries, pp. 67-68, 162.

⁴⁸³ “Background Note—Finland 3/97,” Background Note: Finland, March, 1997, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, at URL www.state.gov/www/background_notes/finland_bgn.html on May 19, 1998. Paasikivi was president during the period 1946-1956, Kekkonen during 1956-1981.

⁴⁸⁴ Häikiö, p. 29.

Crusades and the age of Swedish-Novgorodian hostilities,⁴⁸⁵ Finns at least as early as the 18th century recognized the utility of remaining outside Great Power frictions. In the 1780s Baron G. M. Sprengtporten predicted the birth of an independent Finland as a neutral buffer-state.⁴⁸⁶ As much as was possible, this “distancing” principle was adhered to through the Swedish period, and continued with more success through Russian imperial times.⁴⁸⁷

There was some talk of a proposal for Finland as a Russian Grand Duchy to obtain neutral status in case of renewed Russian-Western hostilities in 1863 and 1885.⁴⁸⁸ The first mention in print of neutrality for an autonomous Finland was in the liberal daily *Helsingfors Dagblad* in 1863, the year of the Polish uprising. The idea persisted into the following decades, as a statement of neutrality was planned for the Finnish declaration of independence on December 6, 1917.⁴⁸⁹ Afterwards, as the policy line of a nation-state, neutrality was already discernible after World War I.⁴⁹⁰ As Alexander Chubarian writes, neutrality in this century has taken many forms and nuances.

The phenomenon of neutrality in the 20th century is extremely variable and has many manifestations. In international political practice neutrality is presented as a form of non-participation in military conflicts (including world wars) or as a form of non-alliance to various blocs and pacts. There is a kind of neutrality confirmed by state legislative acts (even by the Constitution of a country) which has a long-term and constant character. There is another kind of neutrality formulated in government statements envisaged for a short limited period of time. Neutrality can be both passive and active, general or concerning only some spheres of state activities.⁴⁹¹

Finland, too, had a unique and special neutrality policy tailored of its individual geopolitical environment, historical experiences and circumstances. It evolved gradually over time, the result of a multitude of subtle refinements, momentous choices, mundane mistakes and diplomatic triumphs along the way. It probably entailed a complex mixture of what the Nordic neutrals have been accused of embodying: moral Great Powers, free-riders and clever masters of *realpolitik*⁴⁹² (notice the

⁴⁸⁵ Klinge, p. 16.

⁴⁸⁶ Nevakivi, p. 33.

⁴⁸⁷ John Keegan, “Finland” in *World Armies* (2nd ed.), London: MacMillan Publishers, 1983, p. 183. Under Sweden, however, Finnish infantry and cavalry as individual recruits even comprised one-third of Gustavus Adolphus’s army. They fought with distinction at Breitenfeld and Lützen. As an autonomous Russian Grand Duchy, Finland held a privileged position as specifically exempted from conscription. In fact, when “Russifiers” in 1898 tried to impose a four-year service obligation (as was standard in the imperial service), the law was never implemented due to Finnish resistance.

⁴⁸⁸ Pertti Luntinen, “Neutrality in Northern Europe before the First World War” in *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l’histoire*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, p. 108. For example, during the Crimean War, Finnish vessels were forced to fly the Russian flag, which made them subject to the effects of *Russia’s* state of war.

⁴⁸⁹ Nevakivi, pp. 33–34. It was, however, omitted as the Finnish cabinet was dominated by pro-German nationalists.

⁴⁹⁰ Klaus Törnudd, “Ties that Bind to the Recent Past—Debating Security Policy in Finland within the Context of Membership of the European Union” in *Cooperation and Conflict, Nordic Journal of International Studies*, Bengt Sundelius (ed.), Stockholm: Sage Publications, Volume 31, Number 1, March 1996, p. 39. [Törnudd] This refers to Parliament’s rejection of an agreement signed by the government in Warsaw in 1922, which would have formed an alliance with the Baltic States and Poland.

⁴⁹¹ Alexander Chubarian, “Soviet Foreign Policy, September 1939–June 1941, or a Special Kind of Neutrality” in *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l’histoire*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, p. 287.

⁴⁹² Sune Jungar, “Comments” in *Neutrality in History—La neutralité dans l’histoire*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish Historical Society, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1993, p. 325.

polarized praise and condemnation here of Finland's neutrality). Max Jakobson said that Finland's policy development was "the result, and part, of a historical process, rather than the product of abstract thought."⁴⁹³ A. J. R. Groom describes such a creative process thusly:

It would be wrong to suggest that the theory came first and the action followed: rather, a strategy evolved and out of the conjuncture of an ideologically defined goal and the pragmatic considerations of the day. Only later was it conceptualized in an academic formulation.⁴⁹⁴

This seems to have been the case with Finland. Born of "the concrete political problems of the day," as Hans Morgenthau once put it,⁴⁹⁵ neutrality proved practical and successful, thus securing a place of honor in the corpus of feminine political theory (the masculine viewpoint has never been this charitable). Unlike in Malta, for instance, Finland's neutrality was never crafted as constitutionally based,⁴⁹⁶ or binding under international law or Finnish legislation. It was a choice.⁴⁹⁷ It was never declared as a permanent condition, nor did it ever enjoy an international guarantee. It represented a pragmatic means for securing national interests rather than a goal as such.⁴⁹⁸ There was, in fact, universal partisan consensus on Finnish neutrality, even by Finnish communists.⁴⁹⁹

Through design, neutrality was deliberately linked to the idea of the Nordics' harmonious and peaceful nature. Among Anglophile Foreign Ministers and a French-like government coalition,⁵⁰⁰ on December 5, 1935 Prime Minister T. M. Kivimäki identified with Nordic neutrality. He articulated Finland's orientation towards Scandinavia and away from the Baltic countries, Poland and Germany. When war once again loomed inevitable, Finland together with Denmark, Norway and Sweden declared neutrality at a September 18-19, 1939 meeting in Copenhagen.⁵⁰¹ This bond later naturally led to Nordic military defense alliance talks, which were opposed by the Soviets in 1940 and 1948. Kekkonen, however, saw Finland's Scandinavian orientation "as a manifestation of the idea of

⁴⁹³ Jakobson, p. 49.

⁴⁹⁴ A. J. R. Groom, "Neofunctionalism" in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.), *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1994, p. 111. (reprinted from *A Working Peace System* from Quadrangle Books, 1966). Groom was talking about the development of functionalist theory in the discipline of international relations, but his words are applicable to this debate nonetheless.

⁴⁹⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970*, New York: Praeger, 1970 (pp. 248-261), reprinted as "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory" in James Der Darian (ed.), *International Theory—Critical Investigations*, London, 1995, p. 47. He was not speaking of neutrality.

⁴⁹⁶ Alberto Bin, "Security Implications of Malta's Membership in the European Union" in *The International Spectator*, Volume XXX, Number 3, July-September 1995, pp. 7, 12. Malta's neutrality was the only constitutionally based neutrality of the European neutrals. Malta's 1987 Constitution defined the country as "a neutral State actively pursuing peace, security and social progress among all nations by adhering to a policy of non-alignment and refusing to participate in any military alliance," which excluded foreign bases on Maltese territory. Note: *neutrality* is based on non-participation in wartime; *neutrality* denotes the policy of a state to refrain outside conflicts or alliances; *neutralization* is where a state's treaty-based policy undertakes to remain permanently neutral or neutralized.

⁴⁹⁷ "Finnish Foreign Policy and EU Membership" in *Finnish Features—Finland and the European Union*, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki: Kainuun Sanomain Kirjapaino, 1994.

⁴⁹⁸ Nevakivi, p. 41.

⁴⁹⁹ Maude, p. 62.

⁵⁰⁰ Klinge, p. 105.

neutrality... towards the Soviet Union.”⁵⁰² In any case, linking neutrality to feminine national character reduced its threat content, but also had the shadow effect of rendering it somehow less credible (particularly to the Soviets). This dynamic is investigated below.

Although it is debatable whether the FCMA constituted an alliance of sorts or not,⁵⁰³ Finland’s agreement with the USSR was consistent with the European trend towards bilateral and multilateral arrangements between 1947 and 1949. Probably based on its less than impressive war-survival record, by this time, neutrality was generally considered an “unstable option” (a typically pejorative malestream conclusion). Instead, forming and joining military alliances against perceived Soviet expansionism proved the more politically and psychologically desirable choice.⁵⁰⁴

As a result of Kekkonen’s extensive travels abroad, Finnish neutrality enjoyed a long history of recognition in the West. This had been the case at the U.S. State Department since the 1950s, a decade before President Kennedy’s 1961 communiqué in conjunction with Kekkonen’s state visit⁵⁰⁵ in which he stated that the U.S. would “scrupulously respect Finland’s chosen course.” Britain’s PM Harold Macmillan expressed his understanding of Finnish neutrality in May 1961. In 1962 de Gaulle made a similar statement.⁵⁰⁶ The pattern of Eastern recognition was rather different, however.

One of the earliest Soviet acknowledgments of Finnish neutrality was a response to Kekkonen’s January 1952 “Pajama Speech,” which advocated a Nordic neutrals’ defense alliance. Moscow’s reaction was one of approval for the Nordics “to refuse to have any part in the aggressive Atlantic Pact, to observe strict neutrality.”⁵⁰⁷ After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet position entered a two-year state of flux. By the end of the decade, though, a gradual change ensued “from almost universal condemnation” to official recognition and adoption of the “peaceful coexistence” policy.

Austria’s *Staatsvertrag* was concluded in 1955 and her neutral status was declared by Parliament later the same year.⁵⁰⁸ For the first time, Khrushchev grouped Finland with Austria and Sweden when describing foreign policy in 1956-1957. Soviet withdrawal of 10,000 troops from the Porkkala naval base in Finland and 50,000 from Austria marked the beginning of the USSR’s long-term effort to turn “neutralism” in Europe to its own advantage.

This withdrawal also removed the last vestiges of a Soviet military presence in Finland, and thus any theoretical possibilities that, in a crisis, Finland could become a valid Allied target through its Eastern associations. In this respect, Finland could for the first time truly claim some kind of

⁵⁰¹ Nevakivi, p. 36.

⁵⁰² Kekkonen.

⁵⁰³ Maude, p. 12. As Finnish politicians and spokesmen often referred to it as “our security treaty.”

⁵⁰⁴ Raimo Väyrynen, “Neutrality, Dealignment and Political Order in Europe in Mary Kaldor and Richard Falk (eds.) *Dealignment: A New Foreign Policy Perspective*, United Nations University, Great Britain: Billing and Sons Ltd., 1987, p. 166. [Väyrynen]

⁵⁰⁵ Nevakivi, p. 42.

⁵⁰⁶ Jakobson, p. 48.

⁵⁰⁷ Maude, p. 37.

internationally credible neutral stance.⁵⁰⁹ During the second half of the 1950s, neutrality was “consolidated” with growing acceptance in Europe.⁵¹⁰

Until Austria’s conditional neutral status and the return of Porkkala in January 1956, the USSR provided minimal support for the concept of neutrality. Incidentally, it wasn’t until the following month, February 1956, that incumbent President Paasikivi referenced Finnish neutrality for the first time. First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Khrushchev confirmed Soviet acceptance of Finnish neutrality the same month at the 20th Party Congress.

However, in the Brezhnev period, Moscow refrained from using the word in conjunction with Finland. Soviet commentators openly denied the existence of the international meaning of the concept and claimed that it was incompatible with the FCMA.⁵¹¹ In fact, the customary Soviet reaction was one of fierce criticism, particularly with regard to Finland. Finland’s policy was routinely attacked on three levels, its

- (1) **legal basis**, by maintaining that the FCMA’s preambulatory clause stating “Finland’s desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers” held no legal reference to neutrality
- (2) **ideological basis**, by insisting that the concept was subjective and could be interpreted in many ways; and
- (3) **functional basis**, stressing that Finland’s and the Soviet Union’s views on the application of Finnish so-called neutrality were divergent.

This divergence in Russian-Finnish relations was fundamental and long-standing. Finns saw relations as a question of avoiding absorption; the Russian view, it would seem, was purely one of military-strategic thinking, primarily preoccupied with the defense of St. Petersburg-Leningrad and its Kola assets.⁵¹² As the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line evolved, the Finnish interpretation of the FCMA recognized the document as binding, *but subordinate to neutrality*. Finland had, in addition, concerned itself with impressing on the West the validity of Finland’s neutrality based on adherence to the FCMA.

The Kremlin, on the other hand, focused on but one core matter: security against Germany. As a wakeup call to Kekkonen, the 1961 Note Crisis demonstrated clearly that the Soviets did not share Finland’s prioritization of foreign policy directives. It also proved to be a post-war turning point in Finnish-Russian relations. As George Maude suggests, up until the crisis, Finland’s policy was one of distancing from Moscow to demonstrate independence. Afterwards, Finnish policy achieved its goals by pursuing closer cooperation with the USSR. This was, however, part of a search

⁵⁰⁸ Väyrynen, p. 166.

⁵⁰⁹ Jakobson, p. 47.

⁵¹⁰ Väyrynen, p. 166.

⁵¹¹ Nevakivi, p. 40.

for “symmetrical neutrality,” that is, acceptance of its validity in both East and West.⁵¹³

Soviet diplomats even seemed willing by the end of the 1960s to include the word “neutrality” in a joint communiqué, though higher Soviet officials struck it out. In 1970 despite President Kekkonen’s threat of resignation, a revised version was prepared and dispatched to Moscow with the reference excluded. This happened again in 1987 when Kekkonen’s successor Koivisto visited Moscow. The term was again omitted from the communiqué. Upon returning to Helsinki, Koivisto stated publicly that Finland’s neutrality did not depend on the content of any communiqués.⁵¹⁴

Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets continued to reject any “neutrality” label for Finland. This constantly aggravated and disappointed the Finns, who perpetually sought Soviet recognition. Reminiscent of the Note Crisis, experts in Moscow began to argue that the “threat of attack” requiring Soviet-Finnish consultations under the FCMA should be extended to include the general strengthening of Western military resources in Scandinavia.⁵¹⁵ A believable Finnish neutrality was as important as ever. As Krister Wahlbäck has said:

no neutrality is credible in time of crisis unless it is supported by defense forces commensurate with the risks posed by the neutral’s geostrategic location. This is particularly true... with a treaty foreseeing the possibility of military assistance from an adjoining Super Power.⁵¹⁶

For this reason, Finland’s capability — both actual and perceived — for its own territorial defense has remained of paramount importance. The fact was, should an international crisis situation arise and the Soviets wish to enter Finland to “assist,” the Soviets, first of all, could not be trusted to fight for Finnish interests and, secondly and most importantly, may not see fit to leave after the cessation of hostilities. To add insult to injury, in addition to the dangerous ambiguity of Soviet intentions in such a situation, it was speculated that the presence of Soviet troops and installations in Finland would have made the country fair game as a Western target—conventional and nuclear—at the outbreak of war. Definitely this was a lose-lose proposition for Finland. Wishing to diminish the catch-22 factor, Finland linked her neutrality inextricably with her independent defense. Finland’s plausible ability to defend herself, it was hoped, would negate the need for early Soviet assistance in crises⁵¹⁷ and eliminate the possibility of WMDs delivered from or directed at Finnish soil.

⁵¹² Maude, p. 38.

⁵¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 22, 23, 65. This “symmetrical neutrality” coalesced in conjunction with Kekkonen’s visits to Britain, Austria and the U.S. (1961) and France (1962) to gain wide acceptance in the West for a balanced recognition from both ideological camps.

⁵¹⁴ Wahlbäck, p. 374.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 352. Marshal Ustinov broached the idea of common military exercises when he visited Helsinki in summer 1978. The Finnish response was “deafening silence.”

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 374.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 375.

The USSR continued making vague references to “neutralism” and the “peace-loving” nature of the Finns. Not until Gorbachev’s Helsinki speech in October 1989 did the Soviets explicitly recognize Finnish neutrality. As the first Soviet leader to acknowledge it openly, when Gorbachev said the sentence “Finland is a neutral Nordic country,” the audience extended a standing ovation.⁵¹⁸ Also during his speech in Finlandia Hall, he unreservedly stated that the FCMA and Finnish neutrality were compatible and that the FCMA was “an inalienable component of security in Northern Europe.”

Cold War neutrals formed a kind of disengagement zone in Europe, “a disarmament, development and global cooperation” club, but could not bring themselves to form a neutral bloc, as the idea countered the nature of neutrality.⁵¹⁹ Finland’s neutrality stance naturally produced economic consequences. This was keenly demonstrated by the Night Frost crisis.⁵²⁰ In its endeavor to avoid political entanglements, Finland succeeded in creatively crafting non-offensive ways to deal in both Eastern and Western markets. Finland’s so-called German package-deal opened up trade with both Germanies by avoiding the political quagmire of officially recognizing or rejecting one, the other, or both, yet maintained diplomatic and economic links with each.⁵²¹ Later, Finland, much to its chagrin, realized that to remain outside European economic integration would kill its ability to compete in those markets.⁵²² In addition, Finland had two more concerns:

- (1) maintaining the USSR’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, a plan contrary to EFTA principles, and
- (2) overcoming the reluctance of many EFTA countries to admit a Finland they saw as—to borrow a phrase from Max Jakobson—a Soviet “Trojan horse.”⁵²³

Not surprisingly, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) was initially seen as a potential stumbling block between two irreconcilable differences. But as the historian E. G. Palmén is quoted as saying, “In order to save its position a small people must be able to produce clever initiatives to ward off dangers before they become too great.”⁵²⁴ Finland did just that. She devised an ingenious way to *join*, but remain *outside* the organization: all the EFTA member-states joined Finland’s own mini-EFTA, or FINEFTA, in 1961.⁵²⁵ Finland thus gained the economic benefits of EFTA while

⁵¹⁸ Ilkka Suominen, “Finland, the European Union and Russia” in *The World Today*, January 1994, p. 12.

⁵¹⁹ Väyrynen, pp. 180-181.

⁵²⁰ Maude, p. 105. It demonstrated that Western economic integration, synonymous with political integration in Russian eyes, was a matter to be tackled with great care.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁵²² This was particularly true concerning Finland’s wood and paper industries. Finnish paper products, in particular, would have remained subject to import duties, whereas the competition would not.

⁵²³ Jakobson, p. 61.

⁵²⁴ Koivisto, 1985, p. 83.

⁵²⁵ Maude, p. 19.

keeping its long-standing MFN relationship with the USSR.⁵²⁶ This was an older solution that had worked in 1957, when Finland formed her own “Helsinki Club” — Finland’s mini-European Payments Union — to which all OEEC countries adhered.⁵²⁷

Finlandization: Sovietization the Soft Way? No investigation of this time period would be complete without a look at the so-called Finlandization phenomenon. There is some debate over the origin of the term, though it is generally believed that it was coined by the German political scientist Richard Lowenthal in the 1960s. His was not, however, a pejorative term, nor a political theory. Lowenthal did not wish to suggest that Finland was a self-made Soviet satellite, and was reportedly disturbed to learn that the West had ubiquitously adopted the term to mean so.⁵²⁸

William F. Buckley calls it as “a kind of inchoate subordination to Soviet policy.” Walter Lacquer, a harsh critic of what he saw as a policy of appeasement, elaborates on the theory, explaining it as “that process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes reduced” as “the desire on the part of the weaker nation to accommodate its powerful neighbor, sometimes [goes] far beyond objective needs.”⁵²⁹ Henri J. Warmenhoven writes:

This term has come to stand for the degree of mesmerism a very large and powerful state may exert on a small and weak neighbor... particularly if... [it] has been defeated... in a war or wars. Typically, the smaller state is allowed its own systemic preferences... However, it may not steer its own course in matters of foreign policy, and occasionally impositions are made in domestic matters as well.⁵³⁰

George Maude defines it simply as “Sovietization the soft way” under “the comforting fog of peaceful coexistence,” in which the country “adapts both the personnel of its government and its decisions of external policy either to the dictates of the Soviet Union or to what it feels Russia really wants.” Eventually, such a policy weakens the nation to the point that it can no longer “resist further pressures.”⁵³¹ In essence, Finlandization calls into question the quality of a nation’s democracy⁵³² and sovereign self-determination. Finlandization blurs the line separating the external (the domain of foreign policy, global behavior and international relations) and the internal (the realm of domestic matters, legislation and social factors). On a continuum representative of hegemonic domination over a small border-country, with *Total Independence* at one pole and *Complete Subjugation* on the other, a

⁵²⁶ Koivisto, 1985, p. 127. Most Favored Nation status had been granted to each other since as early as 1947. It was widely reported in early 1997 that uncovered documents show a clear link between Finland’s level of trade balanced between EFTA and the USSR and secret agreements making this contingent upon Kekkonen’s continued tenure as president.

⁵²⁷ Jakobson, p. 61. The European Payments Union was set up to free currency transactions between OEEC countries.

⁵²⁸ Matson, p. 5.

⁵²⁹ Walter Lacqueur, “Finlandization” in *The Political Psychology of Appeasement: Finlandization and Other Unpopular Essays*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc., 1980, p. 3. [Lacqueur]

⁵³⁰ Warmenhoven, p. 59.

⁵³¹ Maude, p. 45.

Finlandized nation-state's freedom of action falls subjectively somewhere in between. Finlandization can be seen as a gradation of control by a larger state or a measure of autonomy.⁵³³

Finlandization drew the most heat from the West during the Cold War. Masculinist cultures are sure to see a weak, voluntarily “whipped” country with little self-determination and even less self-respect. Mauno Koivisto blames the tendency in the Western press “to measure independence in decibels: the louder a country criticizes its neighbor's conditions and policies, the more independent it is.”⁵³⁴ Finland's generally harmonious relationship with the USSR, Robert Matson suggests, caused Western analysts and journalists to conclude that a servile Finland had as a matter of policy caved in to Soviet wishes. The assumption was that no truly independent country could possibly coexist with the East; tranquility in Finland meant enslavement.⁵³⁵

Indeed, if this is the yardstick, Finland's Cold War posture most definitely did not measure up: it was quietly tucked away in a remote corner of Europe. Some would contend that Finlandization reduced Finland to timidity and inconsistency, to the level of a cowering dog, which is perpetually maltreated by its master. Finlandization drew its foul water from an all-too-familiar well, critics brooded, for waiting below the surface lay the deftly applied latent threat of Soviet military invasion. Finns such as Martti Häikiö contend that there was little room for choice as “the USSR's lap dog.”⁵³⁶

Kekkonen perpetually tried to paint a bright, positive picture concerning Finlandization. In an October 16, 1974 speech, he described it as a simple policy of reconciliation, implying that the term derogatorily opposed reconciliation with the Soviet Union. In an earlier *Newsweek* interview, he stressed Finland's special circumstances and complex relationship with Russia, insisting that “Finlandization is not for export”⁵³⁷—no one else shared Finland's unique circumstances.

Finlandization probably saw its modern application as a result of the Winter War, when the Soviet Union was in a particularly advantageous position as the victor to impose its will. This was evident in 1940 when the Soviet government effectively opposed the formation of an “anti-Soviet” Finnish-Swedish union. The USSR also demanded the demilitarization of the Åland Islands and expressed its wish to share in the exploitation of the Petsamo nickel mines. In addition, it claimed rail transit rights to and from the Hanko base. While lending diplomatic support to leftist groups in Finland, it pressured the Finnish government to remove the Social-Democrat Tanner from his post as Minister of Supply. The Soviets also warned against electing a Finnish president of any one of four

⁵³² Nevakivi, p. 41.

⁵³³ Depending on one's point of view, the glass is either half empty or half full.

⁵³⁴ Koivisto, 1985, pp. 21-22.

⁵³⁵ Matson, p. 8.

⁵³⁶ Häikiö, p. 97.

⁵³⁷ Maude, p. 49. An interview on September 3, 1973.

candidates mistrusted by Moscow.⁵³⁸

Proponents of Finlandization's "policy of accommodation"⁵³⁹ cite numerous later historical examples. For instance, although Finnish industry desperately needed the capital, in 1947 Finland declined Marshall Plan aid for post-war reconstruction.⁵⁴⁰ This move may have put Finnish economic development back ten years.⁵⁴¹ Later, Finland's reluctance to join the Nordic Council was widely seen as a result of Finlandization (the USSR considered the organization "linked to the aggressive North Atlantic bloc"). The Soviet Union also vetoed Max Jakobson's appointment to the post of United Nations Secretary-General.⁵⁴²

In the UN forum, Finland normally followed a Nordic voting line in matters unrelated to East-West conflict issues. Although he did not elaborate, Koivisto acknowledged inconsistencies in Finland's voting (for example, condemnation of the U.S. operation in Grenada, but support for the Russians in Afghanistan).⁵⁴³ Robert Matson points out that, particularly in the early days as a UN member, Finland had a "consistent policy of abstaining from votes involving serious East-West confrontation" (for instance, the 1956 Hungarian invasion occurred during Finland's *first* United Nations session and required some careful maneuvering).⁵⁴⁴

Other instances include numerous limits on domestic voting and the April 6, 1973 media self-censorship statement restricting potentially antagonistic publications and broadcasts—particularly anti-Soviet articles in the Finnish press, as well as war books and memoirs with an anti-Soviet bias.⁵⁴⁵ It is said that this even applied to mild literature suppression, as, fearing that the Soviets would cut off oil exports, the Finnish government disallowed the publishing of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*.⁵⁴⁶ Finlandizationists point to the fact that Finland recognized the Baltic States "joining" the Soviet Union. In her heart of hearts, Finland knew the Baltics had no more legitimate place in the USSR than Finland herself would have, had history played out differently. Acceptance was done purely in the name of "good neighborly relations" with Moscow.

Russia did not exert pressure exclusively in pursuit of political gains, as it often used its sway over Finland to further economic ends as well. This was true in both the civilian and military spheres.

⁵³⁸ Jakobson, p. 15.

⁵³⁹ Lacqueur, p. 15.

⁵⁴⁰ Maude, p. 104, and Warmenhoven, p. 61. Marshall Aid was alternately known as the European Recovery Program.

⁵⁴¹ Jakobson, pp. 59-60. Sweden, however, in a more favorable position *vis-à-vis* the USSR, viewed Marshall aid as economic, not political, cooperation and accepted without any adverse effects on its neutrality policy. Jakobson suggests that, if the Czechoslovakian communist takeover was a model of what could happen to Finland, declining Marshall aid may well have lent critical credibility to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line at a time when the USSR needed reassurance.

⁵⁴² Lacqueur, p. 9.

⁵⁴³ Koivisto, pp. 44-45.

⁵⁴⁴ Matson, p. 7. Finland abstained, but the Finnish Red Cross (SPR) raised 18 million FIM in one week for the Hungarian relief effort. In the end, the Finns voted for a compromise which supported the Hungarians, but did not explicitly mention the Soviets.

⁵⁴⁵ Maude, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁴⁶ Steven Beschloss, "The Thaw" in *The New Republic*, March 26, 1994, p. 18. It might be more accurate to say that government pressure persuaded the Finnish publisher to abandon the idea. It was subsequently published in Sweden.

One case was the contract to build the Loviisa nuclear power station in southern Finland, in which the preliminary understanding with the British was reversed and the contract instead awarded to the Soviet *Technopormexport* interest.⁵⁴⁷ Similarly, after the 1961 Note Crisis Finns rushed to purchase MiG-21F fighters in an emergency buying frenzy in 1962-1963. There are abundant other examples.

In particular, researchers have focused on the personalities associated with the Finlandization phenomenon. Its infamy has often been concentrated on the Finnish presidency, most notably Urho K. Kekkonen, who George Maude has called the “high priest of firm relations and security and friendship with the Soviet Union.”⁵⁴⁸ In this arena, some of the Soviet intervention in Finnish affairs was blatant. In November 1960 Khrushchev told a group of Finnish politicians that “whoever is for Kekkonen is for friendship with the Soviet Union and whoever is against Kekkonen is against friendship with the Soviet Union.”⁵⁴⁹

In 1962, the Soviets press opposed Olavi Honka’s candidacy for the Finnish presidency.⁵⁵⁰ According to Walter Lacqueur, the Kremlin even threatened to invoke the FCMA, asserting that Soviet-Finnish relations depended upon Kekkonen’s reelection.⁵⁵¹ Matson disagrees, pointing out that the Soviet note in question merely referred to a perceived threatening international situation and not explicitly to internal Finnish politics.⁵⁵² In any case, Honka eventually withdrew.

The same tactic in 1974 pressured the opposing candidate out of the race and pro-Soviet Kekkonen reaped a fourth term. Kekkonen’s preponderant Eastern orientation from the beginning spawned a joke of “Kekkoslovakia” under his administration.⁵⁵³ He had, in fact, won the 1956 presidency to begin by a single electoral vote — courtesy of the communists. Indeed, his personal relationships with prominent Soviets—Minister Pavel Orlov, Leonid Brezhnev and Nikita Khrushchev among them⁵⁵⁴ — made his loyalties suspect. Later, accusations that he was a Soviet spy were never conclusively proven. Widely publicized information in the autumn of 1996 that he accepted significant campaign funding from both the KGB *and* the CIA may prove more ultimately plausible.

Three major Finlandization episodes took place as ripples emanating from the East-West Berlin confrontation. The Finnish Social Democratic 1948-1950 Fagerholm government faced its initial troubles with the USSR in conjunction with the first Berlin blockade. Then, during the second Berlin blockade, in 1958 the USSR demanded the resignation of the Fagerholm government. The

⁵⁴⁷ Maude, pp. 105-107.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid*), p. 27.

⁵⁴⁹ Jakobson, p. 77.

⁵⁵⁰ Maude, p. 21.

⁵⁵¹ Lacqueur, p. 10.

⁵⁵² Matson, p. 7.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁵⁵⁴ Maude, pp. 21, 27.

demand was accompanied by the non-implementation of a promised loan, the Soviet ambassador's transfer to other duties without replacement, the halting of ongoing trade agreement negotiations and the freezing of all imports from Finland, including the delivery of some ships the USSR had ordered from Finland. The Fagerholm government did fall, and the incident came to be known as the "Night Frost" crisis.⁵⁵⁵ The third event, which we have already addressed, was the Note Crisis, which occurred toward the latter end of the third Berlin crisis in 1961.⁵⁵⁶ In January Kekkonen met with Nikita Khrushchev in Leningrad. Once again, normalization in relations was achieved in part through his personal relationship with the Soviet premier.⁵⁵⁷

The presence of Soviet troops stationed on Finnish territory at Porkkala did not help to diminish perceptions of Finlandization.⁵⁵⁸ Yet the debates over whether or not it was a defensive position or a strike force against the capital were really immaterial to the Finlandization argument. The very fact that there were Soviet troops stationed in Finland was sufficient. Withdrawal from the base in January 1956 is believed by Max Jakobson to have been contingent on a barter for a 20-year extension of the FCMA, as Paasikivi is reported to have confidentially promised Moscow that his successors would renew the treaty. This was a personal agreement with Paasikivi just months before his retirement.⁵⁵⁹

Robert Matson has made the argument that the concept of Finlandization was flawed because it was "ethnocentric and ahistorical" in that it assumed Finland anticipated Soviet wishes to such a degree that it was essentially a self-made satellite. Matson further points to features of indigenous political culture, particularly the strong role of the president in Nordic societies, that necessitate a reexamination of the Finnish debate.⁵⁶⁰ Matson is right, particularly when he mentions the "ethnocentric" nature of the critique (which is a profoundly masculine viewpoint) and "indigenous political culture" (which is clearly feminine in its quest for peaceful coexistence and is thus an enigma to masculinist observers).

Indeed, as a final note on the subject, many elements of Finlandization can also be interpreted as legitimately congruent interests between Finland and the USSR. To some, Finland's international

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 105, 130, and Lacqueur, p. 10, and Häikiö, pp. 44-45, and Matson, p. 3. The Soviets accused the Fagerholm government of wanting to join a "marshalled Europe." As a result of this incident, Kekkonen was able to consolidate his monopoly on foreign and domestic policy. As Matson points out, even a cursory review of Kekkonen's political career demonstrates that his reputation as an opportunist was well-deserved.

⁵⁵⁶ Maude, p. 130.

⁵⁵⁷ Jakobson, p. 76.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 46. Finnish estimates placed at the site 10,000 men, tanks, artillery, a small number of aircraft and various naval craft. Ground forces were composed of five army regiments (each with three battalions, a grenade launcher company and an artillery company). Of these, two were artillery regiments, one a tank regiment and several coastal artillery posts. It is intriguing to imagine that nuclear weapons could have also been stationed there. In modern strategic thinking, especially considering the role of nuclear weapons, the Porkkala base held little, if any, practicable military value as a defensive outpost for St. Petersburg-Leningrad.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 45.

⁵⁶⁰ Matson, p. 6.

initiatives were echoes of Russian sentiment, particularly concerning regional issues such as the Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NNWFZ). On the one hand, Finland's relationship with the USSR brought up questions of Soviet values trickling into Finland.⁵⁶¹ On the other hand, it's not such a stretch to accept that Finland and the USSR often shared similar viewpoints, particularly concerning the buildup of conventional and nuclear forces in the North and adjoining areas. John Lukacs made a good point when he wrote in "Finland Vindicated":

As early as 1955 it began to appear to some Soviet leaders (Khrushchev, for example) that the Soviet Union's relationship with a democratic Finland was potentially less dangerous than its relationship with seething and potentially explosive satellites.⁵⁶²

This peculiar relationship was seen by some analysts as an essential part of a Fenno-Scandian equilibrium known as the Nordic Balance. Although a detailed analysis of this phenomenon lies beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that the idea presumed a fundamental integration of the individual Nordic defense solutions. In theory, this "mutual interdependence" or "dynamic interrelationship" restrained Super Power behavior and limited their respective regional manipulations to a minimum.

Such was possible, proponents maintain, because comparable avenues existed for both the U.S./Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact to neutralize possible increased involvement by the other camp. Because each side's action prompted an immediate reaction and thus destabilized the symmetry, the underlying mechanism removed incentives or initiatives leading to increased tension with the sum effect of mutual negation. In short, the two were evenly matched in the Fenno-Scandian context, and the game was a draw. Though the Cold War raged in the form of maritime competition in the surrounding waters, the two-bloc security arrangement (with the Swedish precondition of a strong indigenous defense in the middle) arguably kept the level of confrontation relatively low in the North.

As we saw the in the interplay between Nordic governments and the Super Powers during Finland's Note Crisis, other examples abound. In 1949 the Soviets warned Sweden (which was considering NATO membership at the time) that the USSR would change its policy toward Finland if Sweden persisted with entertaining ideas of joining the Alliance. Similarly, in 1978 Norway decided to limit German participation in Norwegian NATO exercises as Finland intimated that, as a result,

⁵⁶¹ Maude, p. 132.

⁵⁶² Lukacs, p. 61.

FCMA consultations might be called by Moscow.⁵⁶³

6.5. Post-Cold War possibilities

If one considers Barry Buzan's definition of a *security complex* as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another," the degree of symbiosis Paasikivi and his successors incorporated into the Finnish-Russian Cold War relationship, or "balance of dependence,"⁵⁶⁴ adequately fits this description. Finland required reassurances that its territorial integrity would not be violated by Soviet military forces; the USSR needed guarantees that its northwestern flank would not be used as a staging ground or corridor for Western aggression.

Throughout the 1980s, Finland's foreign policy line continued to maintain the essence of this security complex, but subtle, subsurface nuances were becoming discernible. For instance, the frequency of references to neutrality, the FCMA, Paasikivi and Kekkonen gradually dwindled in public speeches.⁵⁶⁵ Government publications from 1983 onwards no longer described the FCMA as the basis for *Finnish foreign policy*, but rather the basis for *Finnish-Soviet relations*. When Koivisto addressed Parliament in March 1988 upon commencing his second presidential term, he made no mention of Kekkonen, Paasikivi, the Soviet Union or the FCMA.⁵⁶⁶ This was a significant change from just six years before and ushered in a new chapter in Finnish thinking on foreign policy matters.

Simultaneously, as the Cold War drew to an end, Finland ardently retreated from the stigma and restraints of the Fenno-Soviet security complex. This took place in the form of systematic, unilateral dismantlement of treaty-based shackles on the country's security, defense and foreign policy mechanisms. First to go — on September 21, 1990 — were Paris Peace Treaty limitations on military size and hardware (particularly the restriction on procurement of German equipment). Also Koivisto nullified as "outdated" the conception that Germany or its allies were FCMA aggressors. Finland also abandoned its policy of so-called *wide neutrality* and began to emphasize the values of the 1990 Paris Charter — namely human rights, democracy, principles of constitutional states and market economic structures. This will be discussed more in a moment. Finland's signed a new post-

⁵⁶³ At the heart of the *Nordic Balance* notion was the divergence in post-World War II Nordic alignments. Prior to the war, all were neutrals, but after 1948 Norden saw three distinct positions: (1) Norway opted for NATO, with self-imposed membership restrictions, most notably prohibitions of the permanent stationing of foreign troops and bans on the deployment of chemical and nuclear weapons on its soil; (2) Sweden chose to maintain its more or less qualified neutrality from the war, remained non-aligned and stressed a credible independent defense (noteworthy is the country's consideration, but rejection, of the nuclear option); and (3) Finland, characterized by deterrence-reassurance, strove to project a neutral image abroad and develop a credible foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the USSR through confidence-building, a strong national defense and the FCMA Treaty.

⁵⁶⁴ Anthony Solis, "U.S. Policy and the Post-Soviet 'Near Abroad' of Central Asia" in *Swords and Ploughshares—A Journal of International Affairs*, Volume IV, Number 1, Fall 1994, p. 50, and Maude, p. 35.

⁵⁶⁵ Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Change in Foreign Policy During the Presidency of Mauno Koivisto 1982-1994" in *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Forssa: Forssan Kirjapaino, 1994, pp. 6-7. [Vaahtoranta]

Cold War agreement with Russia which still prohibits the use of either party's territory for armed aggression against the other. It also precludes militarily assisting an aggressor should Finland or Russia be attacked. Markedly absent, however, is any military cooperation clause. Finland was at last free of the consultations problem once and for all.⁵⁶⁷

Also, Finland's "bridge-builder" function between the blocs, a function it took seriously and found to be an immense source of national pride, is gone. The golden age of bridge-building occurred around the late-1960s and early 1970s. This was a result of both active Euronutral foreign policies and the changing nature of Super Power relations.⁵⁶⁸ Since the confrontation of those years has dissipated, this aspect is no longer relevant. Although there is, of course, always room for improvements in East-West relations, it cannot accurately be said that a chronic lack of channels between East and West exists as it did during the Cold War. During his New Year's speech in 1993, Esko Aho declared that Finland no longer held this role.⁵⁶⁹

Since at least 1994, the word "neutrality" has been markedly absent from official Finnish statements concerning security policy.⁵⁷⁰ Finland claims to continue a policy of "military non-alliance,"⁵⁷¹ which carries different definitional, institutional and (politico)ideological connotations.⁵⁷² This label too was questioned in August-September 1995 in conjunction with discussion surrounding French nuclear capability extended to cover the European Union. With this umbrella also including former neutral EFTA states like Austria, Finland and Sweden, how could they call themselves "nuclear weapon-free states"—let alone countries with a "core of neutrality" — as *de facto* allies of nuclear powers?⁵⁷³

When the FCMA Treaty was discarded in January 1992,⁵⁷⁴ neutrality in the strictest traditional sense becomes obsolete, since it was primarily a counterweight to the FCMA.⁵⁷⁵ During Parliament's EC discussions, Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen rightly pointed out that Finland's neutrality policy predated the Cold War, but chose to emphasize that a neutrality based on the division of Europe and polarization of the Super Powers could no longer be adhered to. Finland was

⁵⁶⁶ Wahlbäck, p. 376.

⁵⁶⁷ "Military Non-Alliance and Independent Defence" section of *Finnish Military Defence*, published by the Defence Staff, Information Division, Fabianinkatu 2, P.O. Box 919, 00101 Helsinki, 1996, p. 7.

⁵⁶⁸ Väyrynen, p. 167.

⁵⁶⁹ Matti Kalliokoski (ed.), *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Forssa: Forssan Kirjapaino, 1994, p. 67. [Kalliokoski] Other countries, such as Ukraine, are claiming this as their domain now.

⁵⁷⁰ Törnudd, p. 54.

⁵⁷¹ In Finnish, *sotilaallinen liittoutumattomuus*.

⁵⁷² John Redmond, "Security Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union" in *The International Spectator*, Volume XXX, Number 3, July-September 1995, p. 36. They are essentially Cold War concepts. *Neutrality* is usually a legal statement in the constitution, neutral on all Cold War issues, and implies standing alone. *Non-alignment* is by disposition and affords the choice of being neutral on different issues and involves membership in the Non-Aligned Movement.

⁵⁷³ Törnudd, p. 48.

⁵⁷⁴ Encarta.

⁵⁷⁵ Vaahtoranta, p. 8.

compelled to redefine it to maintain its validity.⁵⁷⁶ Ole Wæver supposes that Finland's adaptation to post-neutrality realities may proceed along different lines than for sister Sweden across the Gulf of Bothnia. He wrote in a 1992 article entitled "Nordic nostalgia" for *International Affairs*:

Perti Joenniemi has suggested that the Finns are actually handling this [adaptation to European integration] psychologically by transferring their "Big Brother" image from the Soviet Union to the EC, thereby acquiescing to necessities as they learned to do in that realm [under Cold War conditions such as Finlandization]. On the other hand, because of what neutrality meant in the Finnish context, Finland may not be badly placed to handle the security dimension. 'For most Finns neutrality has become a synonym for independence, rather than a political manifesto.' For Finland, neutrality was not seen as an end in itself or as the ideal policy; it was the best Finland could get.⁵⁷⁷

The Nordic Balance has completely disintegrated and Nordic identity itself seems to be withering and evaporating as European integration takes off. Finland no longer conforms to Nordic "bloc voting." For instance, she has diverged with Sweden on the Euro (the common currency) and with Norway on EU membership. Finland deviated radically with its military procurement history, most notably in the 1990-1991 decision to purchase U.S. F/A-18 *Hornet* strike fighter aircraft. Also, Finland has also joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and Russia is clearly no longer the country's central, defining and overriding concern.

Describing Finland's situation after the Soviet Union's demise, one *Suomen Kuvalehti* article put it this way: "Finland is no longer the prey of the Great Bear, which had but two choices: to play dead or be eaten."⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁶ Kalliokoski, p. 71.

⁵⁷⁷ Wæver, p. 90.

⁵⁷⁸ Saska Saarikoski and Olli Ainola, "Naton siivelle" [Under the Wing of NATO] in *Suomen Kuvalehti*, Number 17, April 28, 1995, p. 22. In Finnish, *Suomi ei ole enää suuren karhun saalis, jolla on vain kaksi vaihtoehtoa: leikkiä kuollutta tai tulla syödyksi.*

7.0. Conclusions and Final Remarks

Overview. Originally, this research project was envisioned to be a predominantly in-depth investigation of gendered Finland and her 20th century foreign relations (reexamined in those terms). However, it soon became apparent that the necessary framework for such an undertaking was simply nowhere to be found in the literature. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, a general lack of significant feminist reconstructive contributions to the field was readily felt as a severe limitation. In the context of gendered nation-states, deconstructed binarism alone failed to produce the necessary tools to proceed on firm methodological and theoretical ground. Quite honestly, the bulk of the effort in this paper preceded the empirical section. It was deemed more important.

Empirical conclusions. There is no doubt that Finland is a feminine state and that the U.S. and the former USSR demonstrated strong masculine traits. It was, however, fascinating to reevaluate a piece of history in these terms. It became obvious that Finland actively exported the image of femininity, but saw it as a virtue, not as a fundamental weakness. In the beginning, rather than gaining respect abroad, Finland's efforts at bridge-building, good neighborliness, confidence-building and the like were overshadowed by the stigma of Finlandization. The fact that she was militarily impotent due to Paris Peace Treaty limitations after a horrible World War II defeat contributed to the image of a weak security leech. Finland's peripheral location, its neutrality policy, cradle-to-grave social welfare system and small size were also key factors. However, the very properties that drew criticism are now viewed as progressive, integrative assets as the EU accelerates its unification. These include cooperation, military transparency, open borders, full disclosure, compromise, coalition-building, peace-brokering diplomacy, parliamentarianism, free trade, empathy, restraint and non-aggression. Finland's attempts at redefining security, territoriality, sovereignty and power have historically been remarkably similar to current postmodern feminist approaches. This not only reveals the depth of Finnish femininity, but it also shows that her vision is directly relevant today.

Metatheoretical conclusions. The bottom line: gender works as a category of analysis and thinking of states and gendered entities acting upon gender deontics reaps its own rewards. In the postmodern sense, this launches prevailing discourse into new territory, because it deconstructs *and* reconstructs. Additionally, not only does it mean a more gender-sensitive academic, intellectual and professional array of environments, but it also makes gender a real contender with class and race as a legitimate point of departure for social scientific inquiry. When this happens, power can—conceptually at least—be expressed in terms other than violence, domination and war. Who knows, maybe a more feminine world wouldn't be so bad after all.

Appendices

Appendix A: Development assistance (feminine indicator)

FOREIGN AID CONTRIBUTIONS, SELECTED COUNTRIES ¹										
Rank ODA % of GNP	COUNTRY	ODA ² million \$	ODA % of GNP	Share in Total OECD ODA 1995/94 %	Annual Average % change in volume 1989/90-1994/95	Grant Element % of ODA commitments	Multi-lateral Aid % of ODA	Grants by NGOs ³ % of GNP	Total Resource Flows % of GNP	COUNTRY
1	Denmark	1,623	0.96	2.6	3.4	100.0	44.9	0.03 ^b	1.07	Denmark
2	Norway	1,244	0.87	2.0	1.1	99.2	27.1	0.12 ^b	1.06	Norway
3	Netherlands	3,226	0.81	4.9	-0.8	99.7	30.4	0.08 ^b	1.71	Netherlands
4	Sweden	1,704	0.77	3.0	-1.8	100.0	30.2	0.07 ^b	0.98	Sweden
5	France	8,443	0.55	14.3	0.9	91.8	23.9	0.02 ^b	0.83	France
6	Canada	2,067	0.38	3.7	-0.6	99.4	33.0	0.05 ^b	0.86	Canada
6	Luxembourg	65	0.36	0.1	14.4	100.0	34.2	0.03 ^b	0.40	Luxembourg
7	Belgium	1,034	0.38	1.5	-3.9	99.5	53.0	0.02 ^b	-0.09	Belgium
7	Switzerland	1,084	0.34	1.7	3.0	100.0	28.1	0.06 ^b	0.29	Switzerland
8	Australia	1,194	0.36	1.9	2.5	100.0	22.4	0.02 ^b	0.76	Australia
9	Austria	767	0.33	1.2	9.3	89.5	27.0	0.02 ^b	0.39	Austria
10	Finland ⇐	388	0.32	0.6	-14.5	99.0	43.3	..	0.53	⇒Finland
11	Germany	7,524	0.31	12.1	-0.9	91.4	36.0	0.05 ^b	0.88	Germany
12	Ireland	153	0.29	0.2	17.4	100.0	42.7	0.12 ^b	0.46	Ireland
13	Japan	14,489	0.28	23.4	0.2	82.3	28.1	..	0.82	Japan
13	UK	3,157	0.28	5.4	1.8	97.1	47.1	0.05 ^b	1.39	UK
14	Portugal	271	0.27	0.5	8.3	100.0	33.9	0.00 ^b	0.32	Portugal
15	Spain	1,348	0.24	2.2	10.1	92.1	39.5	0.03 ^b	0.29	Spain
16	New Zealand	123	0.23	0.2	2.7	100.0	20.9	0.03 ^b	0.31	New Zealand
17	Italy	1,623	0.15	3.7	-9.7	97.4	50.4	0.01 ^b	0.26	Italy
18	Greece ⁴	152	0.13 ^a	0.1	82.3	Greece ⁴
19	USA ⇐	7,367	0.10	14.6	-4.4	97.5	23.8	0.04	0.66	⇒USA
20	Turkey ⁴	96	0.07 ^a	Turkey ⁴
21	Korea ⁴	116	0.03 ^a	0.1	9.1	29.1	38.4	..	0.44	Korea ⁴

.. not available ¹ Available data for DAC members and other OECD countries ² ODA (Official Development Assistance) ³ NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations) ⁴ Non-DAC members ^a Including aid to Eastern Europe ^b 1994. This table has been modified from the source. Source: "OECD in Figures—Aid," OECD at URL www.oecd.org/publications/figures/aid.html on May 17, 1998.

Appendix B: Military spending (masculine indicator)

MILITARY EXPENDITURE (ME) AS PERCENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (CGE)			
COUNTRY	RANK	% ME/CGE	COUNTRY
United Arab Emirates	6	38.4	United Arab Emirates
Burma	7	37.5	Burma
China-Taiwan	8	34.8	China-Taiwan
Oman	10	33.9	Oman
Croatia	12	32.0	Croatia
Sierra Leone	14	28.9	Sierra Leone
Kuwait	18	25.5	Kuwait
Singapore	22	24.0	Singapore
Jordan	24	21.7	Jordan
Haiti	25	21.6	Haiti
Israel	26	21.1	Israel
China-Mainland	28	18.5	China-Mainland
Ecuador	30	18.3	Ecuador
Turkey	32	17.6	Turkey
Chile	33	17.5	Chile
USA ⇐	34	17.4	⇒USA
Cyprus	35	17.1	Cyprus
Gambia, The	39	16.2	Gambia, The
Colombia	40	16.2	Colombia
Sri Lanka	43	15.7	Sri Lanka
Thailand	44	15.2	Thailand
Bahrain	45	14.8	Bahrain
Guatemala	47	14.2	Guatemala
Egypt	48	13.7	Egypt
Uganda	52	13.3	Uganda
India	55	12.7	India
Togo	72	10.2	Togo
Peru	78	9.3	Peru
Australia	83	8.8	Australia
UK	94	7.2	UK
France	106	6.6	France
Bulgaria	110	6.3	Bulgaria
Venezuela	111	6.2	Venezuela
Fiji	113	6.0	Fiji
Sweden	115	5.8	Sweden
Papua New Guinea	118	5.6	Papua New Guinea
Spain	119	5.6	Spain
Poland	120	5.4	Poland
Nicaragua	121	5.3	Nicaragua
Finland ⇐	123	5.1	⇒Finland

Excerpts above are from a relative ranking of 167 countries in 1995.
Source: "Country Rank in 1995, by Variable" U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) at URL www.acda.gov/wmeat95/wmeatlst.htm (036_044.pdf) on May 17, 1998.

Appendix C: Social welfare 1 (feminine indicator)

SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP, SELECTED COUNTRIES							
Rank	COUNTRY	AVG	1992	1993	1994	1995	COUNTRY
1	Sweden	37.6	38.7	38.2	37.8	35.8	Sweden
2	Finland ⇐	34.3	34.4	35.5	34.7	32.8	⇒Finland
3	Denmark	33.2	32.1	33.3	33.7	33.7	Denmark
4	Netherlands	32.9	32.9	33.4	32.3	—	Netherlands
5	France	30.2	29.2	30.9	30.5	—	France
6	Norway	28.4	29.0	29.1	28.2	27.4	Norway
7	UK	27.6	27.0	27.8	28.1	—	UK
8	Germany	27.4	26.8	27.7	27.7	—	Germany

This table has been modified from the source.
Source: "Facts About Finnish Social Welfare and Health Care 1998," National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES) at URL www.stakes.fi/facts98.pdf on May 18, 1998.

Appendix D: Social welfare 2 (feminine indicator)

SOCIAL WELFARE AS PERCENTAGE OF CGE, SELECTED COUNTRIES		
RANK	COUNTRY	% SW/CGE
1	Sweden	55.9
2	Germany	48.2
3	France	46.4
4	Italy	38.6
5	UK	34.8
6	⇒USA ⇐	28.2

Figures are for 1992.
Source: M. Donald Hancock et al., *Politics in Western Europe*, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993, p. 345.

Appendix E: Women in government (feminine indicator)

WOMEN AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, SELECTED COUNTRIES			
COUNTRY	RANK	% WOMEN	COUNTRY
Liechtenstein	1	40.0	Liechtenstein
Sweden	2	38.1	Sweden
Finland ⇐	3	36.4	⇒Finland
Denmark	4	29.2	Denmark
Luxembourg	5	28.6	Luxembourg
Norway	6	28.6	Norway
Austria	7	23.5	Austria
Netherlands	8	23.5	Netherlands
Ireland	9	21.4	Ireland
Canada	10	18.5	Canada
Spain	11	16.7	Spain
Iceland	12	15.4	Iceland
Switzerland	13	15.4	Switzerland
Slovakia	14	15.0	Slovakia
Australia	15	14.7	Australia
France	16	14.7	France
USA ⇐	17	14.3	⇒USA
Croatia	18	11.5	Croatia
Portugal	19	11.5	Portugal
Belgium	20	11.1	Belgium
Latvia	21	11.1	Latvia
San Marino	22	11.1	San Marino
Germany	23	10.7	Germany
New Zealand	24	9.1	New Zealand
Slovenia	25	9.1	Slovenia
FYROM	26	8.7	FYROM
Poland	27	8.3	Poland
UK	28	8.3	UK
Japan	29	5.9	Japan
Yugoslavia	30	5.9	Yugoslavia
Hungary	31	5.6	Hungary
Albania	32	5.3	Albania
Belarus	33	5.3	Belarus
Bulgaria	34	4.8	Bulgaria
Italy	35	3.6	Italy
Russia	36	2.4	Russia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	—	0.0	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Czech Republic	—	0.0	Czech Republic
Estonia	—	0.0	Estonia
Greece	—	0.0	Greece
Romania	—	0.0	Romania
Ukraine	—	0.0	Ukraine

Source: "Table 6-2," United Nations, at URL www.un.org/Depts/uns/gender/6-2dev.htm on May 18, 1998.

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